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Note on Transliteration and Pronunciation
I	have	utilised	a	modified	system	of	transliterating	Ottoman	Turkish	and	
Arabic proper names and terms as suggested by the International Journal 
of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES). I have chosen not to use diacritical 
markings except for the occasional apostrophy to signify both the ‘ayn’ 
and the hamza. Most Ottoman Turkish proper names and places are spelled 
according to modern Turkish conventions, except for the fact that I have 
maintained	 the	final	 voiced	 consonant	 that	 corresponds	 to	 the	Ottoman	
spelling:	‘Mehmed’	instead	of	‘Mehmet’	and	‘İzmid’	rather	than	‘İzmit’.	
Place names and words that are more familiar to English- language speak-
ers, such as ‘Istanbul’, ‘Beirut’, ‘qadi’, and ‘pasha’ are spelled according 
to common English usage.
The following is a guide to pronouncing certain letters in modern 
Turkish and transliterated Ottoman Turkish:
• c = j, as in ‘jet’




• ö = German oe, as in ‘Goethe’
• ş	=	sh,	as	in	‘short’
• ü = ew, as in ‘ewe’. 
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Preface
When I tell people that I research Ottoman prisons, or better yet, ‘Turkish 
prisons’,	 their	 horrified	 response	 is	 normally	 along	 the	 lines	 of,	 ‘Have	
you seen the movie Midnight Express?’ and often, ‘Have you ever spent 
time in a Turkish prison?’ The truthful answer to both queries is, ‘Yes.’ 
It	was	my	first-	hand	experience	in	an	Ottoman	prison	that	led	me	to	this	
book. In 2002, I spent a few days in Istanbul in the company of a Turkish 
friend. He suggested that we sit and drink tea in one of the poshest hotels 
in the world, the Four Seasons. As we sat, drank, and chatted in the hotel’s 
courtyard, my friend informed me that the hotel was nothing other than a 
former	Ottoman	imperial	prison.	I	was	flabbergasted.	As	I	looked	around	
the courtyard, I noticed the still discernible prison architecture, such as 
its high walls, turrets, and enclosed courtyard. I wondered what the reac-
tion	of	 the	guests	would	be	if	 they	found	out	 the	history	of	 this	edifice.	
Incidentally, the Four Seasons Hotel stands on Tevkifhane Sokak or ‘Jail 
Road’ in the former imperial centre of Ottoman Istanbul, right between the 
Blue	Mosque,	Aya	Sofya	(Hagia	Sophia),	and	the	Topkapı	Sarayı.
Upon learning the former life of this hotel my interest was immediately 
peaked.	I	had	recently	finished	Michel	Foucault’s	Discipline and Punish 
and I knew that the historiography for prisons in North America and 
Europe was robust, but I had no idea what the current state of the scholar-
ship was for the Ottoman Empire. I quickly found out that it was sorely 
underdeveloped and included only a few short articles on related topics 
and a couple of MA theses, all in Turkish.
While researching in the Imperial Ottoman Archives in Istanbul I found 
a treasure trove of untapped documents related to penal institutions and 
prison reform in the late Ottoman Empire. I quickly realised how inte-
gral criminal justice reforms, including prisons, were to Ottoman plans 
to restructure the empire comprehensively. I also recognised that prisons 
were intrinsic to many facets of Ottoman modernity and nation- state con-
struction during the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.
Similar to Foucault’s assessment of French prisons, I argue that various 
late Ottoman administrations utilised prisons as important instruments of 
social control and discipline. The primary purpose of penal institutions is 
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to	control	and	discipline	the	population,	specifically	those	portions	of	the	
population deemed threats to regime security. My argument, however, 
goes far beyond Foucault’s. Not only were they important instruments of 
social control and discipline, but prisons became microcosms of Ottoman 
modernity. It was within the walls of Ottoman prisons that many of the 
pressing questions of Ottoman modernity played out, such as administra-
tive reform and centralisation, the role of punishment in the rehabilitation 
of prisoners, economic reform and industrialisation, issues of gender and 
childhood, the implementation of modern concepts of time and space, 
identity, social engineering, the rationalisation and standardisation of 
Islamic criminal law, and the role of the state in caring for its population. 
These are all in addition to social control and discipline. Prisons, therefore, 
possess the unique ability to act as windows into the process of Ottoman 
modernity and provide clear insights into broader socio- economic, politi-
cal, cultural, and ideological issues and developments occurring in late 
Ottoman history throughout its entire empire. In the end, this is not a 
book about ‘Turkish’ prisons, but a book concerned with a prison system 
that encompassed all the territories of the former Ottoman Empire during 
the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries: from Yemen to the 
Balkans and from Van to Beirut.
While this work utilises prisons as a window into Ottoman modernity, 
it also juxtaposes reform and intention with the reality of incarceration 
from the points of view of inmates and local prison personnel. Too much 
of Ottoman history is written and conceptualised from the perspective of 
the central state. This history tempers the grand transformational designs 
of	 Tanzimat,	 Hamidian,	 and	 Second	 Constitutional	 Period	 reformers	
with the realities of prison life. In other words, it discusses the intended 
reforms, investigates their implementation, and discusses the acceptance, 
success, failure, resistance, and augmentation they faced through the 
stories and experiences of prison guards and prisoners.
As I delved deeper into my research on Ottoman prisons I realised just 
how intertwined prisons were with larger issues of crime, policing, courts, 
legal reform, and criminal justice in the empire. Unfortunately, this study 
is neither comprehensive, nor exhaustive. In the end, I have only scratched 
the surface of the rich sources available for the study of Ottoman criminal 
justice. Excellent work is being done on other facets of this subject that 
need to be integrated into a more comprehensive picture. My work is 
simply an initial interpretive foray into this vast and understudied topic in 
Ottoman and Middle East history. My hope is that this work spurs fruitful 
discussion, constructive criticism, and further enquiry.
An earlier version of portions of Chapter 3 was presented as a paper, 
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entitled	 ‘Conceptualizing	 Difference	 during	 the	 Second	 Constitutional	
Period: New Sources, Old Challenges’, at the Swedish Research Institute 
in Istanbul and published in Religion, Ethnicity and Contested Nationhood 
in the Former Ottoman Space, edited by Jorgen Nielsen (2012). Another 
small portion of Chapter 3 was published as an article, entitled ‘Identity 
in the Ottoman Prison Surveys of 1912 and 1914’, in IJMES, volume 41 
(2009). A third portion of Chapter 3 was presented as a paper, entitled 
‘Counting the Incarcerated: Young Turk Attempts to Systematically 
Collect Prison Statistics and their Effects of Prison Reform, 1911–1918’ at 
Boğazici	University	in	Istanbul	and	was	published	in	Turkish	as	‘Tutuklu	
Sayımı:	 Jön	 Türklerin	 Sistematik	 Bir	 şekilde	 Hapishane	 İstatistikleri	
Toplama	Çalışmaları	ve	Bunların	1911–1918	Hapishane	Reformu	Üzerine	
Etkileri’ in Osmanlı’da Asayiş, Suç ve Ceza: 18.–20. Yüzyıllar, edited 
by Noémi Lévy and Alexandre Toumarkine (2007). Portions of the 
discussion on theoretical approaches to the study of penal institutions 
found in the Introduction to this book were also published in Turkish, 
entitled	 ‘Hapishaneler	ve	Cezalandırmaya	 İlişkin	Yaklaşımlara	Eleştirel	




the images found on the book cover and in Figures 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 
and 4.4.
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care, assistance, support, and friendship.
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assistance.
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In	 1851	 and	 again	 in	 1918–19	British	 officials	 assigned	 to	 the	Ottoman	
Empire conducted extensive inspections of the empire’s prisons and drew 
up detailed reports of what they found. Notwithstanding their imperialist and 
orientalist undertones, these reports describe Ottoman prisons as being in a 
serious state of disrepair.1 Stratford Canning, the famous British Ambassador 
to the Ottoman Empire, commissioned the 1851 inspections with the intent 
to assist the Ottomans in reforming their criminal justice system. He ordered 
British	Foreign	Office	 representatives	 stationed	 throughout	 the	 empire	 to	
undertake a comprehensive inspection of prisons in order to ascertain their 
deficiencies	and	to	report	back	to	him.	Canning	justified	prison	improvement	
and inspection according to civilisational principles:
But in the present advanced state of human knowledge and public opinion no 
government which respects itself and claims a position among civilised com-
munities can shut its eyes to the abuses which prevail. Or to the horrors which 
past ages may have left in that part of its administration which separate the 
repression of crime and the personal constraint of the guilty or the accused.2
The inspection questionnaire consisted of thirty questions requesting a 
variety of information on many aspects of the empire’s prisons in every 
major	urban	centre.	Questions	 included	 the	number	of	prisoners,	prison	
dimensions and layout, living conditions, hygiene and health concerns, 
rations, prison routines, prison cadre conduct, and governmental funding. 
The comprehensive nature of the questionnaire is quite impressive, as 
are the reports that were subsequently generated, which overwhelmingly 
demonstrate the poor state of Ottoman prison conditions.3 After the British 
Embassy	 in	 Istanbul	 received	 the	 inspection	 results,	 officials	 drafted	 a	
summary report containing multiple suggestions for the general improve-
ment of prisons throughout the empire and submitted it directly to the 
‘Sultan’s	confidential	advisors’.	The	majority	of	the	suggested	improve-
ments referred to health and hygiene issues, living conditions, facility 
repair, and prison regimens.4
Shortly after the unconditional surrender of the Ottomans to the 
Entente	powers	ending	World	War	I	(WWI),	British	officials	conducted	
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a series of inspections of Istanbul’s prisons in the period of late 1918 and 
early 1919 and found prisons to be in a similar state to the state detailed in 
the 1851 inspections.5 There are four striking features of the second set of 
reports. First, inspectors paint a dreadful picture of the state of Istanbul’s 
prisons, including note of widespread disease, malnutrition, poor sanita-
tion, rampant prison cadre neglect, abuse of prisoners, and corruption. 
Second, the reports display a deep bias for incarcerated Christians vis- 
à- vis their Muslim counterparts; the British inspectors express a greater 
concern for the welfare of Christian inmates even though all prisoners 
suffered similarly from the poor conditions. Third, the reports exude 
the British inspectors’ absolute contempt for ‘Turks’. Fourth, two of the 
British	 military	 officers	 (Commander	 Heathcote-	Smith	 and	 Lieutenant	
Palmer) tasked with conducting the initial inspections and reporting their 
findings	 clearly	 express	 an	 ulterior	 motive	 regarding	 the	 potential	 use	
of these reports. They suggested that the reports be added to a number 
of other documents in preparation for the Paris Peace Conference and 
utilised to achieve three of Britain’s post- war goals: that is, being used 
to justify British calls for the abrogation of ‘Turkish sovereignty in 
Constantinople’; being used to substantiate further the disallowance of 
‘Turkish	 independence	 in	Anatolia’;	 and,	 finally,	 being	 used	 as	 propa-
ganda to dampen pro- Ottoman sentiments among Muslims in India. In 
fact,	 one	British	official	 felt	 ‘certain	 that	 if	 the	 Indian	population	were	
instructed systematically as to the real truth concerning the Turk and all 
his ways, we should hear little more of their sympathy for him’. In fact, he 
suggested that ‘some judicious propaganda’ should be distributed in India 
in order to achieve this aim.6
Notwithstanding the sixty- eight year gap between the two sets of 
inspections and their different purposes, both resulted in reports that 
exposed the dire state of Ottoman prisons, especially in the areas of health, 
hygiene, sanitation, administration, corruption and abuse, nutrition, cloth-
ing, and the general state and condition of the facilities. Anyone reading 
these reports and even remotely familiar with the extensive reform pro-
grammes undertaken by various Ottoman administrations over the course 
of the nineteenth century would conclude that prisons had been com-
pletely ignored. These two British prison reports, however, do not reveal 
the extensive Ottoman expenditures in time, energy, money, and human 
capital	 spent	 over	 the	final	 eighty	years	 of	 the	 empire’s	 existence	–	 all	
with the goal of overhauling its prisons and creating a modern criminal 
justice system comparable with contemporary states in Europe, Asia, and 
the Americas.
Instead, these reports reinforce assumptions about Ottoman prisons 
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Introduction
all too familiar to Western audiences. The topic of Ottoman or better yet 
‘Turkish’ prisons inevitably produces particular visceral reactions and 
conjures	 up	 certain	 horrific	 images	 that	 usually	 centre	 on	 three	 things:	
brutal sexual abuse, narcotics, and torture. Oliver Stone’s Midnight 
Express	emblazoned	this	‘Anglo-	American	Orientalist’	image	of	Turkish	
prisons upon our minds.7 However, even Lawrence of Arabia and com-
edies such as Airplane and The Simpsons reinforce these stereotypes. 
Western accounts of Turkish venality and barbarity are legend, especially 
regarding prisons and the treatment of the incarcerated. These fables and 
stories are rife with salacious tales of torture and indiscriminate cruelty 
that say more about Western fears and fantasies regarding its medieval 
and early- modern past than about actual circumstances within Ottoman 
prisons.8 Stereotypes aside, Ottoman prison conditions are, in fact, com-
parable to those found in supposedly more ‘enlightened’ and ‘civilised’ 
countries in Western Europe and North America during the long nine-
teenth century (1770s–1922).9
Unfortunately, such stereotypes hinder serious academic inquiry into 
Ottoman penal institutions, particularly concerning their role in modern 
state formation in the late Ottoman Empire and the actual lived experi-
ences of the incarcerated. As a result, scholars have produced very few 
academic works investigating Ottoman prisons, penal institutions, the 
empire’s criminal justice system, or the everyday lives of non- political 
prisoners. Apart from two monographs, an edited volume, and several 
master’s theses (all in Turkish), and a few English- language articles on 
general prison reform and conditions in the broader Middle East, a large 
lacuna exists in the scholarly work done on Ottoman and Middle Eastern 
prisons. In fact, none of these works treats Ottoman prison reform during 
the long nineteenth century from both an imperial and a local perspec-
tive. Most are limited in scope to a particular time period and a particular 
region, and only a few go beyond basic descriptions of archival documents 
and apply important interdisciplinary theoretical and methodological 
approaches.10
This study focuses on the transformation of the Ottoman crimi-
nal justice system, particularly prisons and incarceration, during the 
late Ottoman Empire (c. 1840–1922) with an emphasis on the Second 
Constitutional Period (1908–18). First, it demonstrates the interconnected 
relationship between the development of modern penal institutions and 
state construction in the late Ottoman Empire. Second, this study attempts 
to link prisons and punishment more broadly with the creation of a modern 
criminal	 justice	 system	 defined	 by	 the	 codification	 of	 Islamic	 criminal	
law, the establishment of criminal courts, and more intrusive policing 
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and  surveillance during the long nineteenth century. Third, it argues that 
prisons act as effective windows into broader state and societal develop-
ments within the empire during this era of reform. This era, however, is 
better characterised as one of transformation centred on continuity and 
change rather than a rupture imposed by the West. It was within the walls 
of these prisons that many of the pressing questions of Ottoman modernity 
played out. Bureaucrats addressed issues related to administrative reform 
and centralisation, the rationalisation of Islamic criminal law and punish-
ment, the role of labour in the rehabilitation of prisoners, economic devel-
opment and industrialisation, gender and childhood, the implementation 
of modern concepts of time and space, issues of national identity based 
on ethnicity and religion, social engineering, and the increased role of the 
state in caring for its population. In other words, prisons are microcosms 
of imperial transformation and exemplify a distinctive Ottoman modernity 
created by the spread of capitalist market relations and the application of 
modern	methods	of	governance	within	a	specific	Ottoman	context.	Fourth,	
this study pushes theoretical models and methodological approaches 
to penal institutions beyond Michel Foucault’s depiction of prisons as 
modern instrumentalities of governance for social control and discipline. 
It does so by looking at the competing ideological, social, economic, and 
practical concerns affecting prison reform and realities on the ground. 
Fifth, and most importantly, this study looks at prisons on both a local and 
an imperial level, thus integrating top- down and bottom- up approaches to 
historical inquiry in order to juxtapose reform and reality. This is accom-
plished by looking at the centre’s reform programmes, intentions, and 
actions in conjunction with an appraisal of the effectiveness of implemen-
tation and mitigated by recourse to the lived experiences of prisoners and 
local cadre in order to ascertain compliance, resistance, and augmentation 
to these reforms. This approach is very important in order to overcome 
the state- centric bias that studies of Ottoman imperial reform generally 
produce. Finally, this volume adds an additional voice to the bourgeon-
ing scholarship, arguing that the development of the modern Middle East 
and South- eastern Europe must be situated in the late Ottoman Empire 
as a result of an internally devised and implemented response to inter-
nal	 concerns	 and	 European	 imperialism.	More	 specifically,	 the	 Second	
Constitutional Period needs to be viewed as the culmination of transfor-
mation that left an important inheritance to the region. It is frequently 
portrayed as the last gasp of a dying empire waiting to expire at the hands 




‘Modernity’ is a highly contested theoretical concept whose academic 
efficacy	 has	 been	 debated	 extensively.11 It is not the purpose of this 
section to provide a detailed account of the development of this concept, 
its relationship to modernisation theory, and its problematic nature. Other 
works have already effectively accomplished this task.12 For the purposes 
of this study, modernity is both a ‘mood’ and a ‘socio- cultural construct’. 
It is a mood insomuch as it is a powerful assumption about the supposed 
superior nature of the ‘modern’ world as compared to a ‘traditional’ one 
characterised as backward, irrational, superstitious, undemocratic, reli-
gious, and/or anti- individualistic. Modernity is a socio- cultural construct 
insomuch as its emphasis lies in its institutional, social, and economic par-
ticularities that have come to dominate the contemporary era, for example, 
capitalist market relations, an expanding and increasingly integrated world 
economy, new technologies, new methods of governance, the nation- state, 
and nationalism.13 Several scholars have recently critiqued this concept 
and applied it to Ottoman and Middle Eastern contexts.14 In this study, 
especially for the reformers and nation- state builders of the late Ottoman 
Empire, ‘modernity’ was both a ‘mood’ and a ‘socio- cultural construct’. It 
dominated their ideological and tangible goals of centralising, standardis-
ing, and rationalising administrative, economic, military, and social power 
within the hands of the state in order to preserve the empire’s territorial 
and administrative integrity.
Penal institutions, including prisons and policing, not only facilitate 
the development of states, but they also act as windows into the process 
of	modernity	and	its	effects	on	a	specific	cultural	and	historical	context.	
While modernity is a global phenomenon that is comparative across the 
world	during	 the	recent	past,	 it	 is	also	uniquely	specific	 to	each	region.	
The spread of capitalist market relations and the implementation of new 
methods of governance were not progressively uniform throughout the 
world. In many cases, different regions experienced the effects of these 
phenomena	 haphazardly	 and	 often	 in	 fits	 and	 starts.	 Various	 regions	
‘blended’ these global processes with their own administrative and eco-
nomic systems, cultural traditions, and ways of life in very unique ways. 
Each region, therefore, created distinct modernities that are globally 
 comparable on some levels, but also cultural and historically unique on 
others. Ottoman, British, Japanese, or American modernities all possess 
similarities,	but	also	exhibit	peculiarities	specific	to	their	historical	con-
texts and development. None represents an authentic or original form of 
modernity that was then copied and exported around the world.15 This 
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view of modernity allows for comparison between the development 
and use of penal institutions among other modernising states during 
this era. The Ottoman experience of modern state construction and its 
particular use of penal institutions, therefore, should not be construed as 
Westernisation. Instead, the blending of global practices, such as admin-
istrative centralisation, rationalisation, and standardisation with Ottoman 
bureaucratic practices produced an entirely new dynamic. This blending, 
culminating in the creation of an Ottoman criminal justice system and 
modern penal institutions, is the central focus of this study.
Approaches to Prisons and Incarceration
As mentioned above, there exists a very limited scholarly literature on 
punishment and penal institutions for the Ottoman Empire. The vast 
majority of academic work on this topic consists of descriptive, close 
readings of state archival documents. They are very state- centric and 
decree- oriented studies that often do not follow the reforms through to 
their implementation or lack thereof. The few works that approach prisons 
theoretically tend also to utilise an overly state- centric approach that 
is closely informed by Michel Foucault’s work. Foucault’s approaches 
provide wonderful insights into penal institutions and state- society power 
relationships, however, if imposed heavy- handed the result is a severely 
limiting interpretation. These limitations shall be discussed in greater 
detail below. This investigation of prisons and punishment in the Ottoman 
Empire draws upon an eclectic and interdisciplinary array of theoretical 
and methodological approaches, the core of which comes from the social 
sciences and attempts to integrate socio- legal and Foucaldian analytical 
frameworks, history from below, David Garland’s concept of ‘overdeter-
mination’, and the debates surrounding modernity into a coherent inter-
pretive	apparatus	 that	explicates	 the	complexities	of	a	specific	Ottoman	
modernity and the role that prisons and punishment played therein. This 
nuanced approach to prisons and punishment traces its roots to studies 
of penal institutions in other world regions during the long nineteenth 
century, namely Western Europe and North America, as well as Latin 
America, Russia, and other regions in Asia.16 This literature contains a 
wealth of theoretical and methodological approaches that can provide an 
appropriate foray into the Ottoman world through judicious selection and 
application.
European and North American penal historiography can be broken up 
into four major groups in terms of methodology and theoretical approach: 
Durkheimian, Marxist, neo- Marxist, and Foucauldian. Besides eighteenth- 
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and nineteenth- century prison reform literature and treatises by John 
Howard, Alexis de Tocqueville, G. Beaumont, Baron de Montesquieu, 
and Jeremy Bentham,17	 one	 of	 the	 first	 scholars	 to	 investigate	 crime,	
punishment, and penality was the renowned sociologist Émile Durkheim. 
He wrote three important works dealing with crime, punishment, and 
penality.18 His theoretical and methodological approach to punishment is 
closely associated with his sociological theories of society, especially his 
concept of the ‘conscience collective’. The ‘conscience collective’ is the 
sum total of the morals, values, and shared identity found within a society 
that governs its laws, actions, and attitudes and helps to create a bond of 
solidarity among its population.19 Durkheim viewed punishment as ‘an 
index of society’s invisible moral bonds’ where its values are constantly 
expressed and reproduced. These rituals of punishment act as windows 
into society itself.20 To Durkheim, punishment also demonstrates society’s 
emotional reaction and need to extract revenge for a violation of its norms 
and mores. It is this irrational emotional response to crime that helps re- 
establish the balance and solidarity that must exist in a society in order for 
it to function properly.21
Durkheim’s methodological approach to punishment makes a tremen-
dous contribution to penal studies, because it connects penal practices, 
laws, institutions, and acts of punishment with society’s morals and 
values. He demonstrates the importance of analysing the relationship of 
penal institutions to public sentiment, how moral solidarity creates pun-
ishment	practices,	and	how	these	practices	reaffirm	societal	solidarity.22 
Durkheim’s methodology, however, treats the ‘conscience collective’ as 
if it is an uncontested fact of social life. He never accounts for the ideo-
logical struggles that are associated with a society’s morality, nor does he 
acknowledge that any society’s moral order or legal system is a contested 
and constantly negotiated process. In fact, legal regulations or systems 
represent a compromise of various and diffuse ‘conscience collectives’ 
within a given society and do not equate in a one- to- one ratio with a soci-
ety’s collective morality.23
The	 Marxist	 approach	 to	 crime	 and	 punishment,	 as	 exemplified	 by	
George Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer’s Punishment and Social Structure, 
centres on the ruling elite’s relationship to the means of production and its 
desire to preserve and strengthen its hold on power.24 Penal practices and 
institutions are held to be economically determined since the key dynamic 
in history and society is class struggle, which, in turn, drives social change 
and gives shape to concrete institutions. The ruling class creates these 
institutions, such as schools, the military, and the criminal justice system, 
to quell political opposition, promote its social and economic interests, 
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preserve the status quo, and legitimate its domination over subordinate 
classes.25 A society’s particular mode of production, be it feudal, capital-
ist, or Asiatic, determines the amount of corporeal punishment meted out 
to the offender. This approach successfully highlights the relationship 
between economic interests and the existence, function, and purposes of 
penal institutions. Its myopic economic determinism, however, ignores a 
host of other factors that shape penal institutions and practices, many of 
which have nothing to do with economics. These include the importance 
of ideology and political forces in determining penal policy, popular 
support for penal practices among the lower classes, and penal reform dis-
course based on humanitarian arguments, judicial rhetoric, or the dynamic 
negotiation between penal legislation and practice. Marxist approaches to 
penality, however, dismiss these factors as irrelevant.26
The neo- Marxist approach as epitomised by David Rothman and 
Michael Ignatieff is much more nuanced than the traditional Marxist 
approach.27 It continues to view punishment and penal institutions as a 
means of social control by the ruling class over lower classes, but it also 
investigates	state	power,	law	and	legal	practices,	cultural	influences,	and	
ideology. The ruling class needs this ‘superstructure’ in order for it to 
maintain its economic dominance.28 The strengths of the neo- Marxist 
approach are found in its historicisation of the emergence of penal insti-
tutions	from	specific	social,	cultural,	political,	and	economic	contexts.	It	
asserts that penal policies and institutions are not a result of a monolithic 
process determined simply by one’s relationship to the means of produc-
tion, but are instead a result of multiple forces and determinants, which 
are	both	conflicting	and	concurring	in	any	specific	historical	conjuncture.	
Unfortunately, neo- Marxism still makes penal institutions and policies a 
result of one’s relationship to the mode of production and class interests 
in the ‘last instance’. It still assumes that penal policy debates, which are 
often motivated by issues other than class interests or economics, such as 
humanitarian,	religious,	or	scientific	concerns,	are	still	‘constrained	by	the	
structures of social power and the invisible pressures of the dominant class 
culture’.29
Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish	exemplifies	the	Foucauldian	
methodological approach to penality and penal institutions. The central 
purpose of this work is to explain the disappearance of punishment as 
a public spectacle of violence against the body and to account for the 
emergence of prisons and incarceration as the normative form of modern 
punishment in France. His argument centres on how power interacts with 
knowledge through technologies of discipline and surveillance in order to 
gain increased social control by one societal class over another. This rela-
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tionship between power and knowledge delineates the parameters within 
which all societal relations and social institutions function. The prison and 
other institutions of social control, as well as the techniques of discipline 
and surveillance, are direct products of this power and knowledge rela-
tionship.	Foucault’s	argument	treats	class	conflict	and	economic	determin-
ism	as	superficial	reasons	for	achieving	social	control.	Punishment	 then	
becomes a ‘political tactic’ used to exercise power over the body. Similar 
to all institutions, penal institutions utilise systems of production, domi-
nation, and socialisation to subjugate and render the body docile, malle-
able, and self- disciplining.30 Foucault’s argument has made an invaluable 
contribution to the study of penality. It elucidates the relationship between 
power and knowledge, how techniques of discipline and surveillance 
increase power, how power is exercised through these new technologies, 
and the effects that these new technologies have upon individuals in terms 
of control.
Foucault’s approach and methodology, unfortunately, remains in the 
realm of the ideal. Discipline and Punish bases much of its argument 
upon Jeremy Bentham’s theoretical reform plans, especially the prison 
panopticon design. To Foucault, Bentham’s panopticon represents the 
ultimate example of exercising knowledge and power to gain maximum 
control over the inmate’s body and soul. Bentham’s panopticon, however, 
remained in the conceptual realm. His grand scheme never materialised 
as a physical, operating penitentiary in any European country. Foucault 
never acknowledges this important point. As Rothman points out, ‘for 
Foucault, motive mattered more than practice. Let public authorities for-
mulate a programme or announce a goal, and he presumed its realisation. 
He mistook fantasy for reality.’31 Granted Foucault’s argument is not 
solely focused on the establishment of these mechanisms of power or their 
physical manifestation, but on what these new technologies and practices 
tell us about intent and ideology. However, if such an important design as 
Bentham’s panopticon was never realised, does not this fact reveal impor-
tant insights into a society’s sensibilities towards punishment?
Foucault’s argument also denies agency to those who are the objects 
of these new technologies of power. He does not afford them the ability 
to resist and alter the intended outcomes of these practices. In Foucault’s 
account of penal institutions and practices, he never discusses how resist-
ance undermines and augments the effects that these tactics were supposed 
to produce within a ‘total institution’, such as the penitentiary.32 Patricia 
O’Brien demonstrates how prison subcultures in nineteenth- century 
French	 penitentiaries	 defied	 penal	 institutions’	 idealised	 instrumentali-
ties of discipline, surveillance, and social control through various actions, 
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including tattooing, covert communications, bribing guards, and prosti-
tution. These actions undermined many of the tactics utilised by penal 
institutions to control and rehabilitate the criminal. As a result, resistance 
often leads to the development of more effective techniques of discipline 
and control.33
Foucault’s argument, in many cases, is also ahistorical. He makes it 
perfectly clear that he is not a historian, but a philosopher. His eclectic 
style, incredible explanatory power, and quasi- historical approach all 
make him very popular with academics aspiring to be interdisciplinary 
in their theoretical approaches. In many cases, he attempts to universal-
ise his claims, when in reality his studies are centred on modern France. 
He also claims that all systems, functions, decisions, morals, and actions 
within any society are fundamentally based upon control with power as its 
primary determinant. This is simply replacing Marx’s all- encompassing 
economic determinant with a different one, which in turn ignores the 
numerous countervailing forces that attempt to protect human rights, 
extend freedoms, and improve living conditions and prisoner quality of 
life. He also ignores the political and practical decision- making proc-
esses, including budgetary restraints that act to limit the effective use of 
discipline and surveillance in controlling the prisoner’s body and mind. 
Finally, Foucault’s approach to prisons as examples of the modern state’s 
dominance over society incorrectly draws an impenetrable barrier between 
these	two	reified	entities.	Foucault	portrays	power	as	flowing	unidirection-
ally from the state to society when in reality the divide between the two is 
actually porous, convoluted, and constantly shifting through negotiation 
and	conflict.34
Each of these four approaches is useful for limited inquiries into spe-
cific	areas	of	punishment	and	prisons.	Also	each	one	effectively	focuses	
upon a particular aspect of penality and provides important insights into 
the overall picture of the prison as a complex social institution. All of 
these approaches, however, treat incarceration and prisons in a vacuum. 
None of them integrate prisons into their broader context, namely the 
development of modern systems of criminal justice.
In contrast, this study attempts to place incarceration and prisons within 
a broader context of criminal justice by demonstrating the interconnected 
nature of policing, criminal codes, courts, and incarceration. It also makes 
use of a more comprehensive approach to the study of penality along 
the lines of what David Garland calls a ‘multidimensional interpretative 
approach, which sees punishment as an overdetermined, multifaceted 
social institution’.35 This approach views penal institutions as ‘social 
artifacts’ that embody and regenerate wider cultural categories and serve 
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as a means of achieving particular penological ends. Similar to architec-
ture, clothing, or diet, punishment cannot be explained by its instrumental 
purpose alone, but must also take into account its cultural style, historical 
tradition, and dependence upon institutional, technical, and discursive 
conditions. Punishment is a legal institution, administered by the state, 
but it is also grounded in wider patterns of knowing, feeling, and acting 
that depend upon these social roots and supports for its continuing legiti-
macy and operation. It is also grounded in history, similar to all social 
institutions; modern punishment is a historical outcome that is imperfectly 
adapted to its current situation. It is a product of tradition as much as 
present	policy.	There	are	many	conflicting	logics	that	go	into	punishment	
in any given society. Similar to all social institutions, punishment shapes 
its environment as much as it is shaped by it. Penal sanctions and institu-
tions	are	not	simply	dependent	variables	at	the	end	of	some	finite	line	of	
social causation. Punishment interacts with its environment, forming part 
of	the	mutually	constructing	configuration	of	elements	that	make	up	the	
social world.36
Building off Garland’s notion that prisons are ‘social institutions’, 
this study investigates punishment and prisons utilising a socio- legal 
approach. According to Avi Rubin, the sociolegal approach is:
an interpretive framework that explores the law as an aspect of social rela-
tions. As such, it offers a starting point for formulating a new set of questions 
and methodologies for understanding Ottoman legal change in the context of 
modernity . . . it is not the laws or codes of any given society that form the focus 
of sociolegal analysis but rather, the detailed, varied practices and meaning that 
constitute legal systems and that may not be studied in isolation from key social 
and cultural developments.37
In other words, for this study the socio- legal approach looks at norma-
tive laws, regulations, and reforms together with the actual lived experi-
ences of both prison cadre and inmates. This approach moves far beyond 
Foucault’s focus on the ideal of social control and discipline by incorpo-
rating the reality of Ottoman incarceration in the age of modernity.
Book Outline
This study weaves together six intersecting themes: 1. Transformation 
through continuity and change as opposed to rupture, 2. A focus by 
reformers on prisoner rehabilitation, 3. Administrative centralisation and 
governmentality, 4. Order and discipline, 5. The creation and expansion 
of the Ottoman ‘nanny state’38 in which the government increasingly 
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assumes greater amounts of responsibility for the welfare of its popula-
tion, and 6. The juxtaposition of prison reform with the reality of prison 
life.	The	first	two	chapters	of	this	study	provide	an	overview	of	Ottoman	
criminal justice practices in the early modern period and their transfor-
mation during the nineteenth century. These two chapters are primarily 
constructed from a state- centric administrative perspective and are meant 
to provide a context for understanding the developments, transformations, 
and experiences of the late Ottoman Empire’s penal reforms and realities. 
Chapters 3 to 6 contrast particular reform efforts with the actual experi-
ences	of	inmates	and	prison	officials	to	investigate	how	these	interactions	
affected reform efforts and everyday life within prisons.
Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of the early modern Ottoman 
legal system and its transformation during the long nineteenth century 
with special emphasis on the creation of a comprehensive criminal justice 
system including policing and surveillance, new courts, penal codes, 
and prisons. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the relationship 
between prisons and the transformation of Ottoman criminal justice, espe-
cially the links between the Imperial Ottoman Penal Code (IOPC) and 
incarceration. This transformation was fully rooted in past legal practices 
while also appropriating and adapting new legal policies from abroad. 
This process of transformation does not represent an Ottoman progressive 
march towards Westernisation and secularisation, but one that consciously 
reinterpreted its Islamic legal system and transformed it through the 
application	of	modern	methods	of	governance,	such	as	legal	codification,	
administrative centralisation, the rationalisation and standardisation of 
legal practice, and the utilisation of incarceration as the primary form of 
punishment for criminal behaviour.
Chapter 2 consists of a general survey of Ottoman prison reform from 
the 1850s until the end of the empire (c. 1919) from a state- centric per-
spective. It pays particular attention to the development of programmes 
and policies, where they originated, the foundations they built for 
 successive reforms, and how these reforms exemplify particular regime 
ideologies and world views. Woven throughout the chapter are the six 
broad themes associated with Ottoman prison reform discussed above in 
order to lay out the major topics of investigation that constitute the book’s 
remaining chapters.
The third chapter investigates Ottoman efforts to gain knowledge and 
power over prisons through the collection of statistical information via 
prison questionnaires and surveys. Not only did these efforts provide 
invaluable knowledge about prison conditions and the prison population, 
but they also yield important insights into the ideology and world view 
13
Introduction
of prison reformers. This chapter also includes a discussion of the prison 
population itself, in terms of its socio- economic and religious composition, 
criminality,	and	how	individual	prisoners	were	identified	and	categorised.
Chapter 4 looks closely at prison conditions and structure, particularly 
in terms of organising the prison population according to crimes commit-
ted, convicted or accused, age, and gender. This chapter investigates the 
everyday life of prisoners, both female and male, their experiences, and the 
conditions of incarceration. Despite the Ottoman Prison Administration’s 
attempts to improve living conditions through assuming responsibility for 
health and hygiene, nutrition, and prisoner rehabilitation, prison condi-
tions remained poor and they remained overcrowded. Nowhere else are 
the limits of reform more evident. Nevertheless, Ottoman reformers still 
made	significant	improvements.
Chapter 5 investigates the Ottoman Prison Administration’s attempts to 
professionalise its prison cadre in order to combat corruption and prisoner 
abuse. Ottoman administrators viewed the prison cadre as linchpins of 
successful prison reform and prisoner rehabilitation. This chapter looks at 
these attempts to reform the prison cadre and its effectiveness in light of 
actual prisoner experiences that reveal a culture of corruption, collusion, 
and exploitation. These relationships concretely demonstrate the blurred 
boundaries between guards and criminals, their power relationships, and 
consequently between state and society.
Chapter 6 delves into Ottoman conceptions of childhood, particularly 
regarding incarcerated minors. During the Second Constitutional Period, 
the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) went to great lengths to 
protect children from serving prison sentences by rationalising the legal 
definition	of	 childhood	and	by	centralising	power	 into	 the	hands	of	 the	
IOPC and the state- run criminal courts. By assuming greater responsi-
bility for the protection of juvenile delinquents, the CUP increased the 
state’s intervention into the private sphere and simultaneously reshaped 
the public sphere.
Finally, the Conclusion returns to the initial British inspections of 
Ottoman prisons discussed in this Introduction in order to re- evaluate 
their	findings	and	place	them	in	the	context	of	a	complete	breakdown	of	
most state functions in the immediate aftermath of WWI. It then draws 
larger conclusions concerning the robust penal reforms undertaken by the 
Ottoman Government during the long nineteenth century and the legacy of 
criminal justice reform and penal practice this left to its successor states in 
the Middle East and South- eastern Europe. Finally, the Conclusion makes 
some initial observations regarding the applicability of studying Ottoman 
penal reform in a comparative global context.
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A Note on Sources
The sources for this book consist primarily of state- centric documents 
from The Prime Ministry’s Ottoman Archives (BOA) in addition to 
Ottoman penal and legal codes. The archival documents are particularly 
rich in terms of extensively detailed statistics collected from every prison 
across the empire, photographs of prisons and prisoners, architectural 
designs, building projects, expenditure reports, and reports on prison 
sanitation and health conditions. Some documents also convey debates 
regarding prisoner nutrition, punishment, rehabilitation, and the condition 
of incarcerated women and children. These documents reveal elaborate 
prison reform programmes, new penal codes, and new prison regulations 
formulated and implemented by reformers that also dealt with larger impe-
rial issues and concerns. This study also utilises interrogation documents 
called istintaknameler.39	These	documents	are	remarkable	sources	reflect-
ing	the	prisoner’s	or	official’s	own	words	about	events	usually	involving	
prisoner abuse, guard–prisoner collusion, and corruption. Unfortunately, 
most	archival	documents	make	 it	very	difficult	 to	capture	 the	voices	of	
ordinary prisoners. Very few prisoners were literate and the vast major-
ity did not leave behind memoirs, letters, or such describing their cir-
cumstances and experiences. This genre of document (state generated) 
presents certain pitfalls and limitations, but if ‘read against the grain’ can 
still offer a window into the subaltern’s world, even if only a glimpse, and 
enable the re- creation of some aspects of their everyday lives that in turn 
assist in adjusting the biased perspective of the state.40
Finally, this book relies on evidence gathered from a variety of libraries 
and the national archives in the Republic of Turkey, the United States, and 
Great Britain. These sources consist of bureaucratic, administrative, and 
diplomatic documents, memoirs, travel volumes, newspapers, journals, 
letters, and statistical records in Arabic, English, French, German, Greek, 
Italian, Russian, Ottoman Turkish, and Turkish. These additional sources 
also help to overcome state- centric bias and provide further insights into 
the lives of everyday prisoners and prison cadre.
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Ottoman Criminal Justice and the Transformation 
of Islamic Criminal Law and Punishment in the 
Age of Modernity, 1839–1922 The Age of Modernity, 1839–1922
Over the course of the long nineteenth century (c. 1770s–1922) the 
Ottoman Empire experienced a series of internal and external crises that 
included	 separatist	 movements,	 rebellions,	 fiscal	 problems,	 numerous	
wars, and European imperialism. In the face of these threats, sultans and 
administrators attempted vigorous plans of reform aimed at transform-
ing the bureaucracy, legal and education systems, economy, population, 
and military. As part of this overall restructuring programme, Ottoman 
statesmen included efforts to create a criminal justice system. Therefore, 
when the Young Turks, led by members of the Committee of Union and 
Progress	 (CUP),	 deposed	Sultan	Abdülhamid	 II	 and	 created	 the	first	 of	
their two major penal institutions in August 1909 (the Directorate of 
Public Security), the association between penal reform and concepts, 
such as civilisation, developmentalism, social engineering, and the cen-
tralisation and rationalisation of government power were already part 
of Ottoman political and intellectual mentalité. The close correlation 
between penal and broader imperial reforms makes the prison an effective 
window into the process of Ottoman modernity as the empire appropri-
ated and adapted processes of modern statecraft and nation building to its 
particular imperial context.
This chapter highlights the change and continuity of Ottoman criminal 
justice policy and practice as lawmakers applied greater measures of state 
consolidation, standardisation, and rationalisation in order to transform 
the empire’s Islamic legal structures over the course of the long nineteenth 
century. Taken in aggregate, these changes to criminal justice are astound-
ing, however, seeing only the forest while disregarding its individual 
trees results in making one forest indistinguishable from another. In other 
words,	without	historical	 specificity,	 the	description	and	analysis	of	 the	
dynamism of Ottoman criminal justice and imperial transformation often 
obfuscates the process of adoption and adaptation, continuity and change, 
and innovation that took place within the empire. Instead, this dynamism 
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is often replaced with a narrative of rupture, Westernisation, and seculari-
sation that disregards the uniqueness of Ottoman modernity.
Although	a	relatively	neglected	field	in	Ottoman	studies,	several	schol-
ars have recently made forays into topics such as crime, punishment, 
policing, and criminal law in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.1 
A major purpose of this chapter is to synthesise this growing literature 
in order to provide a brief overview of Ottoman criminal justice on the 
eve of modernity as a backdrop to the tremendous transformations of the 
nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. It is not the purpose of this 
chapter to go into great detail regarding all facets of Ottoman criminal 
justice, but to draw its broad outlines in an attempt to establish the context 
from whence the transformations that occurred during the late Ottoman 
Empire emerged, thereby elucidating the deep connections between 
‘modern’ Ottoman criminal justice and its supposed ‘medieval’ predeces-
sor. This overview includes a discussion of the philosophy of Ottoman 
criminal law and its practice in order to demonstrate the antecedents upon 
which nineteenth- century administrators built, such as the concepts of 
prisoner rehabilitation, the Circle of Justice, recourse to law, surveillance 
and	public	order,	and	punishments	consisting	of	fines,	incarceration,	and	
hard labour.
Building upon this foundation, the second purpose of this chapter 
consists of another brief discussion concerning the creation of a com-
prehensive and integrated criminal justice system along generally 
recognised international standards wherein law and practice became 
streamlined,	centralised,	codified,	and	standardised.	During	this	period,	
Ottoman	administrators	transformed	policing	and	surveillance,	codified	
Islamic law into civil and criminal codes, established modern schools 
of law, selectively adapted European legal codes and practices, and 
instituted	a	centralised	prison	system	for	 the	first	 time	 in	 the	empire’s	
history.	 Officials	 did	 not	 create	 this	 system	 ex- nihilo. Instead, they 
built upon existing structures and practices and transformed them into 
an entirely new Islamic criminal justice system. Finally, this chapter 
focuses closely on three intertwined aspects of this new criminal justice 
system, namely the concrete links between these new penal codes, the 
extensive delineation of crimes, and the adoption of incarceration as the 
primary form of criminal punishment. Through the promulgation and 
then expansion of these new penal codes together with other aspects of 
this new criminal justice system, the Ottoman administration gradually 
gained a monopoly over the adjudication of criminal matters. This effec-
tively circumscribed the discretionary power of local administrators and 
Islamic court judges (qadi and naib) in adjudicating criminal cases and 
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meting	out	punishments.	With	the	exception	of	fines,	incarceration	and	
thus the prison became the primary site of criminal punishment within 
the empire.
Ottoman Criminal Justice on the Eve of Modernity
Since the reign of Sultan Süleyman I (r. 1520–66) and through the early 
nineteenth century Ottoman criminal justice policy and practice func-
tioned in a relatively consistent manner in which Sultanic law (kanun) 
and	Hanafi	 Islamic	 law	 (shari’a) were closely integrated and mutually 
legitimated. Rulers of Islamic states, including Ottoman sultans, regularly 
issued decrees to supplement Islamic law in areas where shari’a was 
silent, such as land law, state organisation, public order and security, and 
various criminal matters. Theoretically, none of the decrees was supposed 
to contradict Islamic law; instead, they were supposed to preserve it. For 
example, in the case of criminal matters, various sultans issued decrees 
providing	punishments	for	theft	in	which	the	evidence	or	specific	crime	
did not meet exact Islamic legal stipulations. These types of decrees were 
meant to supplement Islamic law and provide authorities with the discre-
tionary means to maintain public order, safeguard sovereignty, protect 
personal rights including life and property, uphold Islamic law, and 
punish criminals, thus abiding by the Circle- of- Justice ruling philosophy.2 
Scholars, however, have generally characterised sultanic decrees prior to 
the 1530s as completely distinct and ‘secular’ in relation to Islamic law. In 
other words, the criminal codes issued by Ottoman sultans from the reign 
of Mehmet II until Süleyman I were not necessarily in ‘harmony’ with 
shari’a, but allowable since Islamic law made provisions for rulers to keep 
public order and uphold justice.3
Sultan Süleyman I’s chief jurisconsult, Ebu’s- Su’ud, is credited with 
‘harmonising’	 Ottoman	 sultanic	 decrees	 with	 Islamic	 law,	 specifically	
in the realms of land tenure and taxation, trusts in mortmain, marriage, 
and crimes and torts.4 He is also credited with expanding the authority 
of the Caliphate and applying it to the Ottoman sultan. Not only was 
Sultan Süleyman I ruler of the Ottoman Empire and leader of all Muslims 
(ummah), but now he was also ‘the interpreter and executor of God’s law’, 
thus uniting the powers of sovereign and chief jurisconsult in the hands 
of the Ottoman ruler.5 This in turn completely blurred the lines between a 
supposedly secular (kanun) and the sacred (shari’) law. It also brought the 
Islamic	legal	offices	of	 jurisconsult	(mufti) and judge (qadi) fully under 
the	 ideological	 and	 fiscal	 authority	 of	 the	 sultan,	 a	 process	 that	 began	
 centuries earlier.
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As early as the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Sultanate founded a 
network of Islamic courts within the urban centres down to the village 
level of its expanding polity in order to exert its authority and legiti-
macy. This network of courts served the legal, commercial, social, and 
political needs of the surrounding areas and reigned supreme in legal 
matters for all the empire’s subjects regardless of socio- economic status 
or communal identity. Non- Muslims also had recourse to their own 
religious legal institutions. Those institutions, however, existed only at 
the express consent of Ottoman authorities. Islamic courts dealt with all 
aspects of the law, including civil, familial, and criminal, and worked 
closely with other local authorities, such as military and administrative 
leaders, to maintain order and uphold the sovereignty of the sultan. In 
cooperation	with	 other	 local	 authorities,	 court	 officials	 often	 engaged	
in	 many	 of	 the	 functions	 fulfilled	 by	 contemporary	 criminal	 justice	
systems, such as investigation, prosecution, surveillance, policing, and 
punishment.6
Islamic court judges, arguably, were the most important local royal 
officials.	 They	were	 responsible	 for	 a	 host	 of	 other	 legal	 and	 adminis-
trative functions, such as marriage and inheritance transactions, public 
notary, mediation, and protecting civil justice. The judge’s salary came 
from the state as did much of his training and each of his appointments. 
Notwithstanding imperial oversight, which included declarations of how 
certain cases should be adjudicated and the standardising of some legal 
interpretations, Islamic court judges possessed relative autonomy in dis-
pensing justice and mercy, having the ability to consult various sources, 
including Islamic scholars, the cannon of Islamic jurisprudence, sultanic 
decrees, and local custom in order to decide the best resolution for a 
particular case. This was done while attempting to balance numerous per-
sonal, local, regional, and imperial interests and power dynamics, one of 
which was the preservation of Islamic law and practice.7
As the Ottoman sultan’s most visible dispenser of justice and mercy, 
as well as preserver of harmony at the local level, the qadi worked 
with	many	 local	 officials	 to	 mete	 out	 punishment	 and	maintain	 public	
order. These two functions often went hand in hand, each reinforcing 
the other. As a  minimalist or ‘reactive state’ the Ottoman Empire relied 
upon	 a	 multifaceted	 array	 of	 official	 and	 unofficial	 actors	 to	 impose	
order, punish criminals, and settle disputes.8 These methods and actors 
included guarantors (kefil), character witnesses, village and neighbour-
hood watch programmes, local gangs (kabadayı),	 religious	 officials	
from various sects, Janissary networks, local governors, garrison troops, 
market  inspectors, guilds, kinship and tribal groups, and – perhaps most 
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 importantly –  collective responsibility.9 While many of these groups had 
competing interests that could lead to unrest, they regularly cooperated out 
of common interest.10
The purpose of punishment according to Islamic criminal law and 
sultanic supplements was threefold: retribution for the victim, rehabilita-
tion of the offender, and protection of state sovereignty and society by 
removing the offender through execution, banishment, or incarceration.11 
These three purposes are not mutually exclusive and often overlapped in 
terms of intent and application. Punishments meted out ranged from death 
sentences,	to	fines,	financial	restitution,	exile,	incarceration,	and	corporeal	
punishments	 (flogging,	 the	 bastinado,	 mutilation,	 and/or	 amputation).	
Another common form of punishment combined incarceration and hard 
labour wherein criminals served time as oarsmen (kürek) in the galleys of 
the	imperial	fleet.12
The vast majority of punishments meted out for criminal offences 
were discretionary (ta’zir),	 inflicted	by	a	court	 judge	when	the	crime	or	
evidence did not meet the strictures of Islamic law. Islamic legal pro-
cedure, however, still governed these punishments, which could not 
exceed shari’ punishments. In the Ottoman Empire, after the reforms of 
Ebu’s- Su’ud, these punishments were deemed to be in conformity with 
Islamic law and were sanctioned by it.13	Ottoman	executive	officials	also	
possessed other discretionary punishment options (siyaset) that were not 
restricted by Islamic law and could be imposed directly without judicial 
oversight. Siyaset punishments often led to claims of abuse against execu-
tive power. Ottoman authorities regularly interceded to curb this type of 
punishment by virtue of the empire’s Circle- of- Justice ruling philoso-
phy. Eventually, siyaset punishments were completely circumscribed by 
various nineteenth- century reforms, as discussed below.14
Our contemporary views of the rule of law and rationalised legal 
systems often characterise this ‘classical’ system of criminal justice as 
capricious and despotic.15 Ottoman court records, archival documents, 
and even some foreign travel accounts, however, describe a relatively 
well- organised and implemented system of justice wherein a majority of 
Ottoman subjects, regardless of religious or communal background, pos-
sessed	 access	 to	 legal	 recourse	 through	 official	 government	 institutions	
and procedures, such as shari’	 courts	and	official	petitioning.	Limits	of	
communication and technology notwithstanding, the Ottoman justice 
system possessed relatively clear lines of authority and jurisdiction that 
theoretically began and ended with the sultan who simultaneously acted as 
sovereign and caliph, thus bridging the supposed divide between secular 
and sacred.16
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Creating a Modern Criminal Justice System
By	the	 time	of	 its	dissolution	 in	1922,	 the	Ottoman	Empire	had	signifi-
cantly transformed its criminal justice system to include modern central-
ised criminal codes, policing organisations, criminal courts, modern law 
schools, and a centralised prison system wherein the vast majority of con-
victed criminals received incarceration as their punishment. This trans-
formation	did	not	happen	overnight,	but	often	in	uneven	and	haphazard	
ways,	as	imperial	and	local	officials	attempted	to	deal	with	the	challenges	
and crises experienced during this volatile period. This new system was 
not conjured out of thin air or borrowed wholesale from Western Europe. 
Instead, it possesses deep roots and antecedents in the Ottoman ‘classi-
cal’ justice system outlined above. Themes such as prisoner rehabilita-
tion, prison labour, the Circle of Justice, links between Islamic law and 
imperial practice, and the rule of law, however, still functioned and took 
precedence in Ottoman legal circles. The assumptions and world view 
associated with Ottoman modernity governed this transformation. In other 
words,	Ottoman	officials	implemented	these	reforms	in	order	to	centralise	
power over existing criminal justice institutions and practices through 
the rationalisation and standardisation of legal procedure, criminal codes, 
court practices and jurisdictions, and the establishment of powerful police 
forces.
Significant	 developments	 that	 altered	 this	 ‘classical’	 system	 can	 be	
traced back to the reign of Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) and that of 
Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–39). These developments include early legal 
codification	attempts	(Selim	III’s	Nizam- i Cedid Kanunları), the transfor-
mation of surveillance and policing in the imperial capital, the destruction 
of the Janissary corps, and consequently the weakening of the empire’s 
system of guilds. Both the Janissaries and the guilds played a major role 
in maintaining public order in urban areas. Undermining these institutions 
resulted in the adoption of new methods of surveillance and the crea-
tion of new organisations for the maintenance of public order while still 
relying on neighbourhood and village networks, guarantors, military units, 
and	local	religious	 leaders	 to	fill	 in	 the	gaps	as	 these	new	organisations	
developed.17
Taking advantage of these opportunities to expand centralised state 
power, Sultan Mahmud II created a new policing force as part of his 
restructured military under the command of the Serasker (Minister of 
War).	This	 force	was	 still	 responsible	 for	public	order	 and	fire	fighting	
in urban areas. Its functions and structure, therefore, were not much dif-
ferent from the Janissaries. Its authority and power, however, were more 
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centralised under the sultan through his new military force. Eventually, 
through trial, error, and revision, these police forces were separated from 
the military, assigned to the Ministry of the Interior and given clear lines 
of civil authority and power to police the empire’s urban areas.18
Throughout the provinces, particularly in villages and rural areas, the 
Ottoman	administration	haphazardly	established	gendarme	forces	during	
the 1840s, patterned after the French original to maintain order, collect 
taxes, safeguard highways, and supress rebellions.19 These paramilitary 
forces worked together with local governors and military garrisons. Both 
urban police and rural gendarme were primarily engaged in crime preven-
tion with very little investigative authority. Criminal investigations were 
still the responsibility of court judges. Police forces, however, had author-
ity to interrogate and torture suspects in order to extract evidence. Judges 
and these organisations, therefore, worked very closely together to arrest 
suspects, collect evidence, and investigate cases.20
From 1840 to 1880 Ottoman administrators and bureaucrats completely 
transformed the empire’s legal codes and court systems. In so doing, 
Islamic	civil	 law	was	codified	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	Mecelle and new city 
and provincial councils were given power to adjudicate in many matters 
alongside qadis.21 Ottoman administrators also established new courts and 
adopted new procedures for judging criminal cases. In 1840, lawmakers 
simultaneously created a new criminal court system and promulgated the 
first	Ottoman	 penal	 code.	 Reformers	 also	 extended	 powers	 of	 criminal	
adjudication to police and provincial councils in urban and rural areas. 
By 1849 these judicial proceedings became standardised throughout the 
empire. Then in 1854 the empire established criminal tribunals called 
Meclis- i Tahkik, which assumed responsibility for handling criminal 
matters from the provincial councils. These courts functioned similarly 
to Islamic courts, because the accused had no access to legal counsel, 
judges represented state interests, and proceedings were conducted in 
local vernaculars.22
In	 1879,	 the	 Ottoman	 administration	 officially	 created	 the	 nizamiye 
court system. The foundations of this court system date back to the 1864 
Provincial Regulations. The nizamiye courts stood alongside shari’ 
courts in adjudicating both criminal and civil cases. Avi Rubin’s work 
convincingly demonstrates the blurred boundaries in authority and juris-
diction between nizamiye and Islamic courts, because, in most cases, 
qadis presided over both courts. Also in 1879, the empire promulgated 
the Law of the Nizamiye Judicial Organisation (Mehakim- i Nizamiye’nin 
Teşkilât Kanunu) and the Codes of Criminal and Civil Procedure (Usul- ı 
Muhakemat- ı Cezaiye Kanunu and Usul- ı Muhakemat- ı Hukukiye, 
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respectively). Coupled with the new law schools established by Sultan 
Abdülhamid II, these courts and new legal codes and procedures became 
the foundation upon which the empire built its criminal justice system.23
Parallel to the creation of the nizamiye courts, the Ottoman Ministry 
of Justice also adopted wholesale the 1808 French Criminal Justice Code 
and named its new code the 1879 Code of Criminal Procedure (Ceza 
Muhakemeleri Usulü Kanunu).	Most	 significantly,	 this	 new	 procedural	
code	established	the	office	of	public	prosecutor	in	fulfilment	of	Article	91	
of the 1876 Ottoman Constitution, despite the constitution’s suspension 
by	Abdülhamid	II	in	1878.	This	was	the	first	time	that	such	an	office	had	
ever been established in the empire. This new procedural code also regu-
lated criminal legal proceedings, witnesses, and evidence. For example, 
there was now a clear separation between the roles and responsibilities of 
prosecutors from those of judges, which is non- existent under Islamic law. 
The new code strictly circumscribed the judge’s role in the adjudication of 
the assigned cases. It also more clearly delineated the role of the police by 
assigning them sole responsibility for conducting criminal investigations 
and	 for	writing	up	 their	findings	 so	 that	 public	 prosecutors	 could	build	
their cases against the accused. The police could no longer act as judges 
under any circumstance. Previous to this new code, the police and market 
inspectors (muhtasib) were, under certain circumstances, empowered to 
arrest, investigate, try, and punish suspected criminals at the scene of the 
crime.24
Punishment also underwent a dramatic transformation in the nineteenth 
century. With the exception of capital punishment, which became very 
rare after 1839, corporal punishments, including torture, were outlawed. 
While technically still an allowable punishment according to the 1858 
Imperial Ottoman Penal Code (IOPC), exile was severely curtailed. 
Beside	fines,	imprisonment	became	the	most	common	form	of	punishment	
meted out for criminal behaviour. Incarceration in prisons, jails, citadels, 
dungeons, and government buildings was not an innovative punishment 
for nineteenth- century Ottomans. It existed from the empire’s earliest 
days as did incarceration with hard labour. By the middle of the nineteenth 
century, incarceration with hard labour, however, no longer involved 
serving in the galleys at the Imperial Shipyards, although it maintained the 
name kürek.	Tanzimat-	era	reformers	also	established	several	labour	camps	
for prisoners in places such as Cyprus, Rhodes, and Mytilene.25 By the 
early twentieth century, the Ottoman Prison Administration built prison 
factories in major urban areas. Finally, during WWI the Ottoman regime 
pressed many prisoners into work battalions to build roads and raise crops 
as part of the empire’s war effort.26
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In the age of modernity there is an inherent logic found in bureaucratic 
and administrative standardisation and centralisation. Ottoman sultans 
and administrators shared this global logic and applied it to their imperial 
context. Intimate relationships are to be found in the creation of the IOPC, 
the increased delineation of crimes and punishment, the circumscription 
of discretionary punishment, and the shift to the almost exclusive use of 
incarceration as punishment.27 The remainder of this chapter focuses on 
the exposition of these interconnections over the course of the long nine-
teenth century culminating in the Second Constitutional Period.
Penal Codes, Incarceration and Circumscribing Discretionary 
Punishment
Ottoman	 bureaucrats	 created	 the	 empire’s	 first	 modern	 penal	 code	 in	
1840 shortly after the declaration of the 1839 Imperial Rescript of the 
Rose Garden (Hatt- ı Hümayun- u Gülhane).28 This Penal Code (Ceza 
Kanunnamesi) consisted of thirteen articles in forty- two sections and an 
epilogue. The main criminal issues covered by this code included treason, 
incitement	 to	 rebellion,	 embezzlement	 of	 state	 funds,	 tax	 evasion,	 and	
resistance to authority. The code was neither comprehensive nor exhaus-
tive regarding the many crimes punishable by shari’ law or local admin-
istrative practice. It did stipulate that the punishment of incarceration with 
hard labour would be added to the traditional penalty of blood- money for 
homicide. This code, however, did not change traditional forms of pun-
ishment, especially exile or hard labour. It still allowed for discretionary 
corporal	punishments	and	fines	(ta’zir and siyaset) meted out respectively 
by qadis and local governors.29 In other words, local Islamic court judges 
and	 state	 officials	 continued	 to	 possess	 great	 autonomy	 in	 identifying,	
trying, and punishing criminals according to their discretionary powers. 
This code, however, constituted an important combination of administra-
tive	and	religious	law	not	previously	codified	within	the	empire.30
Other items covered in the code include changes in legal procedure 
and	punishments	for	a	variety	of	criminal	offences.	For	 the	first	 time,	a	
code	 stipulated	 specific	 punishments	 for	 offences,	 such	 as	 reprimands,	
corporal punishments, incarceration, banishment, and hard labour. It did 
not, however, sever the dual system of Islamic law and administrative 
regulation within the empire. Some offences continued to be adjudicated 
by the separate systems outlined above, with others being handled jointly. 
Islamic legal procedures, however, still applied to all criminal proceed-
ings.31 Reformers intended this code to serve as a bulwark against admin-
istrative corruption and abuse of power, thus maintaining the Circle of 
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Justice.32 The majority of its articles dealt with these issues as a means to 
centralise power and impose more effectively the rule of law in govern-
ment administration.33
Ottoman legal reformers addressed some of the inadequacies of the 
1840 Code by promulgating the 1851 New Penal Code (Kanun- i Cedid). 
This code consisted of forty- three articles organised into three chapters. 
It	 better	 fulfilled	 the	 demands	 of	 the	 1839	Gülhane Decree by focus-
ing on offences involving crimes against life, honour, and property, 
such as forgery, abduction of girls, and sexual advances toward minors. 
Additionally,	 it	better	clarified	procedures	adjudicating	homicide;	stipu-
lated provisions for prisoner medical care; mandated assistance for poor 
prisoners; and regulated the punishment of slaves. In general, the purpose 
of the 1851 Penal Code was to assist in the maintenance of public order, 
prevent	 tyranny	 and	 corruption	 by	 government	 officials,	 and	 protect	
individual rights. It still did not, however, circumscribe the discretion-
ary	power	of	judges	and	local	officials,	but	it	did	continue	the	process	of	
greater delineation of crimes.34
Sultan	Abdülmecid	and	Mustafa	Reşid	Pasha	replaced	this	penal	code	
in 1858 with the Imperial Ottoman Penal Code (Ceza Kanunname- yi 
Hümayunu). Over the next sixty years, lawmakers continued to expand 
and augment the IOPC.35 It, therefore, became the foundation for 
criminal justice transformation including the transition from corporal 
punishments	to	fines	and	incarceration	as	the	primary	forms	of	criminal	
punishment. In addition to the penal codes of 1840 and 1851, the origins 
of	the	IOPC	are	also	closely	linked	to	broader	imperial	reforms,	specifi-
cally the promulgation of the 1856 Imperial Decree of Reform (Islahat 
Fermanı).
Five years after Ambassador Canning submitted his ‘Memorandum for 
the Improvement of Prisons in Turkey’ to Sultan Abdülmecid, he assisted 
Reşid	Pasha	in	drafting	the	Islahat Fermanı. It announced a wide range 
of legal and economic reforms including equality for all before the law, 
protection	of	property	rights,	citizenship,	and	liberty.	It	also	contained	a	
very important passage related to penal reform:
Penal, correctional, and commercial laws . . . shall be drawn up as soon as pos-
sible and formed into a code . . . Proceedings shall be taken, with as little delay 
as possible, for the reform of the penitentiary system as applied to houses of 
detention, punishment, or correction, and other establishments of like nature, 
so as to reconcile the rights of humanity with those of justice. Corporal punish-
ment shall not be administered, even in the prisons, except in conformity with 
the disciplinary regulations established by my Sublime Porte, and everything 
that resembles torture shall be entirely abolished.36
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These portions of the Islahat Fermanı not only exemplify the early 
beginnings of Ottoman prison reform, but they also map out a robust 
programme to raise Ottoman punishment to the idealised standards of 
‘modern’ civilisation.
In accordance with the Islahat Fermanı, the empire promulgated the 
IOPC on 9 August 1858.37 Portions of the new code included adaptations 
of the 1810 French Criminal Code. The most striking difference between 
this new code and its predecessors was that it included a section devoted 
to the protection of individual rights. Crimes against individuals were 
divided into three categories: ‘(1) crimes committed against lives and 
individual security, (2) crimes against honour and dignity, and (3) crimes 
against	the	property	of	citizens.’38
The IOPC’s promulgation represents a fundamental shift in Ottoman 
and	Islamic	criminal	 law.	Personal	rights	were	codified	and	rationalised	
within an Islamic legal framework wherein the state acted as guarantor 
and supervisor. Contrary to the views of contemporary scholarship, this 
was not the Westernisation of Ottoman criminal law. While it was the 
bureaucratic	Ottoman	state	that	codified	these	laws,	Islamic	court	judges	
still rendered judgments and presided over all proceedings. Additionally, 
the	 very	 first	 article	 of	 the	 code	 claims	 legitimacy	 based	 upon	 Islamic	
principles and precedence.39	The	rationalisation	and	codification	of	these	
rights, however, abrogated some of the autonomy of Islamic courts judges 
and regulated outcomes in a much more standardised way than ever 
before.40 Instead of characterising these reforms as the secularisation of 
Ottoman criminal law and proceedings, they should be viewed as the con-
tinuation of a standardising and centralising process of Islamic criminal 
law that built upon the 1840 and 1851 penal codes.
The IOPC was the forerunner to larger reform efforts intended to over-
haul, centralise, standardise, and rationalise the entire Ottoman judicial 
system. This restructuring eventually included the drafting of the Mecelle. 
As mentioned above, it also laid the groundwork for the circumscription 
of qadi discretionary power. Judicial reforms, standardising legal proce-
dures,	practices,	and	punishments	and	codified	legal	codes	limit	a	judge’s	
autonomy in legal interpretation. The IOPC also facilitated the creation 
of nizamiye courts. While the nizamiye and shari’ courts worked in close 
cooperation for several decades, by 1917 the nizamiye courts superseded 
shari’ courts in all civil and criminal matters, except concerning inherit-
ance and family law.41 While transforming the empire’s courts and legal 
codes to meet the strictures of the Modern World System, administra-
tors still utilised the same Islamic legitimating structures employed for 
 centuries.42 Ottoman rulers and lawmakers built off the empire’s own 
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traditions while applying modern instrumentalities of governance to their 
specific	imperial	context.
An analysis of the transformation of the IOPC from 1858 to 1911 
clearly demonstrates the shift in the conceptualisation of crime and pun-
ishment in the Ottoman Empire during this period. The code was greatly 
expanded	by	stipulating	many	new	crimes	with	fixed	punishments.	With	
the exception of execution, lawmakers discontinued all forms of corporal 
punishment. They also outlawed torture and completely circumscribed the 
ability	of	local	officials	to	impose	discretionary	punishments	(ta’zir and 
siyaset). Administrators replaced these punishments with clearly deline-
ated	fines	and	prison	sentences	according	to	the	type	and	severity	of	the	
crime committed. Some prison sentences included hard labour (kürek), 
especially in cases of serious crime (cinayet).43
By 1911 the IOPC contained 264 articles dealing with criminal legal 
procedures, crimes, liabilities, and punishments. The code was divided 
into four sections, a ‘Preliminary’ section and three chapters. The 
‘Preliminary’ consisted of forty- seven articles split into four parts. These 
parts set forth the general grades and degrees of offences, legal proce-
dures, and punishments for serious crimes (cinayet) and lesser offences 
(cünha and kabahat). The ‘Preliminary’ also stipulates the guidelines for 
determining criminal culpability.44
The	first	 chapter	of	 the	 IOPC	delineates	 crimes	against	 the	Ottoman	
state and the general well- being of its populace as well as their associated 
punishments.	It	includes	121	articles	divided	into	sixteen	parts.	The	first	
two parts deal with crimes that threaten the external and internal security 
of the empire, such as espionage, incitement to riot and civil war, brig-
andage, banditry, and abrogation of the constitution. The vast majority of 




imperial telecommunications, censorship, counterfeiting, forgery, and 
arson.	The	majority	of	these	crimes	are	punishable	by	fine,	loss	of	office	
and privilege, and imprisonment.45
The second chapter is divided into twelve parts containing eighty- 
six articles detailing individual crimes. The enumerated crimes include 
homicide, bodily injuries, threats, abortion, selling adulterated beverages 
and medicines, violations of honour (rape, molestation, or kidnapping), 
improper arrest and incarceration, perjury, slander, vituperation, theft, 
bankruptcy,	embezzlement,	breach	of	contract,	fraud,	and	the	destruction	
of private property. According to the stipulated punishments, the vast 
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majority of these crimes are punishable by various lengths of incarcera-
tion,	fines,	and	death.46 The third chapter of the IOPC consists of twelve 
articles all detailing minor offences (kabahat) and their associated punish-
ments. These offences all pertain to matters of sanitation, cleanliness, and 
the police. Some of the particular offences include improper maintenance 
of chimneys and furnaces, disturbing the peace with loud noise or raucous 
behaviour, public drunkenness, and the improper burial of corpses. Most 
punishments	 consist	 of	 fines	 and	 very	 short	 prison	 sentences	 (usually	
incarceration for a period of twenty- four hours to a week).47
The changes to the IOPC during the Second Constitutional Period 
culminated a continuous process of revision since the code’s adoption 
in 1858. On 4 June 1911, the Ottoman Parliament repealed and reissued 
the IOPC in its most expansive form.48	The	major	modifications	of	1911	
include:
1. new stipulations regarding the punishment of repeat offenders




5. the deduction of time served prior to trial and sentencing
6. regulations about determining the criminal culpability of children, the 
insane, and those who committed an act of self- defence
7. punishments for criminal intent
8. offences and punishments pertaining to the external and internal secu-
rity of the empire
9. new bribery- related crimes and punishments
10. crimes related to the opposition or the circumvention of state regula-
tions, particularly those concerning public health, hygiene, security, 
and order
11. punishments	meted	out	for	dereliction	of	duty	by	state	officials
12. regulations concerning the unlawful entry into private premises
13. regulations forbidding the ill- treatment of individuals by government 
officials,	particularly	in	relation	to	torture	or	bodily	harm
14. regulations and punishments related to persons opposing, disobeying, 
or	insulting	government	officials
15. offences and punishments pertaining to impersonating government 
officials
16. punishments pertaining to the destruction of telephone and telegraph 
communications
17. regulations and punishments related to forgery
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18. regulations and punishments pertaining to arson and the manufacture, 
possession, and selling of illegal weapons and explosives
19. crimes and punishments related to homicide and physical assault
20. crimes and punishments pertaining to persons causing abortion, 
selling adulterated drinks, or selling poisons without guarantee
21. regulations and punishments regarding persons who violate honour, 
such as through molestation, illicit sexual relations, kidnapping, or 
rape
22. punishments and amendments pertaining to unlawful incarceration 
and the kidnapping of infants and children, especially girls
23. punishments and regulations regarding calumny, vituperation, and the 
divulgence of secrets
24. regulations and punishments pertaining to theft
25. regulations and punishments concerning the destruction of govern-
ment and private property
26. punishments pertaining to persons guilty of misdemeanours (kabahat) 
against matters of sanitation, cleanliness, and the police.49
Lawmakers altered every section of the code. In fact, out of the 265 arti-
cles,	a	total	of	fifty-	six	were	rescinded,	revised,	and/or	expanded.50 This 
constitutes the revision of more than 17 per cent of the code.
These 1911 revisions demonstrate the CUP’s intent to consolidate 
greater amounts of power into the hands of the state and rationalise the 
practice of its criminal legal system by reigning in the autonomy of local 
judges and administrators; upholding state sovereignty, individual rights, 
and the protection of private property; and maintaining public order. CUP 
motivations to gain greater access to the lives of the population were also 
at work. The June 1911 IOPC transformations regarding ‘Crimes against 
Honour’, ‘Theft’, and ‘Violent Crimes’ demonstrate these changes and 
CUP goals in terms of criminal delineation, punishment, and discretionary 
authority.
Prior	 to	 the	 promulgation	 of	 the	 IOPC,	 local	 officials	 and	 Islamic	
court judges usually punished those guilty of violent crimes, theft, or 
crimes against honour according to their discretionary authority (siyaset 
or ta’zir), especially since Islamic law is silent on most crimes associ-
ated with these categories. As long as these punishments did not equal or 
exceed those stipulated in shari’a, the vast majority of punishments meted 
out	 for	 these	offences	 consisted	of	 a	 combination	of	fines	 and	corporal	
punishments.	This	gave	local	officials	enormous	autonomy	in	dealing	with	
these offences and often led to accusations of abuse of power.51 With the 
promulgation of the IOPC and its greater delineation of crimes and pun-
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section of the IOPC dealing with crimes against an individual’s honour, 
including sexual offences, perjury, calumny, slander, and vituperation 
(Articles 197–215 inclusive).52 Originally Article 201 only dealt with 
the corruption of youth. In 1860, however, this article was expanded to 
include adultery and its related punishments. According to Islamic law, 
adultery is a hadd offence and carries with it the penalty of death by 
stoning. This punishment was rarely applied, because
to prove adultery/fornication, four male witnesses must independently testify 
to the fact that they have . . . seen the man’s sexual organ penetrate the woman. 
Should any of the four testimonies contradict the other three in any fashion . . . 
the four witnesses will be charged with slander and whipped eighty lashes each. 
[Slander of this type, consequently, is a different hadd offence.]53
Punishment for this crime was regularly handed over to local authorities 
whom exercised their discretionary power to punish the guilty with lashes, 
imprisonment, and so on. The punishments called for in the 1860 version 
of the IOPC were very one sided and harsher on the female perpetrator 
than on the male. This revision mirrored exactly the 1810 French Penal 
Code. In 1911, however, the punishments of incarceration were made 
exactly equal for both males and females, but in addition to jail time, 
males	also	had	to	pay	a	fine.54 This is, no doubt, an interesting discrimina-
tory reversal of the earlier code.
The 1911 version of Article 206 represents an example of the CUP com-
pletely rescinding the previous versions of the article and replacing it with 
a	highly	modified	and	more	comprehensive	one.	All	versions	of	the	article	
deal with the crime of kidnapping children and girls at the age of puberty. 
The	most	significant	changes	consisted	of,	first,	expanding	the	victims	of	
kidnapping to include adults as well as children; second, expanding the 
victims of kidnapping to include males as well as females; third, even 
though victims now included both sexes, female victims were still the 
primary focus of the article; fourth, altering the criteria for determining a 
child’s criminal culpability – originally determined by the commencement 
of puberty according to Islamic law, it was now set uniformly at the age 
of	fourteen;	and,	finally,	unlike	the	1858	version	of	Article	206,	the	1911	
version removed all jurisdictions regarding ‘Crimes of Honour’ from shari’ 
courts. Only the nizamiye courts could adjudicate these types of crimes, 
thus abrogating the qadi’s authority to mete out discretionary punishment 
by subjecting his decisions to nizamiye court procedural provisions.55
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The crime of vituperation and its associated punishments was the 
subject	of	Article	214.	The	original	1858	version	briefly	outlined	only	the	
basics of the crime, such as ‘[falsely] ascribing some vice or otherwise’ 
to	another	person,	and	stipulated	as	punishment	a	fine	or	a	short	period	of	
incarceration.56 In 1911, however, parliament rescinded the 1858 version 
and replaced it with a substantially larger article that extensively expanded 
the	definition	of	vituperation.	This	expansion	stipulates	what	constitutes	
vituperation, in what setting the crime must be committed (in public with 
witnesses or in print), the rights of the accused, and the requisite punish-
ments	(from	twenty-	four	hours	to	six	months	of	incarceration	and/or	a	fine	
of	five	to	fifteen	Liras).	In	fact,	the	original	article	is	only	fifty-	six	words	
long, but the 1911 version is almost 1,000 words in length.57
Theft (sirkat), in all its related forms, including petty theft, violent 
theft,	 breaking	 and	 entering,	 fraud,	 embezzlement,	 and	 armed	 robbery,	
constituted the second most prevalent crime in the Ottoman Empire during 
the nineteenth century.58 Several of the IOPC’s articles relating to theft 
were among the most heavily revised. For example, out of the twenty- six 
articles	dealing	specifically	with	theft,	six	were	almost	completely	restruc-
tured in 1911. These revised articles were 220, 222, 224, 225, 226, and 
230. Articles 216–41 inclusive stipulate the various offences associated 
with theft related crimes.59
The	specific	types	of	revisions	made	in	1911	include	strengthening	the	
punishments and expanding the criteria for breaking and entering. In the 
1858 version of Article 220, breaking and entering only referred to drill-
ing through, digging under, climbing a wall, or breaking down a door or 
window in order to gain access to a building. In 1911, this type of crime 
was expanded to include the breaking and entering into any type of closed 





since theft is one of the original hudud	offences	described	in	the	Quran	
and Islamic jurisprudence. According to these sources, however, theft is a 
very circumscribed crime.61 Out of necessity, therefore, Islamic law allot-




Many revisions either delineated more crimes and/or made punish-
ments more severe. For example, revisions to Article 222 in 1911 simply 
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increased the punishment according to the circumstances under which 
people committed theft, such as whether the theft occurred at night or day, 
whether the thief was armed or not, and whether the crime was commit-
ted by a servant or apprentice against her/his master. The punishment was 
increased from six months to three years of incarceration to one to three 
years of incarceration.62 Other revisions simply imposed harsher penalties 
for	crimes	already	stipulated	in	the	code.	In	many	cases,	officials	doubled	
the stiffest penalties of incarceration as demonstrated by Articles 224, 225, 
and 226. An additional revision to Article 224 included an expansion of 
the number of items whose theft would incur a certain punishment. These 
items were mainly agriculturally related, such as draft animals, horses, and 
tools.63
The most extensively revised theft- related article was Article 230. The 
original version dealt only with petty theft and its associated punishments. 
The Ottoman administration, however, expanded and revised this article 
several	times	from	1858.	The	most	significant	changes	included	making	
those who purchase, receive, and/or sell stolen goods liable for the theft of 
the items. Revisions also included the reduction of punishment for those 
who voluntarily came forward regarding their crimes, confessed them, and 
made restitution prior to arrest or judicial hearing.64
The protection of private property was a key facet of CUP penal 
reform,	 as	 reflected	 by	 the	 number	 of	 revisions	 made	 to	 theft-	related	
IOPC articles and by the number of prisoners arrested, convicted, and 
sentenced for theft- related crimes. Protecting private property had always 
been important to Ottoman rulers and Islamic polities in general, dating 
back centuries.65 During the nineteenth century, theft- related regulations 
and Islamic law were brought into close synchronisation. Many scholars 
characterise these rationalising legal reforms as the Westernisation and 
secularisation of Ottoman legal norms eventually resulting in the abroga-
tion of Islamic law.66 This portrayal is incorrect; Ottoman bureaucrats 
during the nineteenth century were not abrogating Islamic criminal or 
civil law, but standardising and rationalising it in the hands of the state. 
Administrators utilised Islamic law to justify these changes and at the 
same time transformed shari’a	to	fit	the	needs	of	a	modern	imperial	state.	
No Ottoman administration did this more than the CUP during the Second 
Constitutional Period. The protection of private property was particularly 
important to the CUP, because of its attempts to build a middle class, 
increase private enterprise, foster industrialisation, and promote the eco-
nomic development and independence of the empire.67
Violent crime represents the most prevalent crime in the Ottoman 
Empire, according to the 1910–11 crime statistical reports and the 1912 
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Ottoman prison surveys.68 IOPC articles 168–91 dealing with violent 
crimes, such as threats, physical assault, and homicide were among the 
most heavily augmented and expanded in 1911.69 According to Islamic 
law, ‘provisions regarding offenses against persons, i.e. homicide and 
wounding, [are] subdivided into (a) those regarding retaliation (qisas) 
and	 (b)	 those	 regarding	 financial	 compensation	 (diya) . . . and . . . are 
expounded in the fiqh books with great precisions and in painstaking 
detail’.70 Islamic court judges oversaw the restitution and retribution 
demanded by these crimes, but Islamic law also allotted discretionary pun-
ishments associated with these crimes to qadis	and	other	local	officials.71 
Revisions to the IOPC continued to circumscribe these discretionary pun-
ishments and eventually subjugated all homicides to court proceedings.
Article	170	was	the	first	article	related	to	violent	crime	to	be	amended	
in 1911. The original article mandated the death penalty for premeditated 
homicide (‘amden katl). In 1911, Ottoman lawmakers amended it to 
include the death penalty not only for those convicted of premeditated 
homicide, but also for those who wilfully kill (katl- i kasdi) their ‘ancestors 
of either sex even . . . without premeditation’.72	This	change	is	significant,	
because when combined with the changes made to Article 179, violence 
against	 an	 elder	 relative	of	 either	 sex,	 for	 the	first	 time,	 falls	under	 the	
jurisdiction of nizamiye courts, thus limiting the authority of qadis to 
adjudicate these crimes according to Islamic legal procedures. This is an 
important example of the CUP consolidating more power over the family 
within the hands of the state rather than leaving it in the hands of Islamic 
courts. It is also an important example of the state attempting to gain more 
power over all facets of Ottoman life.73
Regarding	homicide,	 lawmakers	 significantly	 changed	 and	 expanded	
Article 174, which originally read:
If a person has killed an individual without premeditation he [or she] is placed 
in kyurek [kürek]	for	a	period	of	fifteen	years;	but	if	this	matter	of	destruction	
of life has taken place while committing another Jinayet [cinayet] either before 
the commission or after the commission, or for the sake of committing a Junha 
[cünha], the person destroying life is punished with . . . death according to [the] 
law.74
The 1911 article expanded the 1858 version by providing greater protec-
tion	 for	 government	 officials	 while	 performing	 their	 duties	 and	 made	
significant	clarifications	regarding	punishments	associated	with	accidental	
homicides.75 Other alterations to homicide- related articles include more 
severe punishments for accomplices.76 Article 177, which dealt with 
assaults that result in the loss of use of a bodily member, was further 
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strengthened	and	clarified	in	1911.	Punishment	now	consisted	of	a	prison	
sentence of at least six years’ hard labour and the perpetrator was respon-
sible for the victim’s medical expenses.77
It should not be surprising that the prosecution of violent crimes, such 
as assault, rape, and homicide, would comprise a major portion of IOPC 
reforms. Central to Ottoman administrative goals was the need to maintain 
public order and discipline. As the state relied less on intermediaries and 
increasingly sought to centralise its authority over the use of force and 
punishment,	there	was	an	increased	confluence	of	what	has	been	charac-
terised as ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ law and legal practice. Islam was not 




penal codes, law schools, a fully developed court system with extensive 
procedural regulations, and a modern prison system. This functioning 
criminal justice system arrested criminal perpetrators and took them 
to police stations for interrogation as part of a criminal investigation. 
A lawyer was assigned to the accused, and a criminal prosecutor was 
assigned to the case. Judges oversaw the proceedings of the court case and 
issued a decision and punishment as prescribed by the IOPC. Depending 
on	the	seriousness	and	circumstances	of	the	crime,	judges	imposed	a	fine,	
a prison sentence for a set period of time, or both. Additionally, the con-
victed even had the right to appeal the judge’s decision. Once convicted 
criminals had served their prison sentences then they could expect a return 
of	their	full	citizenship	rights.	They	were,	however,	placed	under	proba-
tionary supervision, usually equal in length to their prison sentence.78
In sum, this criminal justice process constitutes an enormous trans-
formation from early modern practices. Lawmakers and administrators, 
however, built this new system upon existing legal structures, procedures, 
and legitimation. This transformation possesses deep roots in Ottoman 
sensibilities towards notions of justice, law, rights of subjects and rulers, 
and punishment. In other words, this transformation should not be inter-
preted as Ottoman Westernisation, but the empire’s appropriation, adapta-
tion, and implementation of the assumptions of the modern world to its 
own imperial context. Ottoman imperial needs for greater rationalisation 
of procedure, standardisation of practice, and concentration of power all 
influenced	this	transformation	of	legal	practice	and	punishment.
The	confluence	of	the	need	for	more	consolidated	administrative	power,	
Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire
36
a desire to impose increasing amounts of social control and public order, 
and a greater need for access to and control over the lives of the population 
led the Ottoman administration to create and then greatly expand the IOPC 
over the second half of the nineteenth century by standardising punish-
ment and extensively delineating criminal offences. These actions had the 
cumulative	effect	of	reining	in	the	discretionary	power	of	local	officials	
(judges and governors) and making incarceration the primary type of pun-
ishment imposed for criminal offences. Violent crime, theft, and crimes 
against	honour	as	stipulated	in	the	IOPC	all	demonstrate	this	confluence	
and its associated outcomes.
In the end, the Ottoman drive for state centralisation, standardisation, 
and rationalisation of Islamic criminal law circumscribed the discretionary 
power of the qadi to such an extent that the practice of Islamic criminal 
law became much more rigid. Consequently, these efforts laid the founda-
tion for Islamic criminal legal practices in many contemporary Muslim 
states. The harsh punitive legal actions carried out in Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
Nigeria, or by the Taliban are not medieval, but wholly modern. They are 
primarily a response to the demands of the modern state. With the applica-
tion of new methods of governance, the processes built into Islamic law to 
maximise the restoration of communal harmony and minimise harsh pun-
ishment	have	been	undermined	in	order	to	create	a	rationalised,	codified,	
standardised, and uniform Islamic legal system for the Ottoman Empire. 
It was not the Ottoman reformers’ intent to make Islamic criminal law 
more punitive. The punishments meted out for particular crimes by the 
IOPC	parallel	their	Western	counterparts	in	terms	of	jail	sentences,	fines,	
and	even	the	death	penalty.	However,	when	a	codified	and	standardised	
Islamic criminal code meets a centralised state apparatus and a radical 
ideology, the overwhelming outcome appears to be the extreme applica-
tion of Islamic punishment as the norm rather than the rare exception as 
practised throughout Islamic history.
At the same time that lawmakers were creating comprehensive penal 
codes, the empire was also transforming its prisons in order to accom-
modate the transition to incarceration as the empire’s primary punishment 
for criminal activity. This prison reform programme culminated in the 
Second Constitutional Period. As the CUP overhauled the IOPC, it also 
implemented	the	first	of	its	extensive	prison	reforms	in	late	1911	and	early	
1912.	This	 included	 the	creation	of	 the	first	centralised	Ottoman	Prison	
Administration, the conduct of a comprehensive prison survey, and the 
development of a comprehensive programme to refurbish and modernise 
the	 empire’s	 prisons	 and	 jails.	 It	 is	 no	 accident	 that	 Ottoman	 officials	
enacted interrelated judicial, criminal, and penal reforms in 1911–12.
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Prison Reform in the Late Ottoman Empire:  
The State’s Perspectives
The 1850s constitute a very important transitional period for prison 
reform in the Ottoman Empire. As discussed in the Introduction and in 
Chapter 1, the convergence of British inspections of Ottoman prisons, 
the Islahat Fermanı, and the promulgation of the Imperial Ottoman 
Penal Code (IOPC) drew attention to many criminal justice related issues 
and prepared the ground for extensive prison reform efforts. First, the 
inspections revealed the dire state of the incarcerated and the need for 
state intervention to improve conditions. Second, the Islahat Fermanı 
announced an aggressive agenda to create, expand, and overhaul the 
Ottoman criminal justice system, including prisons. Finally, the prom-
ulgation of the 1858 IOPC transformed the empire’s criminal justice 
practices by extensively delineating criminal behaviour and their associ-
ated punishments and outlawing corporal punishments including torture. 
This effectively circumscribed the discretionary punitive powers of local 
Islamic	court	judges	and	administrative	officials.	In	so	doing,	the	IOPC	
mandated incarceration as the primary punishment for criminal behav-
iour, thus making prisons the principal site for this newly standardised 
penalty.
Practical reasons for prison reform aside, Ottoman rulers and admin-
istrators also engaged in it for ideological purposes. Over the course of 
the nineteenth century the notion that prisons and punishment demon-
strate a particular society’s level of civilisation was adopted worldwide.1 
In fact, this association between civilisation and punishment dates back 
to the second half of the eighteenth century with Jeremy Bentham, 
Cesare Beccaria, and others.2 By the mid- nineteenth century, Ottoman 
bureaucrats	 firmly	 linked	 nation-	building	 and	 civilisation	with	 criminal	
justice and prisons. The mutual association of these concepts entered 
the Ottoman intelligentsia’s mentalité from both internal and Western 
European	 sources.	 One	 of	 the	 most	 influential	 was	 the	 long-	serving	
British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Sir Stratford Canning.3 
Canning devoted a great deal of time and energy to promoting reform 
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within the empire and viewed its advancement in ‘European civilisation’ 
and ‘Christian civilisation’ as the only hope for solving the Near Eastern 
Question.4 According to Ambassador Canning, it was Britain’s ‘duty . . . 
[and] vocation . . . not [to] enslave but to set free’. Britain’s task was ‘to 
lead the way and to direct the march of other nations’, thus encapsulating 
British Orientalist and ‘White Man’s Burden’ views towards the Ottoman 
Empire.5
In Canning’s 1851 ‘Memorandum on the Improvement of Prisons in 
Turkey’, he clearly associates modern penal practices such as the moral 
rehabilitation of prisoners, proper health and hygiene, and crime preven-
tion,	with	progress,	 reason,	scientific	advancement,	and	European	‘civi-
lisation’.6	Reşit	Pasha	and	Sultan	Abdülaziz	expressed	 similar	views	 in	
the 1856 Islahat Fermanı: ‘Proceedings shall be taken . . . for the reform 
of the penitentiary system as applied to houses of detention, punishment, 
or correction . . . so as to reconcile the rights of humanity with those of 
justice.’7 The connection between prison reform and ‘the civilisation of a 
country’ was part of Ottoman imperial discourse and it continued to grow 
throughout the rest of the empire’s existence.8
In addition to civilisational uplift, Ottoman administrators also shared 
the world view that a centralised, standardised, and rationalised admin-
istrative state founded on the principles of what Foucault terms ‘govern-
mentality’ was essential to the empire’s survival.9 Ottoman bureaucrats 
and rulers attempted to implement this administrative approach on all 
governmental levels. Imperial prison reforms were, therefore, carried out 
for both practical and ideological purposes.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the central 
administration’s prison programmes, philosophy, and ideology in order 
to establish the groundwork for understanding the developments, trans-
formations, and realities of late Ottoman criminal justice and incarcera-
tion. It also discusses the broad themes associated with Ottoman prison 
reform: civilisational transformation, prisoner rehabilitation, increased 
administrative centralisation, standardisation, and rationalisation, order 
and discipline, and the creation and expansion of state patriarchy. In 
so doing, it argues that prisons act as effective windows into broader 
imperial transformation and the intricacies of Ottoman modernity. It 
was within the walls of prisons that many of the pressing questions of 
Ottoman modernity played out. Bureaucrats addressed issues related to 
administrative reform and centralisation, the rationalisation of Islamic 
criminal law and punishment, the role of labour in the rehabilitation of 
prisoners, economic development and industrialisation, gender and child-
hood, the implementation of modern concepts of time and space, issues 
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of national identity based on ethnicity and religion, social engineering, 
and the increased role of the state in caring for its population. In other 
words, prisons are microcosms of imperial transformation and exemplify 
a distinctive Ottoman modernity created by the spread of capitalist market 
relations and the application of modern methods of governance to a spe-
cific	Ottoman	context.
It also argues that prison reform and the transformation of Ottoman 
penal practice did not occur overnight or in a systematically progressive 
way, but the groundwork was laid in the 1850s for extensive Ottoman 
criminal justice reformation that included the empire’s sprawling and 
dilapidated network of prisons, jails, fortresses, and other governmental 
structures	used	for	incarceration.	Each	Ottoman	administration	(Tanzimat,	
Hamidian, and CUP) built on the previous regime’s efforts, emphasising 
certain aspects so that by the time the CUP came to power, it was able 
to take full advantage of past reforms and implement them more fully 
according to its Positivist world view.
This chapter’s discussion of prison reform is broken into two main 
parts.	The	first	discusses	prison	reform	during	the	Tanzimat	and	Hamidian	
eras (c. 1850–1908). The second section focuses on prison reform 
during the Second Constitutional Period until the empire’s dissolution 
(c. 1908–22). This discussion further develops themes in Chapter 1 
by beginning in the 1850s and includes the empire’s participation 
in international prison conferences, drafting and adoption of detailed 
prison regulations, engaging in regular prison inspection routines, col-
lecting	 extensive	 prison	 statistics,	 creating	 unified	 prison	 regimens	 that	
attempted to standardise practice and behaviour, professionalising the 
prison cadre, and constructing new prisons. Reforms culminated in the 
Second	Constitutional	Period	as	the	CUP	created	the	empire’s	first	cen-
tralised Prison Administration and overhauled its prisons on an unprec-
edented level. The CUP continued these efforts throughout WWI by 
expending large sums of money, time, and effort. Prisons constituted an 
important facet of its programme to transform the empire into a powerful, 
centralised, and industrialised nation- state.
By providing this state- centric overview of prison reform, this chapter 
contextualises subsequent chapters that offer detailed studies of many of 
these reforms, how they were implemented, and how they affected local 
prison	officials	 and	 inmates.	These	 chapters,	 therefore,	 bring	 state-	 and	
people- centric histories together in order to complicate the picture of the 
late Ottoman Empire, particularly concerning crime, punishment, and 
incarceration.
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Prison Reform in the Tanzimat and Hamidian Eras  
(c. 1850–1908)
According to Canning’s 1851 Ottoman prison report, health and living 
conditions were dreadful. Most prisoners had little access to fresh air, 
exercise, adequate food, or medical treatment. Prisons were makeshift 
structures usually located in local military compounds, fortresses, or in 
government building annexes. Inmates primarily depended on family, 
friends, or religious endowments for their meagre subsistence. All kinds 
of prisoners were incarcerated together: the accused with the convicted, 
the petty criminal with the felon, adults with children, and sometimes 
even men with women. According to Canning, immediate and extensive 
reforms were required for both Ottoman prisons and the imperial criminal 
code.10 As stated above, this report in combination with the promulgation 
of a series of penal codes and the Islahat Fermanı securely entrenched 
criminal justice and consequently prisons on the imperial reform agenda.
Just prior to the promulgation of the 1858 IOPC, the Ottoman admin-
istration	hired	Major	Gordon,	a	British	military	officer,	 to	direct	prison	
reform in the empire. The Ottoman Government paid him a handsome 
sum and allocated a budget of more than 1,250,000 kuruş to administer 
and reform the empire’s dilapidated network of prisons, jails, dungeons, 
and fortresses. Gordon complained profusely about how ‘hellish’ Ottoman 
prisons and dungeons were, and held up the Tersane Dungeon (zindan) as 
the epitome of brutality and neglect. He attempted, without much success, 
to introduce prisoner work discipline into the empire by adopting the 
British and American concepts of labour prisons. Idleness, however, con-




Abdülmecid, Gordon successfully lobbied that the penal code adopt a 
four-	part	 classification	 of	 criminal	 behaviour:	 accused	 (zanlı), misde-
meanour (kabahat sahiplerine), less serious offence (erbab- ı cünhaya), 
and serious offence/felony (mürtekib- i cinayet).12
Notwithstanding Gordon’s efforts, Ottoman bureaucrats were slow 
to invest a great deal of time and money in reforming prisons during the 
Tanzimat	era,	although	they	did	commission,	fund,	and	undertake	some	
projects.13 For example, Ottoman administrators constructed a model 
penitentiary (Dersaadet hapishane- yi umumisi) in the Sultanahmet district 
of Istanbul in 1871.14 This prison was supposed to be replicated in each 
provincial centre of the empire, but it never came to fruition. It was located 
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next to the At Meydanı (Hippodrome) and near Sultanahmet Jail in the 
centre	of	the	imperial	capital.	This	penitentiary	represents	the	fulfilment	of	
a prison reform recommendation by Ambassador Canning in 1851.
Those [the prison reforms] which relate more directly to the building, to the 
construction of new or the improvement of old ones, require more time and a 
larger expenditure. Much, however, would be gained by adopting the whole as 
a system, and carrying it into practice gradually – If a single prison, by way of 
model, were established on sound principles in the Capital, for instance, where 
one of a better kind has already been formed under the Zaptie [police], the 
improvement	confirmed	by	experience	might	be	extended	with	ease	throughout	
the empire according to local circumstances and the command of means.15
Perhaps	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 substantiate	 the	 connection	 between	 a	 model	
prison constructed in 1871 and Canning’s recommendation in 1851, but 
the construction did take place and the prison was designated a peniten-
tiary (hapishane- yi umumi).16
Besides the obvious need for prison reform, another reason for build-
ing	such	an	edifice	was	to	procure	greater	political,	judicial,	and	financial	
autonomy from European powers. Many late nineteenth century Ottoman 
officials	hoped	that	such	reforms	would	convince	the	Great	Powers	that	
the empire deserved equal status in the Concert of Europe and lead to the 
abolishment of exploitative capitulations.17 Despite the adoption of the 
1858 IOPC and the creation of a model prison in the imperial capital, it 
was not until the Hamidian era that administrators began replicating this 
type of prison around the empire and penal reforms gained greater sig-
nificance.	As	a	result	of	these	legal	and	judicial	reforms,	punishment	and	
prisons became an issue of ‘civilisation’ among the rising Ottoman intel-
ligentsia with a growing focus on rehabilitating prisoners (‘ıslah- ı nefs’).18
Although these changes and activities mark very important steps in 
the direction of concrete penal reform, further developments did not 
take place until the Hamidian era (1876–1908). Sultan Abdülhamid II 
legislated and implemented penal reforms on several fronts – judicial 
proceedings in criminal matters, participation in international prison 
conferences, the construction of new prisons, new prison administrative 
regulations, and regular prison inspections. His successes, however, were 
founded	on	the	efforts	of	his	predecessor	(Sultan	Abdülaziz)	who	prom-
ulgated the ‘Instructions for the Administration of the Provinces’ on 21 
February	 1876.	 These	 instructions	 stipulated	 that	 district	 officials	were	
required to supervise prisons, maintain prison population registers, and 
submit regular written reports to the Ministry of Justice. Not only did it 
delineate administrative responsibilities for prisons, but it also affected 
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their internal organisation by mandating the separation of convicted and 
accused inmates. Additionally, it contained provisions designed to combat 
arbitrary detentions.19
Building	from	Adbülaziz’s	efforts,	Sultan	Abdülhamid	II	issued	the	1879	
Code	of	Criminal	Procedure	and	officially	 instituted	 the	nizamiye court 
system (both of which were discussed in Chapter 1). Contemporaneous 
with	 these	 developments,	 Abdülhamid	 II	 ordered	 Müfettiş	 Pasha	 to	
conduct a comprehensive inspection of Ottoman prisons and submit his 
recommendations for improvement as part of a new prison reform cam-
paign (hapishane ıslahatı).	He	was	also	given	specific	orders	to	find	ways	
to rescue ‘prisoners from their miserable conditions’ (mahbusların hâl- i 
sefâletten).	Müfettiş	 Pasha	completed	his	 inspections	and	 submitted	his	
report in December 1879. It contained scathing descriptions of the woeful 
prison conditions, complaints regarding the length of sentences, and rec-
ommendations for improvement. His most intriguing recommendation 
concerned the newly constructed (1871) Dersaadet penitentiary. He found 
it inadequate and in need of replacement after just eight years of use. He 
proposed that penitentiaries be separated from populated areas and, there-
fore, recommended that the Dersaadet penitentiary be relocated to a small 
island in the Marmara Sea just off the coast of Istanbul. This prison would 
house	only	criminals	sentenced	to	fifteen	or	more	years	of	hard	labour.20
Shortly	after	Müfettiş	Pasha	filed	his	report,	the	Ministry	of	Justice	in	
May 1880 issued ‘The Regulation for Prisons and Houses of Detention’ 
(Hapishane ve Tevkifhane Nizamnamesi). The 1880 Prison Regulation 
contains six sections consisting of ninety- seven articles meticulously 
detailing the proper administration of Ottoman prisons in both the imperial 
centre and provinces. The regulation includes such items as standards for 
health and hygiene, living conditions, and the spatial separation of differ-
ent types of prisoners based on gender, age, type of crime, and status as 
convicted	or	accused.	It	also	stipulates	the	types	of	prison	officials	to	be	
employed, such as wardens, clerks, doctors, and male and female guards, 
and their associated responsibilities. Regulations regarding the conduct of 
prison personnel and internal prison order and discipline are also clearly 
delineated.	Additionally,	it	specifies	the	types	and	manner	of	prison	labour	
and who should perform them.21
This	 regulation	was	 the	first	 of	 its	 kind	 in	 the	 empire.	 It	was	 never,	
however,	officially	adopted	by	sultanic	decree	(irade). Regardless of its 
unofficial	status,	it	represents	a	significant	step	in	Ottoman	penal	reform	
for	at	least	two	reasons.	First,	it	signifies	the	Ottoman	process	of	appro-
priation and adaptation of European prison regulations. Ottoman prison 
reformers sifted numerous sources, including French and Prussian prison 
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administrative regulations, and adapted the measures best suited to the 
empire’s	 specific	 needs	 and	 circumstances.22 Second, the 1880 Prison 
Regulation served as the template for prison reform and administration 
throughout the rest of the empire’s existence.
Abdülhamid	 II	 attempted	 to	 implement	 the	 first	 article	 of	 the	 1880	
Prison Regulation, which states, ‘Every district (kaza), sub- division (liva) 
and provincial centre shall possess a prison and house of detention [jail].’23 
In almost every provincial centre and in many administrative sub-districts, 
officials	 constructed	 either	 a	 prison	 (hapishane) or a jail (tevkifhane). 
Abdülhamid II also constructed a number of ‘model’ prisons, had pictures 
taken of them, and showed them off to the rest of the world. These ‘model’ 
prisons were built according to new architectural designs and furnished 
with the latest equipment. Unfortunately, the administration of the vast 
majority of Ottoman prisons did not follow the 1880 Prison Regulation.24 
This represents, however, a higher degree of penal reform implementation 
than	during	the	Tanzimat	era.
Beginning	 in	 the	 1870s,	 Ottoman	 representatives	 first	 attended	 and	
then fully participated in international prison conferences. This par-
ticipation brought prestige and provided a forum for discussing important 
reform	policies.	Ottoman	 representatives	 attended	 the	first	 International	
Penal Congress in 1872 as observers, but it was not until 1890 that 
they participated as full members in the international prison conference 
held at St Petersburg, Russia. Prior to 1890, only ‘civilised’ European 
and North American countries could be full participants. The topic of 
Ottoman involvement produced a great deal of consternation among the 
Great	Powers,	but,	in	1890,	a	formal	invitation	to	participate	was	finally	
extended. This invitation marked an important step for Ottoman self- 
perceptions of the empire’s own civilisational progress.25
Ottoman representatives translated the proceedings of the conference 
and submitted them to the Council of State (Şura- yı Devlet) to be debated 
and	ratified.	Most	issues	discussed	at	the	conference,	however,	had	already	
been addressed in the 1880 Prison Regulation. The empire continued to 
participate in international prison conferences until 1910, which was the 
last conference held prior to the outbreak of WWI.
Eighteen ninety-six was an important year for prison reform in the 
empire.	Under	the	direction	of	Abdülhamid	II,	administrators	reaffirmed	
legislation that was passed in 1879 that authorised provincial governors 
to appoint committees for preliminary inquiries into corruption, abuse of 
official	power,	health	and	hygiene	concerns,	and	prisoner	mistreatment.	
The membership of these appointed committees consisted of a president, 
a Muslim, and a non- Muslim. Each member possessed the authority to 
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request information from the police and to release prisoners who were 
unjustly detained. This legislation also authorised governors to appoint 
both prison directors and guards.26
In	 close	 association	 with	 this	 legislative	 reaffirmation,	 Abdülhamid	
II established ‘The Commission for Expediting Initiatives and Reforms’ 
(Tesri- i Muamelat ve Islahat Komisyonu) and placed it under the direction 
of the Ministry of the Interior. He charged it to conduct regular inspec-
tions in order to monitor the progress and hasten the implementation 
of imperial reforms. This commission spent a major portion of its time 
investigating health- and hygiene- related issues, particularly in prisons, 
hospitals, and major urban areas. The commission’s efforts clearly align 
with Hamidan goals for the state to take greater responsibility for public 
health and hygiene, especially in the prevention and spread of communi-
cable diseases such as cholera and syphilis.27 During the time in which 
the	commission	operated	(1896–1908),	numerous	reports	detailed	specific	
prison health concerns and described the general state of Ottoman prison 
disrepair. These reports provide a general picture of prison conditions 
in the empire, demonstrating that most prisons were not abiding by the 
hygiene directives issued by the Sublime Porte or to be found in the 1880 
Prison Regulation.28
Notwithstanding these efforts, prison reform was still hampered by 
administrative	 inefficiency.	No	single	ministry	or	department	possessed	
full	responsibility	for	administering	or	financing	the	empire’s	sprawling	
prison network. The centralisation of bureaucratic responsibilities between 
the palace (Sultan Abdülhamid II) and the Sublime Porte (the Ministries 
of Justice, Finance, and Interior) were still in the process of being ration-
alised. The Ottomans had yet to create a central Prison Administration 
with the comprehensive powers to implement the 1880 Prison Regulation. 
Abdülhamid II’s reign, however, did result in a greater level of bureau-
cratic streamlining than his predecessors had brought about. He also 
strengthened the connections between the concepts of civilisation, the cen-
tralisation of administrative power, and prison reform. Abdülhamid II’s 
reforms also demonstrate the state’s growing intervention into the daily 
lives of its subjects, especially in terms of health care and preventing the 
spread of infectious disease. His world view focused on centralising his 
power and the transformation of his empire. This left an important legacy 
and foundation for the CUP on which to base its own reform agenda. 
During the Second Constitutional Period, as imperial crises worsened and 
the authoritarian nature of the government increased, the CUP fully inte-
grated prisons into its nation- state construction, economic development, 
and social- engineering programmes.
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Prisons Reform in the Second Constitutional Period
The Ottoman Empire of the early twentieth century was anything but 
peaceful, prosperous, and stable. In the few years leading up to the 1908 
Constitutional Revolution there were waves of strikes, popular protests, 
and riots throughout the empire as a result of dire economic hardships, 
crop failures, and new taxes. CUP revolutionaries planned, instigated, 
and fanned many of these protest actions.29 During 1908 and 1909, the 
Ottoman administration and society experienced tremendous upheaval as 
a result of a coup d’état and countercoup, the reinstatement of the 1876 
Constitution, the reintroduction of parliamentary rule, extensive territorial 
losses in the Balkans, an initial relaxation of press censorship, a general 
liberalisation of politics, and extensive bureaucratic and administrative 
reforms.30
With the CUP’s ascendance, there was an explosion in political activ-
ism, demonstrations, and the proliferation of printed materials throughout 
the empire. Various nationalist identities and ideologies competed for the 
hearts and minds of portions of the Ottoman population. From 1908 to 
1913, vast stretches of Ottoman territory were lost, including Crete, the 
territories of present- day Libya, the Dodecanese Islands, and all of the 
Balkans, except for the eastern portion of Rumeli, resulting in a massive 
influx	of	Muslim	refugees	into	the	empire.	The	Ottoman	world	was	liter-
ally ‘turned upside down.’31
This context of social, territorial, demographic, and political crises 
helps illuminate the role that penal policy and reform played in CUP 
pragmatism and modern state construction. Police and prisons constitute 
key institutions for maintaining power and imposing order and discipline 
upon a population, especially during times of crisis. As early as 1909, the 
CUP clearly linked penal reform and prisons, in concrete terms, to social 
control and modern state formation. Penal reform also began playing a 
role in CUP ideology to bring civilisation, science, reason, progress, eco-
nomic development, and administrative centralisation to the empire.
Shortly after coming to power, the CUP took drastic action to curb 
strikes and political protests, even though its members had originally 
promoted these activities, leading up to the 1908 Revolution. It brutally 
crushed these actions and passed legislation outlawing them.32 The CUP’s 
inner circle possessed a healthy distrust of the masses according to Gustav 
Le Bon’s (1841–1931) elitist and racist philosophy concerning crowd 
psychology. CUP members read Le Bon’s The Psychology of the Crowd, 
first	published	in	1895,	and	adopted	its	principles	as	a	foundation	of	their	
political ideology. They viewed themselves as an elite group leading the 
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nation to reason, science, progress, and civilisation. Le Bon was a Comtian 
Postivist and his views originated from the French Third Republic, whose 
elites believed that the French Revolution had gone terribly wrong during 
the Jacobin Reign of Terror.33
The Young Turks, and especially the leaders of the CUP, attempted to 
promote themselves as inheritors of the ideals of the French Revolution. 
They continuously portrayed Sultan Abdülhamid II as a corrupt despot 
similar to Louis XVI of France and labelled the sultan’s administration 
the ‘ancien régime’. The inner circle of the CUP mainly consisted of low- 
level	bureaucrats	and	junior	military	officers	who	received	European-	style	
educations in the schools established by Abdülhamid II. Their frustration 
grew to revolutionary levels at what they viewed as the sultan’s nepotistic 
and sycophantic style of rule. They claimed to possess the training and 
expertise to save the empire from dismemberment and collapse by raising 
the	Ottoman	populace	to	the	level	of	a	scientific	society.	To	Le	Bon,	the	
Third	Republic,	and	the	CUP,	the	masses	constituted	a	powerful	yet	fickle	
force that needed to be controlled, dominated, and directed for the good 
of the nation. As a result of the 1909 countercoup the CUP viewed the 
masses as a real threat to its rule, and thus it established a powerful penal 
institution to subdue, monitor, and control the masses.
In August 1909, just four months after the failed countercoup, the CUP- 
led government established the Directorate of Public Security (Emniyet- i 
Umumiye Müdiriyeti). It functioned as a CUP harbinger to consolidate 
power and control the population. For example, one of the directorate’s 
functions was to monitor and control vagrants, vagabonds, and the unem-
ployed.34 This new directorate replaced the Ministry of Police (Zabtiye 
Nezareti), was attached to the Ministry of the Interior, and was allocated a 
considerable budget.35 As early as 1910, the Directorate of Public Security 
collected and reported to the Ministry of the Interior detailed statistics 
regarding crime, riots, strikes, and general political issues from across the 
empire.36
Prison reform during the Second Constitutional Period began almost 
immediately with the intent to exploit penal institutions for the purpose 
of social engineering. From 1909 to 1911, the CUP- led government, 
focused on developing a central prison policy. In order to develop its pro-
grammes,	prison	officials	conducted	detailed	inspections	from	Yemen	to	
the Balkans. It suspended all major prison construction and repair projects 
until a general prison architectural design could be developed. In formu-
lating its policy, the CUP drew heavily from the 1880 Prison Regulation 
and further implemented Article 1, which mandated a central prison and 
jail in every administrative district throughout the empire. The CUP 
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utilised Hamidian prison regulations as the template for its own prison 
reforms and implemented the 1880 Prison Regulation at an unprecedented 
level, especially in areas associated with order, discipline, administration, 
and health and hygiene.37
Simultaneous to these initial inspections, the Ottoman administration 
raised the funds necessary to implement its penal reform programme. 
After deposing Abdülhamid II, the new government wrested administra-
tive	power	from	the	Hamidian	bureaucracy,	confiscated	the	sultan’s	prop-
erty, auctioned it off, reformed the Ministry of Finance, and attempted to 
create a more accurate, transparent, and balanced budget.38 Administrators 
devised various schemes to raise funds for prison reform. These included 
establishing a number of labour prisons in major population centres of 





In May 1911, just prior to the IOPC revisions, Ottoman legislators 
promulgated a regulation to reorganise the empire’s prisons. This regu-
lation called for investigations into particular prison practices aimed at 
disciplining and rehabilitating prisoners. It also led to the creation of 
the empire’s second major penal institution, the Prison Administration 
(Hapishane İdaresi).41	Except	for	military	and	consular	prisons,	this	office	
streamlined and consolidated the decentralised Ottoman system of more 
than a thousand different prisons and houses of detention into one bureau-
cratic administration and placed it under the jurisdiction of the Ministry 
of the Interior.
The CUP- led Ottoman Parliament then passed extensive legislation 
related to penal policy and practice. As discussed in Chapter 1, on 4 June 
1911, the Ottoman Parliament heavily revised the 1858 IOPC aimed at cen-
tralising and expanding the bureaucracy’s authority over the adjudication 
of crime and punishment. The reformed IOPC delineated new crimes, codi-
fied	and	standardised	punishments,	expanded	state	authority	over	the	use	of	
force, further circumscribed the autonomy of court judges and local admin-
istrators, increased the state’s ability to intervene in familial matters, and 
augmented	definitions	regarding	criminal	culpability,	particularly	in	rela-
tion	to	minors.	These	changes	solidified	the	central	administration’s	control	
over criminal legal matters and punishment. It also entrenched incarceration 
as the primary punishment for criminal activity. There are deep and impor-
tant connections between these IOPC revisions and the prison reforms initi-
ated and implemented from 1911–12, especially the 1912 prison survey.
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Having collected enough preliminary information, created a centralised 
Prison Administration, substantially augmented the IOPC, and secured the 
necessary	 funding	 the	 Prison	Administration	 launched	 its	 first	 compre-
hensive prison census in January 1912. It distributed the survey to every 
province and administrative district throughout the empire and requested 
enormous amounts of information about the prison population and prison 
management. The 1912 prison survey requested details regarding crimes 
committed, sentences served, marital and familial status, occupation, 
education level, age, and the ethno- religious and national identity of each 
prisoner. It also collected information on prison expenditures, health care, 
deaths in prisons, rates of recidivism, and prison factories. Chapter 3 
contains a detailed discussion of this survey and the information it yields 
regarding the empire’s prison population.42
The knowledge and power gained by this questionnaire and others 
like it not only shaped CUP penal reform, but it also fashioned the 
prison into a premier institution for social control, social engineering, 
and Ottoman nation- state construction, surpassed only by the police and 
military. Prisons became microcosms of the CUP’s larger plans to meld 
the empire’s population and administration into a modern nation- state. 
The programmes implemented in Ottoman prisons, such as education, 
administrative and organisational centralisation, social engineering, health 
and hygiene, labour, and economic development parallel those imple-
mented empire- wide. Additionally, the Prison Administration also initi-
ated another statistical campaign in 1912 concerning prison employees. 
This survey collected the names, titles, numbers, responsibilities, salaries, 
and dates of service of all prison employees. Combined, these two surveys 
provide the most detailed picture of the Ottoman prison population and 
administration ever compiled.43
After completing these surveys and processing their results, the CUP 
initiated	its	first	comprehensive	prison	reform	programme	in	early	1912	
aimed at bringing ‘Ottoman prison standards and health and hygiene con-
ditions in line with the Laws of Civilisation’.44 Mandated reforms required 
every prison to have an outdoor courtyard for inmates and called for the 
hiring	of	qualified	prison	employees	who	were	literate	in	penal	laws	and	
practices. Another reform made provisions for prisoner rehabilitation 
through education and labour. Additionally, every prison was either to be 
renovated or rebuilt according to modern architectural standards. After 
completing all of the research and initiating such an extensive programme 
in early 1912, the Ottoman Government suddenly suspended all of these 
reforms in the autumn of 1912. It has been argued that the Balkan Wars 
caused this discontinuance, but this is only partially correct.45
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In the summer of 1912, the CUP won an outright majority in the 
Ottoman	Parliament	and	gained	sole	control	of	the	government	for	the	first	
time. Notwithstanding this major victory, the CUP quickly found itself 
expelled from power after being accused of using its Special Organisation 
(Teşkilat- i Mahsusa) to intimidate, spy upon, and assassinate political 
rivals in order to manipulate election results. The Entente Liberal, the 
CUP’s main opposition party, was instrumental in bringing down the CUP 
Government. Its political platform advocated administrative decentralisa-
tion for the Arab provinces, economic liberalisation, free trade, and Great 
Power intervention in the empire’s economic, administrative, and social 
problems.46 It is important to note that until 1912 the CUP had never held 
direct	political	power,	but	had	remained	a	clandestine	society	influencing	
Ottoman politics from behind the scenes through elected representatives. 
Intense political pressure caused by the 1912 electoral scandal, resulted 
in the CUP Government resigning and being replaced by the ‘Great 
Cabinet’- led National Unity Coalition.47
The ‘Great Cabinet’ quickly purged the government of CUP members, 
arresting many, executing some, and chasing others into exile. This new 
coalition government emasculated CUP military support in the Balkans 
by about 70,000 troops and demoted the military leadership loyal to the 
CUP.48 Another apparent victim of the new government was the CUP’s 
prison reform programme.
The First Balkan War did not start until 8 October 1912. As a result of 
the	military	purges	of	CUP	officers	and	troops,	especially	in	the	Balkans,	
the Ottoman military was woefully unprepared and, therefore, soundly 
defeated. Edirne was on the verge of collapse, which would expose 
Istanbul to foreign invasion and conquest. On 28 January 1913 some 
members	 of	 the	 CUP	 stormed	 the	 cabinet	 office	 of	 the	 Sublime	 Porte,	
shot	the	Minister	of	War,	overthrew	the	‘Great	Cabinet’	and	for	the	first	
time	consolidated	political	power	firmly	within	their	own	hands.	The	new	
cabinet reconvened parliament, reinstating all the loyal CUP members 
who were elected in 1912.49
In response to the general upheaval caused by the Balkan Wars and 
its temporary loss of power, the CUP attempted to consolidate its politi-
cal control even further by restructuring the Ministry of the Interior. 
On 22 December 1913, Talat Pasha (Minister of the Interior) issued the 
‘Regulation for the Restructuring of the Ministry of the Interior’ (Dahiliye 
Nezareti Teşkilati Hakkında Nizamname). It completely overhauled, 
streamlined, and increased the power of the ministry. Out of all the reforms 
enacted by the CUP during the Second Constitutional Period, none were 
more extensive than what took place in the Ministry of the Interior.50
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The new ‘central organisational core’ of the ministry consisted of 
eleven directorates, including the Directorate of Public Security (Emniyet- i 
Umumiye Müdiriyeti) and the Directorate of Prisons (Hapishaneler 
Müdiriyeti). Although similar organisations had been created shortly after 
the failed countercoup of 1909 and in 1911, the 1913 regulation raised the 
profile	of	both	directorates	within	the	Sublime	Porte	and	greatly	expanded	
their responsibilities and powers. The Directorate of Public Security was 
charged with ‘executing and pursuing all matters, issues, and affairs that 
concern the maintenance of public order, security, discipline, and the rule 
of law within all territories under [Ottoman] dominion’. The regulation 
also charged it to ‘gather and analyse all intelligence dealing with its 
assigned duties’ and to be ‘responsible for maintaining and administering 
law enforcement’. For its part, the Directorate of Prisons (Hapishaneler 
Müdiriyeti) replaced the Prison Administration (Hapishane İdaresi). This 
constitutes an upgrade in status from being an ‘administration’ to that of 
a ‘directorate’ in the bureaucracy, thus making it on par with the other 
directorates within the Ministry of the Interior. Furthermore, this directo-
rate was given extensive new powers including ‘maintaining, repairing, 
operating, constructing, and administering all prisons and gathering all 
necessary intelligence and information pertaining to any of the aforemen-
tioned responsibilities’.51 The powers and responsibilities given to these 
two directorates are indicative of modern penal institutions.
From December 1913, the prison increasingly became a focus of 
CUP administrative and societal reform. The CUP revived, resumed, and 
expanded the suspended 1911–12 prison reform programme. The conduct 
of prison surveys and reports shifted from annual to tri- annual reporting 
on	prison	officials	and	the	incarcerated.52
In 1914, the Directorate of Prisons initiated another comprehensive 
prison survey. Similar to the 1912 prison survey, it sent this question-
naire (sual varakaları) to every prison in the empire. The questionnaire 
requested information on the state and condition of each prison facility 
asking for detailed input from local prison administrators in the form of 
extensive	written	comments	about	the	specific	needs	for	their	respective	
prisons.53 To make their cases some wardens included photographs of their 
facilities that revealed the woeful conditions that prisoners were forced to 
endure.54 Other prison directors included blueprints of the prisons that 
they wanted built.55
The	 findings	 of	 this	 survey	 resulted	 in	 a	 massive	 prison	 renova-
tion and construction programme similar to the one initiated in 1912. 
Administrators designed, funded, and initiated new prison construc-
tion projects around the empire, particularly in provincial centres. In its 
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continued adherence to the 1880 Prison Regulation, it appears that the 
Directorate of Prisons intended to build a prison in every administrative 
district in the empire.56 Similar to the 1911–12 plans to raise the money 
for such a project, on 25 January 1914 the Directorate of Prisons issued 
a directive calling for the selling of ‘ruined existing prisons and vacant 
lands’	in	order	to	finance	the	prison	overhaul.57
This revitalised building and renovation programme launched scores of 
new	prison	construction	projects.	Prison	officials	from	around	the	empire	
submitted land surveys, building estimates, and expenditure reports to 
the Directorate of Prisons, which in turn approved and funded them with 
the assistance of the Ministry of Finance. There are literally thousands of 
prison architectural designs, building estimates, and expenditure reports 
held in the Ottoman archives that illustrate the massive scale of this 
 operation.58 Unlike in the Balkan Wars, the CUP did not suspend prison 
reform during WWI. In fact, prison reform continued to expand through-
out the war. The effort, time, and resources expended on prison reform 
during this period clearly demonstrate the importance of penal institutions 
to the CUP’s imperial vision.
These penal reform efforts should not be attributed to pressure from 
Germany, its wartime ally. CUP interest and efforts regarding penal codes, 
practices, and institutions pre- dates its alliance with Germany and did not 
continue in order to curry German support. The Ottoman Empire was very 
successful	 in	 securing	 the	 loans	and	financial	assistance	 it	wanted	 from	
Berlin	during	the	war.	For	the	first	time,	a	Great	Power	(Germany)	needed	
Ottoman assistance more than the other way round. Germany was desper-
ate to keep the Ottomans in the war. This gave the CUP and the Ottoman 
Minister of Finance (Cavid Pasha) enormous leverage over its German 
ally	when	it	came	to	financial	matters	–	even	securing	German	financial	
assistance for the empire’s prison reforms.59
On 6 May 1915 the Directorate of Prisons completed another statistical 
collection campaign. This survey did not deal with prison conditions, but 
focused on budgets and expenditures in relation to the number of inmates. 
Each province provided expenditures for the current year as well as previ-
ous ones and proposed its future budget.60
The importance of prisons to CUP ideology and state formation is 
demonstrated no clearer than during WWI. Faced again with crisis, the 
Ottoman administration continued to place heavy importance on penal 
reform.	During	the	summer	of	1916	Ottoman	foreign	officials	in	Germany	
began interviewing potential candidates for the newly created position 
of ‘Inspector General of Prisons and Penitentiary Establishments for the 
Ottoman Empire’ (Inspecteur Général des Prisons et Etablissements 
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Pénitenciers de l’Empire Ottoman).	 Ottoman	 officials	 narrowed	 the	
candidates	 to	Dr	Paul	Pollitz	and	M.	Alexander	Klein.	Both	Pollitz	and	
Klein had extensive experience of directing German prisons. The suc-
cessful candidate’s main responsibility would be to continue to overhaul, 
manage,	and	reconfigure	the	empire’s	prisons.61 On 15 October 1916, the 
Directorate of Prisons had the Ottoman Ambassador to Berlin, Ibrahim 
Hakki	Pasha,	 hire	Dr	Paul	Pollitz	 as	 the	 empire’s	 Inspector	General	 of	
Prisons and Penitentiary Establishments. This hiring was approved by 
the	highest	echelons	of	the	Ottoman	Government	including	Grand	Vizer,	
Mehmed Said Halim Pasha, and Interior Minister Talat Pasha.62
Dr	Pollitz	was	a	private	German	citizen,	a	professional	prison	admin-
istrator, a reformer, and a criminal psychiatrist. According to his contract, 
Dr	Pollitz	received	a	substantial	annual	salary	of	1,200	Turkish	Lira	and	
also received payments of 1,500 Francs upon his arrival to Istanbul and at 
his	departure	in	order	to	offset	travel	expenditures.	He	was	hired	for	a	five-	
year term beginning on 1 November 1916.63 Upon his arrival to Istanbul, 
Dr	Pollitz	expanded	and	intensified	the	already	robust	penal	reform	pro-
grammes initiated by the Directorate of Prisons and focused his efforts on 
greater	administrative	efficiency	and	oversight.	Additionally,	he	expanded	
the construction of new prisons, improved health and hygiene conditions, 
and championed the plight of incarcerated minors.
Shortly	 after	 his	 arrival,	 Dr	 Pollitz	 began	 reviewing	 Ottoman	 penal	
regulations.	 On	 28	 December	 1916,	 Pollitz	 submitted	 a	 draft	 proposal	
to the Ministry of the Interior for a new comprehensive prison regula-
tion.	 This	 massive	 document	 more	 than	 doubled	 the	 size	 of	 the	 1880	
Prison Regulation. Some additions included standardising salaries for all 
prison employees based on position and experience, clearer guidelines 
regarding prison health and hygiene practices, daily prison routines and 
organisation,	and,	most	significantly,	placing	greater	importance	on	prison	
labour.64 Debate regarding this proposal continued for several months, 
but it was never adopted due to budgetary concerns. On 24 April 1917, 
however,	the	CUP	and	Directorate	of	Prisons	officially	ratified	the	1880	
Prison Regulation and distributed it to every prison in the empire.65 This 
was	the	first	time	in	the	Ottoman	Empire’s	long	history	that	any	compre-
hensive	 prison	 regulation	was	 officially	 adopted	 and	made	 binding	 for	
every	prison.	Prison	practice,	at	 least	on	paper,	was	finally	standardised	
for the empire.
Shortly after submitting his revised Ottoman Prison Regulatory Code, 
Dr	 Pollitz	 issued	 a	 statement	 outlining	 his	 comprehensive	 plans	 for	
penal reform, which included the reorganisation of the prison population 
according to the gravity of the crimes committed. For example, prisoners 
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sentenced to one to three months should all be incarcerated at the lowest 
administrative level (kaza) while perpetrators of more serious crimes 
should be incarcerated together at the provincial or sub- provincial level. 
Dr	 Pollitz,	 throughout	 his	 tenure	 as	 inspector	 general,	 championed	 the	
separation of the convicted and accused through the construction of many 
new jails (tevkifhaneler) for the better maintenance of prison order and 
prisoner protection. He also proposed restructuring the powers of provin-
cial, sub- division and district governors regarding the administration of 
prisons on the local level.66
Dovetailed	 with	 these	 programmes,	 Dr	 Pollitz	 also	 proposed	 and	
implemented	new	regulations	governing	prison	finance.	In	January	1917,	
he ordered the compilation of prison budgets and expenditures for 1916. 
According to the data, the 1916 budget for the Directorate of Prisons 
totalled 314,474 Turkish Lira (TL).67 The 1917 proposed budget repli-
cated the amounts spent in 1916 for supplies, medicines, and salaries, but 
did not estimate future building costs.68
The 1916 expenditures are quite remarkable considering that the 
empire was at war, even though the amount only represents 2 per cent of 
the total budget for the Ministry of the Interior in 1912. The Ministry of 
the Interior, however, was responsible for the maintenance and operation 
of all internal services, transport, infrastructure, and government adminis-
trations throughout the empire. The fact that the Ottoman prison popula-
tion constituted less than 0.16 per cent of the total Ottoman population 
makes the amount of resources spent on prisons surprising.69
As	a	result	of	these	budgetary	inquiries,	Dr	Pollitz	proposed	a	set	of	new	
regulations for Ottoman prison budgets and expenditures (Hapishaneler 
Nizamnamesi’nin hapishanelerin hesap muameleleri). It consisted of ten 
articles focused on greater transparency, control, and accountability of the 
Directorate of Prison’s expenses on all levels. His assistants wrote up the 
new proposal and submitted it to the Ministry of the Interior on 7 October 
1917.70
Dr	Pollitz’s	 agenda	 also	 included	 ascertaining	 prison	 conditions	 and	
managing the numerous building projects that were already under way. 
By 26 November 1916, he received a report detailing the current build-
ing projects for new jails (tevkifhaneler) within the empire. These pro-
jects	 included	 İzmir,	Adana,	Mersin,	Beirut,	 Eskişehir,	 Samsun,	 İzmid,	
Kayseri,	 Yozgad,	 and	 Kala-	i	 Sultaniye,	 in	 addition	 to	 projects	 already	
begun	in	Istanbul	and	Üsküdar.	Each	tevkifhane was to hold 400 prison-
ers separated into different quarters for men, women, and children. These 
houses	of	detention	would	also	contain	an	infirmary,	toilets,	washrooms,	
a mosque, a morgue, and a kitchen. The estimated cost of each jail ranged 
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from 10,000 to 15,000 Turkish Liras. Just to reiterate, all of these projects 
pre-	date	Dr	Pollitz’s	arrival.
As part of his broader inquiries into the condition of the empire’s 
prisons,	 Dr	 Pollitz	 requested	 information	 on	 several	 additional	 items,	
divided into four categories: 1. the physical structure of the building – its 
size,	capacity,	and	age;	2.	general	prison	conditions	–	ventilation,	light,	and	
dampness; 3. health and hygiene – cleanliness, disease, the existence of a 
clinic, mentally ill prisoners, clothing, parasites, potable water, and toilets; 
and 4. food – type, quality, and quantity.71 These inquiries led directly 





of inmates eighteen years of age and under, each prison’s food source, the 
names, locations, and types of every prison throughout the empire, the 
number of male prisoners and the number of female prisoners, the types of 
crimes committed (cinayet, cünha, and kabahat), number of working pris-
oners, the number and types of employees in each prison, and the number 
of	prisoners	who	possessed	expertise	that	would	benefit	the	war	effort,	such	
as agricultural or road construction.73 Many of these categories match the 
follow-	up	questions	Dr	Pollitz	had	asked	just	a	month	earlier	about	 jails	
(tevkifhaneler) under construction in 1916 and 1917.74 In fact, there is also 
a close correlation between the added emphasis he placed on prison labour 
in his proposed prison regulation (nizamname) and the new prison survey.75
Dr	 Pollitz	 sent	 the	 questionnaires	 to	 every	 provincial	 governor	 and	
prison in the empire. The directive was issued jointly by the Directorate 
of Prisons and the Ministry of the Interior and signed (in Ottoman 
Turkish,	no	 less)	by	Dr	Pollitz.	 It	 stipulated	 that	 each	of	 the	provincial	
governors (valiler) was personally responsible for the completion of the 
survey in addition to supplying the requested information ‘to the greatest 
degree (en ziyade) about the prison guards (gardiyanlar),	prison	officials	
(memurler), the prison board of directors (heyet idaresi), the prison direc-
tors (müdirler), and the general conditions of the prisons (hapishanelerin 
ahval umumiyesi)’. The provincial governors were also responsible for 
providing information regarding the number of prisoners being compelled 
to do agricultural work.76	 In	 the	 end,	Dr	Pollitz	 justified	 the	 survey	 by	
claiming that it would be the ‘basis for the reorganisation (teşkilat)’ of the 
empire’s prisons.77
By	March	1917,	 the	vast	majority	of	 local	prison	officials	had	com-
pleted and returned the questionnaires.78 The Directorate of Prisons 
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compiled the results into a meticulously organised master copy.79 These 
statistical	 tabulations	became	the	basis	of	Dr	Politz’s	reform	campaigns	
for the rest of his tenure. His campaigns focused on improving prison 
health and hygiene conditions, relieving prison overcrowding, construct-
ing new prisons, prison repairs, the plight of juvenile delinquents, devel-
oping programmes to rehabilitate prisoners, especially through labour, and 
bringing greater order and discipline to prison regimes.80
Dr	Pollitz	spent	a	great	deal	of	his	time	inspecting	prisons	and	verify-
ing that reforms were being implemented. His peregrinations took him 
throughout the empire from Rumeli to the Aegean and throughout Anatolia 
and the Arab provinces.81 This continued until he was relieved from duty 
in 1919 and prison reform in the empire came to a screeching halt. The 
post- CUP Ottoman Government slashed prison budgets as a result of 
losing WWI and the Entente occupation of Istanbul. Without the CUP 
in power, prison conditions quickly deteriorated as demonstrated by the 
British prison inspections conducted in late 1918 and in early 1919. The 
inspection reports described horrifying conditions including widespread 
corruption, abuse, and death due to poor hygiene, disease, and malnutri-
tion. It appears that the only reforms carried out in the empire’s prisons 
during the Armistice Period (Mütakere Dönemi) and the allied occupation 
of Istanbul occurred as a result of Entente pressure.82 A comparison of 
acheivements	during	 the	 tenures	of	Major	Gordon	and	Dr	Pollitz	as	 the	
directors of Ottoman prison reform seventy years apart, demonstrates 
the empire’s increased commitment to prisons and penal institutions over 
the course of the nineteenth century.
Conclusion
As this brief state- centric overview of Ottoman penal reform demon-
strates, prisons were important sites of imperial transformation in the 
late	 Ottoman	 Empire.	 These	 modifications	 represent	 a	 coherent	 and	
internally developed system of reforms by Ottoman bureaucrats to cen-
tralise power within the hands of the state and enter more fully into the 
lives	of	 the	empire’s	 citizens.	These	 transformations	do	not	 represent	 a	
rupture from the past or a discarding of long- held beliefs and practices in 
some sort of secularising and Westernising mission. This transformation 
represents a clear example of the development and execution of a unique 
Ottoman modernity that consciously adapted new methods of governance 
to existing structures in the empire, thus creating a new dynamic distinc-
tive to the empire’s historical, ideological, and cultural development. 
Notwithstanding CUP claims that the ancien régime was gone, it clearly 
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built on existing programmes and furthered them in an attempt to create a 
modern state.
This chapter also demonstrates the central government’s clear inten-
tion to increase its intervention into the lives of its population at all levels 
of state and society, particularly the prison. Similar programmes and 
processes being implemented throughout the empire were simultaneously 
happening within prison walls, thus making the prison a microcosm of 
Ottoman modernity and transformation. These programmes and poli-
cies included administrative centralisation, the streamlining and stand-
ardisation of regulation and procedure, information gathering, employee 
professionalisation, improving public health and hygiene, economic 
development, and the rehabilitation of prisoners through productive 
work.
Subsequent chapters juxtapose particular reform efforts with the 
actual	 experiences	 of	 inmates	 and	 prison	 officials	 to	 investigate	 how	
these interactions affected prison reform efforts and everyday life. These 
include prison surveys and the prison population, prison organisation and 
everyday life, the professionalisation of the prison cadre and the realities 
of corruption and prisoner abuse, and juvenile delinquency and incar-
ceration. These chapters further several themes discussed in this overview 
and go into greater detail about state intentions, ideology, implementa-
tion, and their effects on prison life as local administrators and prisoners 
 appropriated, resisted, and/or ignored these attempts. They also continue 
the other intersecting themes woven throughout the book that include 
transformation through continuity and change, a focus by reformers on 
prisoner rehabilitation, administrative centralisation and governmental-
ity, order and discipline, and the creation and expansion of Ottoman state 
patriarchy in which the government increasingly assumed greater amounts 
of responsibility for the welfare of its population.
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Counting the Incarcerated: Knowledge,  
Power and the Prison Population
As mentioned in Chapter 2, soon after its creation in May 1911, the 
Prison Administration began to organise a detailed prison survey. This 
survey commenced on 18 January 1912 by eliciting information regard-
ing every aspect of prisons, including budgets, health care, employees, 
prison labour, and inmates. Categories of inquiry associated with pris-
oners included crimes committed, gender, date of incarceration, marital 
and familial status, recidivism, punishment, social class and occupation, 
ethno- religious/national identity, age, and literacy. The survey broke down 
each	of	these	categories	further	into	lists	of	specific	items	related	to	the	
prisoner’s identity. For example, familial status differentiated its various 
categories according to gender. Under each gender, categories included – 
single, married with children, married without children, widowed with 
children, and widowed without children. Another example concerns the 
prisoner’s social class and occupation. This group divided the popula-
tion into twelve categories not differentiated by gender: state employees, 
teachers, physicians, merchants, money changers, land owners, artisans, 
farmers, workers, sailors, servants, and unemployed.1
The level of information collected and tabulated by means of this 
survey	 fits	 the	 description	 of	 what	Michel	 Foucault	 called	 a	 ‘tableaux 
vivants’.	According	to	Foucault,	this	table	is	‘the	first	of	the	great	opera-
tions of discipline . . . which transforms the confused, useless or danger-
ous multitudes into ordered multiplicities’. The organising of seemingly 
disparate bits of information about inmates from more than a thousand 
prisons across a vast empire into a rational system made this question-
naire ‘both a technique of power and a procedure of knowledge’.2 The 
Prison Administration arranged the questionnaire to link the singular and 
the multiple together within one document. Foucault claimed that this 
combination simultaneously provided knowledge of the individual and 
the group. This process divided the prison population into comprehen-
sible parts while simultaneously totalising it into an intelligible whole 
that Ottoman authorities could understand, control, and discipline. The 
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 knowledge and power gained by this and subsequent prison surveys con-
ducted in the Second Constitutional Period not only shaped CUP penal 
reform, but also helped fashion the prison into one of the premier institu-
tions for social control, social engineering, and modern state construction 
within the empire, surpassed only by the military and perhaps the police.
Building off the overview of prison reform provided in Chapter 2, 
this chapter explores the various ways that the Prison Administration and 
later the Directorate of Prisons gathered information about its prisons and 
inmates during the Second Constitutional Period. The chief focus of this 
chapter is the description and analysis of the creation, conduct, content, 
and results of the 1912 prison survey. Its various categories of identity 
provide insights into the composition of the prison population; Ottoman 
administrative and societal sensibilities towards crime, criminality, and 
punishment; and its conceptualisation of difference according to ethno- 
religious, communal, and national identities assigned to the incarcerated.3 
This survey provides the most detailed picture of the prison population 
during the empire’s entire existence and its results are woven throughout 
this chapter in order to provide a clearer picture of the incarcerated.
The 1912 Ottoman Prison Survey and Prison Population
Population surveys provide valuable insights into the dynamics and com-
position of a particular institution, region, or society. The 1912 prison 
survey provides these kinds of insights not only for the prison population 
but	for	society	as	a	whole.	This	section	first	discusses	the	development,	
use, and importance of statistics and censuses for the Ottoman bureaucracy 
during the long nineteenth century, thus providing the historical context of 
the 1912 prison survey. The next part analyses the development, structure, 
conduct, and limitations of the 1912 prison survey in order to facilitate the 
subsequent	analysis	of	specific	categories	of	the	survey	and	the	constitu-
tion of the prison population found in sections two and three.
Over the course of the nineteenth century the collection, analysis, and 
use of statistics in Europe developed into the standard means by which 
institutions studied, organised, predicted, and, ultimately, controlled large, 
variable, complex phenomena such as ‘societies’. For social scientists and 
bureaucrats,	statistics	provided	scientific	authenticity	to	their	conclusions.	
Society was not a passive entity to be shaped and moulded with ease by 
bureaucratic	directives	and	legislation,	but	a	dynamic	force	of	conflicting	
interests	 and	 actions.	 In	 fact,	 statisticians	were	 among	 the	 first	 to	 fully	





viewed statistics as the chief means of gaining knowledge and power to 
shape, control, and reform society. This, in turn, facilitated the creation 
of a modern nation- state. Understanding complex phenomena, such as a 
nation- state’s population, economy, agriculture, and trade, provides the 
means to shape and control them for the common good.4 Foucault even 
points out that ‘statistics’ has ‘state’ as its root.5
Throughout its existence, the Ottoman Empire conducted extensive 
cadastral surveys and collected population statistics for taxation, military, 
and security purposes. In the 1830s, the framework, scope, regularity, and 
efficiency	of	statistical	collection	changed	as	modernising	reforms	began	
in earnest. The entire population increasingly became the object of these 
campaigns as the bureaucracy needed to further harness social power. 
The administration utilised statistics for practical purposes, such as tax 
levies, military conscription, infrastructural improvements, land surveys, 
administrative organisation, and social engineering projects. It stressed 
efficiency	and	accuracy	as	essential	elements	of	governance,	thus	laying	
an	 important	 foundation	 for	 the	 centralising	 reforms	 of	 the	 Tanzimat,	
Hamidian, and CUP eras. The military became the driving force behind 
the administration’s efforts to keep accurate statistics of the numbers and 
ages of Muslim males eligible for conscription.6
Administrators increasingly recognised the importance of statistics 
as guides for imperial transformation. Nevertheless, no centralised sta-
tistics bureau existed before 1891. Prior to the 1870s, the Sublime Porte 
attempted only one major census in 1828/29–31. It was, however, not 
systematic,	continuous,	or	comprehensive.	In	some	areas	officials	counted	
individuals, but in many cases they obtained their information from 





of Population Registers (Ceride- i Nüfus Nezareti). In 1839, census respon-
sibilities were divided among various ministries. This system appointed 
population	 officials	 on	 the	 district	 level	who	were	 ‘required	 to	 register	
all births, deaths, and migrations and to report several times a year to 
the	 central	 office	 in	 Istanbul’.7 During its time in operation (1839–53), 
this system produced nearly 21,000 population registers from across the 
empire.8
Despite the existence of extensive raw population statistics, the 
data was not systematic or comprehensive. Population surveys were, 
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however, conducted with chronological regularity. Provincial administra-
tors reported these statistics to Istanbul in annual ‘yearbooks’ (salname-
ler).	It	was	from	these	records	that	Ottoman	and	foreign	officials	compiled	
imperial	population	figures,	although	they	varied	in	detail,	accuracy,	and	
reliability depending on where and when they were collected, for example, 
in pastoral- nomadic areas or before, during, or after wars and treaties.9 
Also,	provincial	officials	rarely	counted	individual	women	and	children,	
or the elderly. Their chief concern was military age Muslim males and 
the total number of individuals in a particular region or religious (millet) 
community.10
In 1874 the Council of State (Şura- yı Devlet) ordered the establishment 
of a new system for collecting population statistics and called for a new 
census. It was never conducted, however, because of political instability 
(1876 was the year of three sultans), the Russo- Ottoman War, and the 
promulgation and suspension of the 1876 Ottoman Constitution. These 
new orders and regulations pertaining to censuses, however, established 
the basis for developing a more advanced system during the Hamidian 
era.11	In	1879	Grand	Vizier	Küçük	Said	Pasha	recommended	the	creation	
of a ‘statistical system’ to monitor bureaucratic activities and provide the 
government with accurate information for making policy decisions.12 As 
soon as the political situation stabilised, Abdülhamid II ordered a new 
census to be conducted jointly by the Ministries of War and the Interior for 
military and taxation purposes.13
In addition to basing the new census on the 1874 regulations, Sultan 
Abdülhamid II and the Council of State actively appropriated census 
policies and procedures from foreign governments. They shared the same 
world	 view	 concerning	 the	 benefits	 that	 accurate	 and	 comprehensive	
population statistics brought to good governance, economic development, 
state stability, and imperial power.14 In 1886 Abdülhamid II approached 
American Ambassador Samuel Cox for assistance with the Ottoman 
census. Ambassador Cox had chaired the US congressional census com-
mittee and played an instrumental role in successfully completing the 
1880 US Census.15
Conducted from 1881–93, the new Ottoman census called for every 
imperial subject to be counted, described, and issued an identity card 
(nüfus tezkeresi),	which	was	required	 to	conduct	any	official	state	busi-
ness including land transactions, tax payments, and obtaining travel visas. 
Collected personal data included given name, nickname, surname name, 
address, age, religion, profession, civic, tax, voting status, and any disabil-
ities. This level of information was unprecedented for Ottoman population 
surveys.16 To expedite its completion and continue the work of recording 
71
Counting the Incarcerated
population changes, Abdülhamid II established the Statistical Council 
of the Sublime Porte in 1891 and ordered it to ‘collect . . . information 
on everything that happened in the provinces . . . down to the smallest 
detail’.17
The census of 1881–3/1893 resulted in a clear picture of the empire’s 
diverse population. The government utilised this data to facilitate reform 
programmes throughout the empire, including prisons, and to shape 
society for the empire’s common good. These efforts laid the foundation 
for CUP policies and programmes concerning the collection and exploita-
tion of population statistics.
CUP members recognised the potential power of statistics. Many of 
its	 members	 possessed	 the	 same	 affinity	 for	 statistical	 information	 as	
their Western counterparts, having been educated in modern schools with 
European curriculums. As a result of their Comtian Positivist world view, 
CUP members saw themselves as the elite class of technocrats, respon-
sible	for	reshaping	the	empire	according	to	the	scientific	principles	upon	
which all modern, civilised, and rational societies should be based.18 For 
Positivists,	statistics	represented	the	pre-	eminent	scientific	tool	for	‘total-
ising and individuating’ the empire’s population, including its inmates.19 
The breadth and depth of the Prison Administration’s 1912 prison survey 
represents a culmination of the inheritance of these long- term administra-
tive practices and CUP innovations.
As stated above, the 1912 prison survey collected information from 
every house of detention in the empire. The survey requested precise 
information on inmates, including their numbers, whether they were con-
victed or accused, age, gender, marital and familial status, ethno- religious 
and national identity, literacy, recidivism, social class and occupation, 
crime committed, date of incarceration, and prison sentence. The survey 
also requested information concerning deaths, sickness, disease, injuries, 
which prisons had hospitals or clinics, the types of diseases treated, and 
surgical procedures performed. Details concerning prison budgets were 
collected, including details such as projected and actual expenditures, 
employee salaries, repair and construction costs, and medical expenses. 
It also asked for data on prison factories, production, expenditures, and 
profits.	Additional	factory	data	on	the	quantity	and	type	of	goods	manu-
factured and how many inmates it employed was also collected. The 
survey directive provided clear instructions on how the survey was to 
be conducted and how the results should be returned, and it threatened 
those who failed to comply with ‘serious consequences’. All prisons were 
required	to	confirm	with	the	Prison	Administration	that	they	had	received	
their copy of the survey, and the Prison Administration went so far as to 
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send out periodic reminders concerning the survey’s due date.20 In the 
end, the majority of prisons returned their completed surveys on time, but 
some of the completed surveys have been subsequently lost, destroyed, or 
withheld.21
The questionnaire possessed a particular organisational logic that both 
facilitated and hindered the usefulness of its data. It was not organised 
according to individual prisoners, but according to the crime committed 
and	the	prisoner’s	gender.	The	thirty-	three	specific	crimes	for	which	data	
was collected drove the rest of the tabulation process. All subsequent 
categories followed a particular crime in this order: gender, year of 
incarceration, marital status, recidivism, prison sentence (lesser crimes), 
socio- economic status and occupation, prison sentence (felonies), ethno- 
religious and national identity, age, and literacy. All categories, except for 
socio- economic status and occupation, differentiated according to gender 
(see Figure 3.1).22
For	example,	in	the	district	prison	of	Cebele,	located	in	the	Trabluşşam	
administrative sub- division of the Beirut province, the total prison popu-
lation consisted of 159 individuals in 1912. Of those 159, eighty- three 
were awaiting trial and seventy- six were convicted and serving their 
prison	sentences.	Among	the	seventy-	six	sentenced	criminals,	fifty-	one	
Figure 3.1 1912 prison survey questionnaire, Beirut province’s Cebele prison.
Source BOA, DHMBHPS 5/9, doc. 4
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(forty- four males and seven females) were incarcerated for assault and 
battery (darb ve cerh) with sentences ranging from one week to one 
month.	 Twenty	 males	 were	 single,	 fifteen	 males	 were	 married	 with	
children, and nine males were married without children. Of the seven 
females convicted of assault, four were married with children and the 
other three were married without children. The assault convicts consisted 
of twenty- one farmers (zürra), thirteen labourers (amele), nine artisans 
(esnaf),	five	merchants	 (tüccar), and three land owners (ashab- ı akar). 
All	fifty-	one	inmates	were	Muslim.	The	ages	of	the	male	prisoners	break-
down accordingly: Eighteen were aged from 14 to 20, ten were aged 
from 21 to 30, twelve were aged from 31 to 40, three were aged from 41 
to 50, and one was aged from 61 to 70 years of age. The seven female 
prisoners	were	all	aged	from	21	to	30	years.	Finally,	twenty-	five	males	
were literate while the other twenty- six convicted of assault and battery 
were illiterate.23
The various limitations of this data result from the questionnaire’s 
organisation and content. Since no names were recorded, it is impossible 
to	match	a	specific	prisoner	incarcerated	for	a	particular	crime	with	her	or	
his age, occupation, literacy level, or ethno- religious and national identity 
unless he or she was the only person incarcerated for a particular crime. 
Recording errors as well as omissions of pieces of information are addi-
tional limitations to the usefulness of these surveys. On many occasions 
prison	officials	regularly	and	purposely	omitted	certain	information;	for	
example, some forms do not include details on prisoners’ ages or ethno- 
religious	and	national	identities.	On	others,	officials	incorrectly	recorded	
a prisoner’s ethno- religious and national identity by assigning multiple 
conflicting	 identities.	 Confusion	 is	 to	 be	 expected,	 however,	 since	 the	
empire was so geographically, linguistically, ethnically, and religiously 
diverse.
Outside of raw numbers, it is impossible to reconstruct the entire 
Ottoman prison population at any time during the empire’s existence. The 
surviving prison surveys, however, allow the reconstruction of more than 
two- thirds of the 1911–12 prison population in great detail. In fact, these 
surveys make it possible to reconstruct the prison population for the prov-
inces and independent administrative sub- divisions of Istanbul, Baghdad, 
Beirut,	Canik,	Edirne,	 the	Hijaz,	Kastamonu,	Mamüretülaziz,	Manastır,	
Mosul, and Yanya.24 Gerneral prison population statistics broken down 
by province are also available for 1914, 1916–17, 1918–19, and 1919–20, 
but they do not have nearly the level of detail as can be found in the 1912 
survey (see Charts 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5).25
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Conceptualising Crime and Socio- economic Status
This section investigates the categories found in the 1912 prison survery 
regarding crime and socio- economic status. It also utilises the prisoner 
data collected from these two categories to partially reconstruct the 
Ottoman prison population. In so doing, this section reveals important 
insights into CUP and broader Ottoman sensibilities towards class, crime, 
and social control by sheding light on which crimes were most commonly 
prosecuted by the state and the socio- economic status of these criminals.
As part of CUP attempts to impose social order and discipline, the 
prison survey collected information on each prisoner’s socio- economic 
status and occupation. This category provides clear data on which crimes 
particular segments of society committed and what percentage of the 
prison	population	came	from	a	specific	social	class.	Not	surprisingly,	the	
vast majority of the Ottoman prison population was from the lower class. 
The	1912	prison	survey,	however,	was	not	very	specific	or	exhaustive	in	
its	socio-	economic	classifications.26 It did, however, attempt to organise 






5. Money Changers & Bankers (sarraf).




10. Ship Captains & Sailors (kapudan ve taife).
11. Servants (hademe).
12. Unemployed (işsiz).27
The survey makes interesting distinctions regarding socio- economic 
status and occupation, such as differentiating between skilled and 
unskilled workers (esnaf and amele) and between rural and urban workers 
(zürra and esnaf/amele).	 It	 also	 collected	 information	 on	 very	 specific	
types of occupations, such as sailors, money changers and bankers, 
teachers, and medical doctors, thus constituting an interesting mixture 
of	professionals	and	unskilled	workers	filling	quite	specific	occupations.	
Government employees (memurin), however, were grouped all together 




its ideological and pragmatic approaches to politics and state administra-
tion favoured centralisation, rule of law, professionalisation, and account-
ability. Concerning the organisation of this category, there appears to be 
a	definite	separation	and	gradation	in	socio-	economic	status	with	profes-
sionals and the higher- skilled occupations preceding the less skilled. The 
final	 two	categories	(servants	and	the	unemployed)	represent	 the	lowest	
rungs of the Ottoman socio- economic ladder.
Despite the broad nature of these occupational divisions, these catego-
ries	do	provide	significant	 insights	 into	the	composition	of	 the	Ottoman	
prison population. It also sheds light on the socio- economic groups about 
which the CUP was most concerned, such as bankers and money changers, 
merchants, skilled and unskilled labourers, artisans, farmers, and ship cap-
tains and their crew members, all of whom occupied vital positions in the 
Ottoman economy. It also provides insights into the groups that the CUP 
was least concerned with, such as religious scholars and clerics (ulema, 
Province and independent  
sub- division
Male Female Total
Baghdad 1,660 80 1,740
Beirut 3,930 90 4,020
Bitlis 578 43 621
Canik 1,722 45 1,767
Edirne 6,787 362 7,149
The	Hijaz 414 45 459
Istanbul 5,670 272 5,942
Kastamonu 1,051 143 1,194
Mamuretülaziz 2,099 106 2,205
Manastır 3,998 168 4,173
Mosul 2,808 26 2,834
Yanya 1,867 114 1,981
Totals 32,584 1,494 34,085
Chart 3.1 1911–12 prison statistics.
Note Several provinces and independent administrative sub- divisions are not represented here 
because their results are not available to researchers.
Source BOA, DHMBHPSM 3/36, 4/4, 4/20, 4/21, 5/1, 5/9, 6/27, and 12/70; BOA, DHMBHPS 
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Province (Vilayet) Male prisoners Female prisoners Provincial totals
Istanbul 919 48 967
Edirne 558 49 607
Adana 996 53 1,049
Ankara 1,242 143 1,385
Aydın 2,618 225 2,843
Beirut 1,221 30 1,251
Hüdavendigar 799 50 849
Suriye 1,116 33 1,149
Sivas 1,141 73 1,214
Kastamonu 1,137 118 1,255
Konya 901 84 985
Bitlis 85 11 96
Haleb 646 18 664
Trabzon 180 3 183
Mosul 499 4 503
Diyarbekir 1,097 31 1,128
Mamuretülaziz 218 16 234
Independent sub- 
division (Sancak)
Urfa 281 4 285
İzmid 266 13 279
İçil 81 4 85
Eskişehir 164 0 164
Bolu 455 47 502
Canik 280 9 289
Çatalca 13 6 19
Zor 100 2 102
Kudüs-	i	Şerif 628 15 643
Karesi 712 45 757
Kala- i Sultaniye 133 18 151
Chart 3.3 1916–17 prison statistics.
Note Several provinces and independent sub- divisions did not report their prison statistics in full. 
These	include	Trabzon,	Bitlis,	Mamuretülaziz,	Edirne,	Mosul,	Çatalca,	and	Kütahya.	




Province (Vilayet) Male prisoners Female prisoners Provincial totals
Independent sub- 
division (Sancak)
Kayseri 242 13 255
Karahisar-	ı	Sahib 289 13 302
Menteşe 224 23 247
Maraş̧	 350 16 366
Niğde	 360 8 368
Kütahya 0 0 0
Cebel- i Lübnan 269 6 275
Tekke 197 18 215
Grand totals 20,417 1,249 21,666
Province (Vilayet) Sentenced (Mahkumin) Awaiting trial (Mevkufin) Total
Istanbul 450 500 950
Edirne 600 425 1,025
Adana 750 755 1,505
Ankara 925 810 1,735
Aydın 1,955 1,325 3,280
Bitlis 645 475 1,120
Beirut 1,125 930 2,055
Haleb 1,050 580 1,630
Hüdavendigar 1,045 625 1,670
Diyarbekir 750 725 1,475
Suriye 1,450 650 2,100
Sivas 880 1,055 1,935
Trabzon 500 350 850
Kastamonu 1,250 640 1,890
Konya 1,140 755 1,895
Mamuretülaziz 650 250 900
Mosul 550 350 900
Chart 3.4 1918–19 prison statistics.
Source BOA, DHMBHPS 163/85
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Province (Vilayet) Sentenced (Mahkumin) Awaiting trial (Mevkufin) Total
Independent sub- 
division (Sancak)
Urfa 200 150 350
İzmid 255 155 410
İçil	 100 95 195
Eskişehir	 240 105 345
Bolu 550 255 805
Tekke 240 210 450
Canik 50 150 200
Çatalca 55 45 100
Zor 90 85 175
Kudüs-	i	Şerif	 240 255 495
Karesi 640 225 865
Kala- i Sultaniye 125 235 360
Kayseri 250 135 385
Karahisar-	ı	Sahib 220 145 365
Kütahya 325 275 600
Menteşe	 325 145 470
Maraş	 220 235 455
Niğde	 250 345 595
Cebel- i Lübnan 155 145 300
Totals 20,245 14,590 34,835
Chart 3.4 (continued)
Province (Vilayet) Sentenced (Mahkumin) Awaiting trial (Mevkufin) Total
Istanbul 178 241 419
Edirne 600 425 1,025
Adana 750 755 1,505
Ankara 925 810 1,735
Aydın 1,955 1,325 3,280
Chart 3.5 1919–20 prison statistics.
Note	 The	provinces	of	Erzurum	and	Van	did	not	report	their	prison	statistics.
Source BOA, DHMBHPS 165/97
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Province (Vilayet) Sentenced (Mahkumin) Awaiting trial (Mevkufin) Total
Bitlis 645 475 1,120
Hüdavendigar 1,045 625 1,670
Diyarbekir 750 725 1,475
Sivas 880 1,055 1,935
Trabzon 500 350 850
Kastamonu 1,250 640 1,890
Konya 1,140 755 1,895
Mamuretülaziz 650 250 900
Mosul 550 350 900
Independent sub- 
division (Sancak)
Urfa 200 150 350
İzmid 255 155 410
İçil	 100 95 195
Eskişehir	 240 105 345
Bolu 550 255 805
Tekke 240 210 450
Canik 50 150 200
Çatalca 55 45 100
Karesi 640 225 865
Kala- i Sultaniye 125 235 360
Kayseri 250 135 385
Karahisar-	ı	Sahib 220 145 365
Kütahya 325 275 600
Menteşe	 325 145 470
Maraş	 220 235 455
Niğde	 250 345 595
Erzincan 60 150 210









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































talebeler, imams, muezzins, and hafizler). This group, which according to 
the 1894–5 Ottoman census consisted of more than 583,000 practitioners, 
was the single largest profession in the empire.28 Despite its prevalence, 
the Prison Administration did not collect data on this occupation, even 
though the CUP was very suspicious of religious professionals and purged 
many for their anti- constitutional views.29
The vast majority of the 1911–12 prison population came from the 
lowest socio- economic classes. In fact, this group made up more than 90 
per cent of the entire prison population. These prisoners were of low status 
and	when	employed	filled	the	lowest	paying	and	least	prestigious	occupa-
tions in Ottoman society, such as artisans, labourers, farmers, and serv-
ants. Additionally, they represent the largest segments of Ottoman society, 
and they constitute the local and imperial governments’ main base for tax 
revenues and military conscription. In other words, they are the masses 
that the CUP feared so intensely. The CUP, therefore, was very keen to 
monitor and control these segments of society (see Chart 3.6).
The prison statistics for 1912 for the provinces and administrative sub- 
divisions that are listed in Chart 3.6 show that out of a prison population 
of	34,085	in	1912	there	were	321	government	officials,	104	teachers,	13	
physicians, 159 merchants, 24 bankers and money changers, and 872 
land owners. The total number of prisoners from the middle and upper 
classes was only 1,493. This represents less than 4.4 per cent of the total 
prison population. Prisoners from lower classes, however, number at least 
30,067 individuals (the occupations of 2,525 inmates were not reported) 
and constitute at least 88 per cent of the Ottoman inmate population. The 
breakdown of this total number is 7,191 artisans, 12,966 farmers, 4,856 
labourers, 451 ship captains and crew members, 1,050 servants, and 3,553 
unemployed.30
In 1914, the Prison Administration updated the prison survey’s ques-
tionnaire	 to	 reflect	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 1912	 survey	 by	 reorganising	 the	
survey’s socio- economic status and occupation section. This change dem-
onstrates a need to devote more space to the most prevalent occupations 
found among prisoners. In the 1914 version many of the categories for 
professionals	were	combined	while	others	were	more	clearly	defined.	For	
example, the categories for physicians (atıbba) and teachers (muallimin) 
were combined and then expanded to include all learned professions: ‘phy-
sicians, teachers, and other learned professionals’ (atıbba ve muallimin ve 
sair ehl- i fünun).31
The 1914 questionnaire also augmented and circumscribed the 1912 
‘servants’ category. It changed the title to ‘servants of merchants, money 
changers, bankers, and others’ (tüccar ve sarraf ve saire hademesi). This 
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of Ottoman industrialisation and economic expansion, not to mention its 
war effort. Protecting their property and their physical safety was impor-
tant, especially since theft and assault were the most common crimes 
committed by servants.32 Connecting socio- economic status with crimes 
committed reveals additional insights into CUP and broader Ottoman con-
ceptualisations of criminality, class, and social control.
The ‘crimes committed’ category is the most important section of the 
questionnaire since it drove the rest of the survey. The survey divides 
the category ‘Types of Crimes’ (Nev‘i- i Ceraim) into two sections 
‘Misdemeanours and Less Serious Crimes Section’ (Cünha ve Kabahat 
Kısmı) and ‘Serious Crimes Section’ (Cinayet Kısmı).	 The	 first	 section	
contains twenty- one categories dealing with lesser offences. Nineteen of 
the	categories	contain	specific	‘less	serious	crimes’	and	the	two	remaining	
categories are ‘other lesser crimes’ and prisoners awaiting trial for lesser 
crimes (mevkufin).33 The ‘Serious Crimes Section’ contains seventeen cat-
egories.	Fourteen	contain	specific	serious	offences.	One	category	concerns	
those prisoners awaiting trial for serious crimes. The last two categories 
are for prisoners awaiting trial in martial law courts and a category for 
totalling all prisoner statistics.34
Figure 3.2 1914 prison survey questionnaire, Istanbul province.
Source BOA, DHMBHPS 150/3, doc. 2
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According to the IOPC, there are literally hundreds of cinayet, cünha, 
and kabahat crimes that are punishable by incarceration. The Prison 
Administration, however, only requested data for thirty- three crimes. The 
survey listed some crimes as a general category, such as theft, but most 
listed	crimes	were	specific.	A	close	analysis	of	 these	crimes,	 their	 rela-
tion to the IOPC, and the number of criminals convicted offers revealing 
insights into Ottoman society and CUP ideology regarding crime and its 
threat to public order and safety.
The	first	section	of	the	‘Types	of	Crimes’	category	(Cünha ve Kabahat 
Kısmı) consists of the following twenty- one categories:
1. Disrespecting civil servants, gendarme, and soldiers (me’murin, 
zaptiye ve askere şetm ve hakaret).
2. Aiding and abetting the escape of a convict and concealing habitual 
serious offenders (mahbus kaçırmak ve ihfayı erbab- ı cinayet).
3. Lacking good character, such as vagrants without skills or profession 
(bila salahiyet sanat- ı resmide bulunmak).
4. Forgery of travel permits and passports (mürur tezkeresi ve pasaport 
sahtekarlığı).
5. Assault and battery (darb ve cerh).
6. Offering abortions and harmful medications (iskat- ı cenin ve eczayı 
muzırra i’tası).
7. Seducing and dishonouring a virgin (hetk- i ırz ve iğfal- i bakire).
8. Indecent sexual behaviour (fi’il- i şeni).
9. Verbally and physically molesting youth (gençlere harf endazlık ve 
elile sarkıntılık).
10. Unlawful arrest and incarceration (usul ve nizam haricinde habs ve 
tevkif).
11. Switching, concealing, and stealing a child and kidnapping a girl 
(çocuk tebdili, sirkati ve gaybi ve kız kaçırmak).
12. Providing false witness, oath, or evidence during a judicial pro-
ceeding (umur- ı hukukiyede yalan şehadet ve yemin ve tehdidamiz 
mektup).
13. Vituperation, insulting, and slander (şetm ve hakaret ve iftira).
14. Fraud (dolandırıcılık).
15. Theft (sirkat).
16. Corruption/Embezzlement	(emniyet- i suiistimal).
17. Wasting or destroying a person’s goods, property, and documents/
papers (nasın malını ve emlakini ve evrakını iza’a ve telef etmek).
18. Opposing police directives, announcements, and warnings (nizamat, 
bildiri ve tenbihat- ı zaptiyeye muhalefet).
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19. Miscellaneous lesser crimes and misdemeanours (ceniha ve kabahat- i 
mütenevvi’a).
20. Debtors (medyun).
21. Those arrested for lesser crimes and misdemeanours awaiting trial 
(mevkufin).35
Less serious offenders constituted roughly two- thirds of the 1911–12 
prison population.36
Under the second section (Cinayet Kısmı) fourteen crimes were listed 
in the following order, together with three other categories:
1. Aiding	and	abetting	bandits	and	embezzling	state	goods	(kat- i tarik 
yataklığı, zimmete emval- i miri geçirmek).
2. Premeditated homicide (‘amden katl).
3. Homicide without premeditation (min gayri ta‘ammüdden katl).
4. Wilful homicide without premeditation (katl- i kasdi).
5. Severe assault and battery and severing a body part (cerh ve darb- i 
şedid ve kat‘- i uzuv).
6. The intentional aborting of a foetus (cebren veya kasden iskat- i 
cenin).
7. Violent indecent sexual behaviour (cebren fi’il- i şeni).
8. Kidnapping a sexually mature female (cebren baliğa kaçırmak).
9. The	 forgery	 of	 seals	 and	 official	 items	 (mühür ve enva‘- ı resmiye 
sahtekarlığı).
10. Arson (kundakçılık).
11. Armed theft causing injury (mu‘amele- i şedid icra ve cerh ile 
hırsızlık).
12. Theft through breaking and entering (meskun mahalden duvar delerek 
veyahut kapı kırarak hırsızlık).
13. Armed theft without injury (mu‘amele- i şedid icrasıyla bila cerh 
hırsızlık).
14. Possession of weapons forbidden by the Ministry of War (esliha- i 
memnu‘a- i divan- i harbi).
15. Prisoners awaiting trial in martial law courts (misafirhaneye vurud 
iden Divan- i Harb- i Örfiden).
16. Those arrested for serious offences awaiting trial (mevkufin).
17. Total (yakut).37
Serious offenders made up nearly one- third of the prison population of 
1911–12.38
The vast majority of the crimes listed on the questionnaire concern 
property, life, honour, and social order. Eighteen crimes deal with violent 
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behaviour against an individual, fourteen deal with types of theft, nine 
crimes are honour related (character and sexual purity), and nine crimes 
deal with issues related to state responsibilities, authority, and power. 
Finally, all of the offences, in one way or another, deal with crimes against 
social order, discipline, and control. None of these crimes, however, are 
associated with espionage, bribery, the selling of government secrets, 
dereliction of duty, or state corruption. The Cinayet section does not even 
have a catch- all category similar to the one possessed by the Cünha ve 
Kabahat section in which serious offenders of other crimes not included in 
the questionnaire could be listed. The CUP collected information on very 
specific	types	of	crimes	that	closely	correspond	with	the	1911	changes	to	
the 1858 IOPC.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the CUP furthered the process of consolidat-
ing judicial power into the hands of the state and rationalising the practice 
of Islamic criminal law already begun in previous regimes. Its goal was 
to reign in the autonomy of Islamic court judges, particularly regarding 
crime, individual rights, and the protection of property. In so doing, the 
CUP expanded state consolidation of power and its encroachment into 
the lives of the population. An analysis of the convergence between the 
1911 penal code revisions, the crimes listed on the prison survey, and 
the statistical results explicates CUP ideology and pragmatism towards 
crime, preserving and expanding its own power, and a better understand-
ing of criminal behaviour in the empire, particularly concerning crimes 
against	state	officials	and	those	associated	with	honour,	theft,	and	violence.
Throughout history states have placed a high priority on protecting their 
officials	involved	in	tax	collection,	law	enforcement,	regime	preservation,	
and maintaining public order. The Ottoman Empire and the CUP were no 
different.	In	fact,	the	amount	of	attention	given	to	protecting	state	officials	
during the Second Constitutional Period reveals the importance that the 
CUP placed on it, even though few were incarcerated for these crimes.
The Prison Administration listed two crimes on the prison survey 
dealing	with	offences	against	state	officials:	‘Disrespecting	civil	servants,	
gendarme, and soldiers’ and ‘Opposing police directives, announcements, 
and warnings’. IOPC Articles 112–16 address these types of crimes 
and	 their	 respective	punishments.	The	1911	 IOPC	 reforms	 significantly	
modified	these	articles	in	order	to	delineate	crimes	and	punishments	more	
clearly. In fact, only Article 112 was not altered.39
The number of prisoners arrested, convicted, and incarcerated for 
crimes	against	state	officials	was	very	low	in	comparison	to	other	crimes	
listed on the prison survey. In 1911–12 the administrative areas of Canik, 
Istanbul,	 Beirut,	 Baghdad,	 Bitlis,	 and	 the	 Hijaz	 incarcerated	 a	 total	 of	
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14,549 prisoners.40 Out of those prisoners, only 322 were convicted for 
crimes	against	state	officials.41
The	vast	majority	of	those	incarcerated	for	crimes	against	state	officials	
served very light sentences. A total of 281 prisoners were either pardoned 
or spent from twenty- four hours to one month in prison. The other forty- 
one prisoners received varying sentences ranging from one month to one 
year, with just a handful of prisoners being incarcerated for a maximum 
of two years.42 Generally these light punishments indicate that violations 
were not of a serious nature.
Only the independent administrative sub- division of Canik appears to be 
an exception to the generalities listed above. Out of its 1911–12 prison pop-
ulation of 1,767 inmates, a total of 100 were convicted of ‘Disrespecting 
civil	officials,	gendarme,	and	soldiers’.	 It	 is	not	clear	why	there	were	so	
many arrests and convictions for such an uncommon crime, but in the end 
it actually did conform to the aforementioned norms. Only eight of these 
inmates served any jail time (three months to a year). The other ninety- two 
prisoners convicted of this crime were pardoned.43 The overall results (few 
convictions and light sentences) appear staggeringly low for a crime that 
the	CUP	heavily	modified	in	1911	and	then	closely	monitored.
Of	those	prisoners	who	served	time	for	crimes	against	state	officials,	
the vast majority were artisans (ninety- two).44 The numbers for the rest 
of the occupations and professions were twenty- one farmers, twenty 
labourers,	 eighteen	 unemployed,	 nine	 government	 officials,	 five	 serv-
ants, a land owner, a merchant, and a sailor. The high number of artisans 
indicates the existence of tensions between this segment of society and 
urban state authorities as manifest by the numerous strikes and protests 
that happened from 1881 to 1910. As mentioned in Chapter 2, shortly 
after coming to power in 1908, the CUP- led government enacted a series 
of laws severely curtailing the right to protest and strike, thus limiting the 
power of artisans and guild members.45 Tracking the number of prisoners 
arrested, convicted, and serving time for disturbing the peace and attempt-
ing to abrogate state authority was vitally important to the CUP, especially 
in the wake of the 1909 countercoup.
As discussed in Chapter 1, in 1911, the Ottoman Parliament sig-
nificantly	altered	the	section	of	the	IOPC	dealing	with	crimes	against	an	
individual’s honour, including sexual offences, perjury, calumny, and 
vituperation.46	Although	these	crimes	also	do	not	represent	a	significant	
statistical number of actual convictions and incarcerations, they do consti-
tute	a	significant	portion	of	the	crimes	for	which	statistics	were	collected.	
Out of the thirty- three crimes listed on the prison survey, ten crimes were 




crimes related to honour, it ignored others, such as kidnapping adults. 
Instead, it focused on crimes associated with kidnapping children of both 
sexes (considered a less serious offence) and kidnapping females at the 
age of puberty (nine to fourteen years old), but not yet manifesting menses 
(mürahika), which was considered a serious criminal offence.47 With so 
few	prisoners	convicted	of	these	crimes	it	is	difficult	to	understand	why	
the Prison Administration expended such energy tracking them.
The prison survey listed the crimes of slander and vituperation under 
the same heading and combined their statistics. It is, therefore, impossi-
ble to distinguish between these two closely related offences.48 The state 
incarcerated only a small percentage of its prison population for these 
crimes.	In	Baghdad,	the	Hijaz,	Istanbul,	Beirut,	Bitlis,	and	Canik	inmates	
convicted of slander and vituperation represent less than 3 per cent of the 
prison population (451: 14,549) in 1911–12. More than 90 per cent of 
these prisoners received and served prison sentences of twenty- four hours 
to one month.49
Their crimes could not have been too serious especially since the 
maximum penalty for felony slander was ten years’ imprisonment with 
hard labour. If slander or vituperation were of a less serious offence the 
maximum penalty was one to three years of incarceration, but the survey 
indicates a prevalence of short prison sentences for these two crimes.50 
This indicates that most of the perpetrators committed vituperation, which 
according to the IOPC is the lesser of the two offences. Regarding the 
socio- economic status and occupation of those convicted and incarcerated 
for slander and vituperation, at least 88 per cent were artisans, labourers, 
farmers, servants, or unemployed.51 With so few being incarcerated for 
this crime it appears odd that the CUP- led Prison Administration consid-
ered it important to track. When the inmates’ socio- economic backgrounds 
are taken into consideration, however, it makes more sense. Keeping the 
masses in check and protecting the reputations of the middle and upper 
classes, especially for a new administration, are essential to securing and 
maintaining power.
The second most prevalent type of crime committed in the Ottoman 
Empire, according to the prison survey, was theft (sirkat) in all of its 
related forms, including petty and violent theft, breaking and entering, 
fraud,	embezzlement,	and	robbery.	Theft-	related	crimes	constituted	nine	
of the thirty- three crimes listed on the questionnaire. More prisoners were 
convicted and incarcerated for theft- related crimes than any other except 
assault and battery (darb ve cerh). The Ottoman Parliament heavily 
revised theft- related portions of the IOPC in 1911 as well. The prison 
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population	of	1911–12	in	Istanbul,	Baghdad,	Beirut,	Bitlis,	the	Hijaz,	and	
Canik incarcerated for misdemeanour theft consisted of 2,603 out of a total 
population of 14,549. Nearly 70 per cent (1,816 out of 2,603) of inmates 
served sentences of one week to six months incarceration. A total of 2,436 
of the prisoners incarcerated for theft (more than 93 per cent) were from 
the lower classes (artisans, farmers, labourers, servants, and unemployed). 
Muslims constituted nearly 58 per cent of theft convicts at 1,501 and 449 
Christians (Ecumenical, Armenian, and Bulgar Exarchate) rounded out 
the largest proportions of the prisoners incarcerated for misdemeanour 
theft.52 Legal reform, aggressive prosecution, and incarceration for theft 
demonstrate CUP priorities to protect private property.
Violent crimes were the most prevalent offence in the Ottoman Empire. 
In fact, the 1912 prison survey collected statistics on fourteen different 
violent	crimes.	Again,	the	Ottoman	Parliament	in	1911	heavily	modified	
all IOPC articles relating to violent crime, especially threats, physical 
assaults, and homicide.53
The actual number of prisoners convicted of violent crimes, particularly 
assault and homicide, constitute almost half of all inmates in 1911–12. 
For example, 2,926 out of the 5,942 individuals incarcerated in Istanbul 
prisons in 1911–12 were convicted of violent crimes. In Beirut, out of the 
4,020 incarcerated persons, 2,121 were serving time for either assault or 
homicide, and in Bitlis 347 prisoners out of a total population of 621 were 
incarcerated	for	violent	crimes.	Baghdad,	Canik,	and	the	Hijaz	all	had	a	
lower percentage of violent criminals in their prisons than either Istanbul 
or Beirut. In all three of them, however, violent crime was still the most 
prevalent type of offence committed. Out of a prison population of 1,740, 
there were 799 prisoners convicted of violent crimes in Baghdad, whereas 
Canik	had	631	prisoners	out	of	1,767,	and	the	Hijaz	had	the	fewest,	at	84	
out of 460.54
The single- most prevalently convicted and incarcerated crime during 
the Second Constitutional Period was ‘assault and battery’ (darb ve 
cerh). In the provinces and independent administrative sub- divisions of 
Istanbul,	 Baghdad,	 Beirut,	 Bitlis,	 Canik,	 and	 the	 Hijaz	 5,605	 out	 of	 a	
total prison population of 14,549 served time for ‘assault and battery’. 
Despite accounting for the largest percentage of convictions and incar-
cerations, most ‘assault and battery’ crimes were minor. A total of 80 per 
cent of those convicted for ‘assault and battery’ served light sentences 
(twenty- four hours to one month). Their crime, therefore, was most likely 
fisticuffs.	Nearly	89	per	cent	of	those	incarcerated	for	‘assault	and	battery’	
were from the lower classes (artisans, farmers, labourers, servants, and 
the unemployed).55 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Second Constitutional 
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Period was a particularly volatile time in terms of war, uprisings, foreign 
interventions, separatist movements, and political instability. Maintaining 
public order and social control, especially among the lower classes, was a 
matter of top priority for the CUP.
Even the crimes for which few individuals were actually incarcerated, 
but still monitored by the prison surveys (vituperation, slander, and crimes 
against	 state	 officials)	 add	 additional	 insight	 into	 Ottoman	 administra-
tive goals regarding its desire to consolidate power within its hands and 
protect	government	officials.	Both	of	these	goals	are	essential	for	creating	
and	maintaining	a	strong,	centralised,	and	efficient	government	that	pos-
sesses a monopoly on the use of violence to enforce its laws. They are also 
key elements to imperial transformation and revitalisation. Combining 
statistics on criminal behaviour with socio- economic status provides even 
deeper insights into CUP ideology and Ottoman society.
A Marxist and neo- Marxist explanation for the predominance of 
the lower classes in Ottoman prisons claims that the upper and middle 
classes utilise prisons as a means of controlling the masses, maintaining 
political and economic power, protecting their personal well- being and 
property, and disciplining the labour force. The proletariat of all industri-
alised and developing countries during the Second Industrial Revolution 
consisted predominantly of unskilled workers and peasants. The Second 
Constitutional	Period	and	the	CUP	fit	this	Marxist	and	neo-	Marxist	inter-
pretation, except that its inner- circle rejected Great Power laissez- faire 
liberal economics and viewed it as the major cause of the empire’s eco-
nomic and political problems. The CUP envisioned achieving an industri-
alised empire via state- directed developmentalism (étatism), which also 
required	a	disciplined	labour	force	to	staff	the	factories	and	work	the	fields	
of a newly created Muslim bourgeoisie.56 Monitoring and controlling the 
lower classes and protecting the property and well- being of this emerging 
bourgeoisie were high priorities for the CUP as manifested by the concep-
tualisation and results of the 1912 prison survey.
Conceptualising Difference: Identity and the Ottoman Prison 
Survey
Socio- economic status and criminality are not the only categories that 
offer compelling insights into the empire’s prison population and CUP 
ideology. Likewise, the prison questionnaire’s category on ethno- religious 
and national identity provides data on prisoner identity and understand-
ing of CUP conceptualisations of difference, in terms of race, ethnicity, 
religion, and nationality.57 As stated earlier, governments utilise censuses 
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to identify, quantify, and categorise their population in order to harness 
social power and facilitate social control. The process of collecting statis-
tics through population surveys can actually create identities. Ian Hacking 
coined the term ‘nominalism’ to signify the act of ‘making people up’. 
According	 to	 Hacking,	 ‘nominalism’	 reflects	 state	 intentionality	 as	 it	
assigns identity to its various populations through censuses and other pop-
ulation registrations.58 This concept applies to the Ottoman prison survey, 
because the state is assigning identity to inmates who lack the power of 
self-	identification.
‘Nominalism’ can have unintended consequences. For example, in 
Macedonia, European powers forced the Ottoman Empire to conduct a 
thorough population survey beginning in 1903 that resulted in a great deal 
of political and social strife.59 In 1872, the Ottoman administration estab-
lished the (Bulgarian- dominated) Exarchate and recognised it as a sepa-
rate religious community (millet) from the (Greek- dominated) Ecumenical 
Patriarchate. This caused intense nationalist struggles between the differ-
ent Eastern Orthodox communities in the Balkans concerning which reli-
gious and/or nationalist community the population belonged, especially 
among the Bulgarian, Serbian, and Greek- speaking communities. Each 
group struggled, especially their clergies, for potential control of the reli-
gious community and perhaps the future nation. If a certain group within 
the Macedonian population decided to identify with the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate then it was choosing to be ‘Greek’, even if it spoke Bulgarian 
or Serbian and vice versa.60
The 1903 census exacerbated this explosive situation of compet-
ing	nationalist	movements	 identified	by	 religious	affiliation.	During	 the	
census, local religious leaders, nationalists, ideologues, and government 
officials	intimidated	and	coerced	local	populations	to	identify	themselves	
with one party or the other, either the Ecumenical Patriarchate or the 
Bulgarian Exarchate. The census became a site for naming and identifying 
elements of the population for taxation, military conscription, and their 
potential nationalist proclivities. Not only was the Ottoman state trying to 
impose	its	own	classification	upon	Macedonia’s	population,	but	the	people	
were actively identifying and naming themselves.61
During	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 Macedonia	 was	
the central stronghold of the CUP and the staging ground for the 
1908 Constitutional Revolution. CUP loyalists entrenched themselves in 
Macedonia’s administrative and military hierarchy.62 Even the Inspector 
General of Rumeli and director of the 1903 census Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha 
was an active CUP supporter.63 He was well aware of the explosive poten-
tial of the 1903 census for the Macedonian population. For this reason, 
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he debated whether or not to use the most benign and generic population 
classifications	available:	Muslim,	Jew,	and	Christian.	He	eventually	aban-
doned	the	idea	because	those	categories	went	against	the	1902	Mürzsteg	
Programme, which required the Ottomans to implement ‘administra-
tive reorganisation according to national principles’ within Macedonia. 
According	 to	 the	 Mürzsteg	 Programme,	 ‘national	 principles’	 meant	
nationalist	 identity	 based	 on	 specific	 religio-	linguistic	 characteristics.64 
If utilised, perhaps the generic categories could have prevented some of 
the violence that resulted from the more controversial religious identities 
delineated in the census.
As a result of its participation in the 1903 Macedonian census and 
their modern educations, CUP members understood the power of sta-
tistics in nation- state construction. European meddling and Christian 
national- separatist activities galvanised Macedonian Muslim support for 
the 1908 Constitutional Revolution led by the CUP.65 What took place in 
Macedonia demonstrated to CUP members the explosive power of iden-
tity appropriation and helps to explain the Prison Administration’s choice 
of identity categories in the 1912 prison survey.
The identity categories contained in the 1912 prison survey reveal 
important insights into how the CUP conceptualised difference among 
the state’s population. As a result of constant warfare and immense social 
upheaval characterising the Second Constitutional Period, these prison 
surveys represent the closest attempt to a population census ever carried 
out by the CUP.66 The categories of identity found in the prison survey 
provide the most concrete example available for understanding how the 
CUP conceptualised difference in terms of ethnicity, religion, and nation-
ality prior to the radicalisation of identity and its brutal demographic 
 engineering programmes post- Balkan Wars and during WWI.67
One of the prison survey’s most intriguing categories of identity con-
cerns a prisoner’s millet identity. The title of this category is ‘Milliyet- i 
Mahkumin’.68 According to twentieth- century standards, this title should 
be translated as ‘the prisoner’s national identity’. This translation, however, 
actually obfuscates the multiple and contradictory meanings millet pos-
sessed during the late Ottoman period. Based upon the word’s usage in the 
survey, ‘Milliyet- i Mahkumin’ should be translated as ‘the prisoner’s ethno- 
religious, communal or national identity’. Under this category the possible 
millet identities of a prisoner consisted of the following ten choices:
1. İslam.
2. Rum Katolik ve Protestan (Ecumenical Patriarchate Christians who 
are Catholics or Protestants).69
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3. Ermeni Katolik ve Protestan (Armenian Christians who are Catholics 
or Protestants).
4. Musevi (Jewish).
5. Bulgar (Bulgarian Exarchate).
6. Milel- i Muhtelife- yi Osmaniye (Other Ottoman Communities).




10. Milel- i Muhtelife- yi Ecnebi (Other Foreign Nationals).
This category was broken into two main divisions: Ottoman subjects and 
foreign nationals. The division related to Ottoman subjects consists of six 
groupings:
1. Muslims (İslam).
2. Ecumenical Patriarchate Christians who are Catholics and Protestants 
(Rum Katolik ve Protestan).
3. Armenian Christians who are Catholics and Protestants (Ermeni 
Katolik ve Protestan).
4. Jews (Musevi).
5. Bulgarian Exarchate Christians (Bulgars).
6. Other Ottoman Communities (Milel- i Muhtelife- yi Osmaniye).
The second division, referring to foreign nationals, consists of four 
groupings:
1. German, French, British, and Austrian foreign nationals (Alman, 
Fransa, İngliz, ve Avustralı).
2. Iranian foreign nationals (İranlı).
3. Greek foreign nationals (Yunanlı).
4. Other Foreign Nationals (Milel- i Muhtelife- yi Ecnebi).70
The organisation of this category, the possible millet options, and the 
use and meaning of millet,	 reveal	 several	 significant	 insights	 into	CUP	
conceptions of difference. First, each of the millet categories related 
to the Ottoman population represents divisions and identities based on 
sectarian lines and not along linguistic, quasi- racial, or cultural designa-
tions. Most of these religious groups represented long- standing Ottoman 
administrative and bureaucratic designations based largely upon Islamic 
and customary law (shari’a and örf- i hukuk), thus dividing the Ottoman 
population along monotheistic sectarian lines: Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam.71 Previous Ottoman attempts to collect population statistics during 
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the  nineteenth century also categorised the empire’s population according 
to these basic sectarian designations.72
Of	 these	 three	 monotheistic	 religions,	 prison	 officials	 only	 divided	
Christianity into sectarian sub- categories. These Christian millet subdi-
visions were the Armenian Patriarchate, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 
and the Bulgarian Exarchate,73 which was originally a subgroup of the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate, but, as mentioned above, was separated in 
1872.74	The	grouping	of	Ottoman	subjects	according	to	religious	affilia-
tion	received	official	recognition	as	the	‘Millet System’ on 25 April 1861.75 
The Ottoman administration founded this system, in part, to implement the 
Imperial Rescripts of 1839 and 1856, which declared that all Ottoman 
subjects	possessed	equal	status	before	the	law	regardless	of	religious	affili-
ation.	Even	the	final	category	for	classifying	the	identity	of	the	prisoners	
who were Ottoman subjects was organised along confessional lines. The 
category ‘other Ottoman communities’ or milel- i muhtelife- yi Osmaniye, 
acted as a catch- all category and would have included other religious sects 
(mezhepler)	such	as	Alevis,	Druze,	Yazidis,	Maronites,	Assyrians,	Latins,	
and Coptic Christians.76
Furthermore, these categories of identity suggest that the concept of 
ethnicity based upon linguistic, quasi- racial, or cultural designation was 
either in its infancy within the Ottoman Empire or was consciously being 
avoided by the CUP at this time. This is illustrated by the inclusion of 
Catholics and Protestants within the religious millet of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate and Armenian populations. This inclusion implies that these 
two	 categories	 were	 not	 strictly	 based	 on	 a	 unified	 religious	 identity,	
because if Catholics and Protestants somehow fell under the category of 
Ecumenical Patriarchate and Armenian Christianity, then these designa-
tions were not purely religious. They also appear to represent a quasi- 
ethnic identity, one intertwined with religion, culture, and language. That 
said, within the prison survey only Christian millets conveyed any sense 
of ethnicity outside the lines of strict sectarianism.
By	contrast	prison	officials	did	not	request	the	number	of	Ottoman	sub-
jects considered Turks, Arabs, or Kurds among the prison population. The 
CUP appears to have been content to include these groups under the rubric of 
Islam without reference to racial, linguistic, religious, or supposed national 
differences among these groups. They were not viewed as separate ethno- 
religious communities possessing national identities of their own. Rather 
they were conceptualised as part of the core constituency of the Ottoman 
nation – Muslims. The issue of differentiating the ethno- religious national 
identity of Muslims that is so pervasive and perversely manipulated in the 
contemporary Middle East does not appear to have been an important issue 
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to the Prison Administration.77 Perhaps the CUP attempted to avoid similar 
fractious problems with its Muslim population that existed among the 
Balkan Christians during the 1903 Macedonian census. During the Second 
Constitutional Period, other CUP attempts to collect statistics on various 
segments of the Ottoman population regarding crime, military conscription, 
or taxation, either categorised the population along similar sectarian lines as 
the	prison	survey	or	simply	identified	them	‘Muslim’	or	‘Non-	Muslim’.78
The only place in the questionnaire where millet possesses the possible 
meaning of ‘national’ is in the second division of the ‘Milliyet- i Mahkumin’ 
category. This section deals exclusively with subjects of foreign states 
incarcerated in Ottoman prisons and contains no sectarian differentiations. 
As a result, it is clear that millet does possess a nationalistic connotation, 
but only in reference to foreigners and not Ottoman subjects. Therefore, 
in this one category of the questionnaire (‘Milliyet- i Mahkumin’), the term 
millet possesses several different meanings: religious, ethno- religious, 
and	national	identity.	This	clearly	demonstrates	the	state	of	flux	in	which	
millet found itself during this time. The multiple meanings of millet caused 
confusion	among	some	local	prison	officials	who,	while	completing	the	
survey, assigned multiple millet identities to individual prisoners.
Concepts such as nationalism, race, and ethnicity are not germane to 
the regions, languages, or cultures of the Middle East. There were no 
words in Persian, Turkish, or Arabic that adequately described what these 
concepts meant in the late Ottoman Empire. New words were adopted 
from European languages or indigenous words were imbued with new 
significance	while	still	maintaining	their	traditional	meanings.	This	led	to	
great confusion as to what the terms in question actually meant. Millet is 
one such example. Its inclusion in the prison survey confused many state 
officials	charged	with	assigning	millet identity of the empire’s prisoners. 
Sometimes	these	local	officials	even	gave	prisoners	multiple	millet identi-
ties within the same category of the survey.
For	 example,	 prison	officials	 in	Mecca	 (the	provincial	 capital	 of	 the	
Hijaz)	assigned	multiple	millet identities to the same prisoner. Some pris-
oners	were	identified	both	as	Muslims	and	as	belonging	to	‘other	Ottoman	
communities’. Additionally, incarcerated German, French, British, and 
Austrian subjects were also given dual millet identities, but in this instance 
as simultaneously foreign nationals and Muslims.79	Hijazi	prison	officials	
were not the only ones applying multiple millet identities to the incar-
cerated. In Baghdad province, national and religious identity was also 
conflated.	Officials	 in	 the	Baghdadi	 administrative	 district	 of	Kazımiye	




Iranian nationals were also Muslims and whether or not Ottoman Muslim 
subjects belonged to ‘other Ottoman communities’.80
The	Beirut	district	of	Hayfa	and	the	Yanya	district	of	Margılıç	are	two	
other examples of this phenomenon.81 All prisoners, not just Muslims, were 
given multiple millet identities. In fact, all Ottoman subjects who were 
assigned a religious millet identity of Muslim, Ecumenical Patriarchate, or 
Jewish were also listed as belonging to ‘other Ottoman communities’. It 
appears	that	the	Hayfa	and	Margılıç	prison	officials	made	a	clear	distinc-
tion	between	religious	affiliation	and	ethnic	or	communal	identity	and	that	
the term millet possessed these clear and distinct meanings in their minds. 
These instances are unique in comparison with the rest of the survey.
In	 other	 provinces,	 such	 as	 Manastır,	 Mamüretülaziz,	 Mosul,	 and	
Istanbul,	 local	 prison	 officials	 did	 not	 assign	multiple	millet identities. 
In fact, only a handful of administrative districts from around the empire 
made this mistake.82 In other words, they did not specify the religious 
affiliation	of	foreign	nationals	or	those	labelled	as	‘other	Ottoman	com-
munities’. However, the assigning of multiple millet identities to the same 
prisoner was not limited to one isolated province. It cannot, therefore, 
be explained away as a strange aberration in one obscure corner of the 
empire. The areas that did assign multiple millet identities were spread 
across the empire. As a result of this ambiguity and the confusion it 
caused, the Prison Administration adjusted this category in order to clarify 
millet’s meaning and usage in a subsequent version of the survey.
On 25 May 1914, the province of Istanbul submitted its prison sta-
tistics for 1913–14 utilising a similar version of the 1912 questionnaire. 
There	were,	however,	some	significant	alterations,	particularly	regarding	
the ethno- religious, communal, and national identity of the inmates. The 
title of the 1914 version of this category was changed from ‘Milliyet- i 
Mahkumin’ to ‘Milliyet ve Tabiiyet- i Mahkumin’. This same category 
was now separated into two subdivisions not previously contained in the 
1912 questionnaire. The two new subdivisions were entitled ‘tebaiyeten 
Osmaniye’ and ‘tebaiyeten ecnebiye’. Instead of ten different choices 
regarding the prisoner’s identity, this version included twelve different 
designations divided equally between the two new subdivisions. The sub-
division of tebaiyeten Osmaniye included the following:
1. İslam.
2. Rum ve Rum Katolik ve Protestan (Ecumenical Patriarchate and 
Ecumenical Patriarchate Catholic and Protestant).
3. Ermeni ve Ermeni Katolik ve Protestan (Armenian and Armenian 
Catholic and Protestant).
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4. Musevi (Jewish).
5. Bulgar (Bulgarian Exarchate).
6. Milel- i Muhtelife- yi Osmaniye (Other Ottoman Communities).
The second subdivision of tebaiyeten ecnebiye included the following:





6. Milel- i Muhtelife- yi Ecnebi (Other Foreign Nationals).
These	new	titles,	subdivisions,	and	categories	represent	significant	clari-
fications	of	the	original	1912	questionnaire’s	ambiguous	use	of	the	term	
millet (see Chart 3.7).83
The	 first	 significant	 change	 is	 the	 addition	 of	 two	 related	 words	 –	
tabiiyet and tebaiyeten – found in the title of the entire category related 
to the ethno- religious, communal, and national identity of the prisoners 
and in the category’s two new subdivisions. The words are, respectively, 
an adjective and adverb and possess the meanings of ‘nationality or alle-
giance’ and ‘as a subject’. Both words are also closely associated with tabi 
and tebaa, which mean respectively ‘a subject of a state or sovereign’ and 
‘subjects; subject (of a state)’. Tabiiyet’s antonym tabiiyetsizlik means 
‘statelessness’.84
The use of tabiiyet and tebaiyeten in the 1914 prison survey represents 
a	significant	change	and	clarification	in	terminology.	It	indicates	that	the	
Ministry of the Interior and the Prison Administration realised the ambigu-
ous nature of millet and sought to clarify its meaning regarding national 
and communal identity between Ottoman and foreign subjects. The 1912 
questionnaire	conflated	the	traditional	diplomatic	usage	of	the	term	millet 
(as religious sovereignty) with the more recently developed meaning of 
‘ethno- religious community’ in reference to Ottoman subjects.85 The con-
fusion	caused	by	this	conflation	was	clearly	demonstrated	by	the	prison	
officials	who	incorrectly	assigned	multiple	millet identities to individual 
prisoners.
In the 1914 version, the meaning and use of the terms millet and milliyet 
are much more circumspect and do not refer to a prisoner’s nationality. 
Instead, the term tabiiyet is used to designate national identity, whereas the 
terms millet and milliyet only refer to the ethno- religious and communal 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































let’s varied meanings during this period. He clearly approves of restricting 
the meaning of millet to identify groups of people based upon religious 
affiliation.	This	 he	 claims	maintained	 its	 original	Quranic	meaning.	He	
does acknowledge, although disapprovingly, that millet was also being 
used to identify peoples according to language or place of origin.86
The 1914 version followed the same format and overall content 
of the 1912 questionnaire. It did, however, change the Armenian and 
Ecumenical	 Patriarchate	 categories	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 clarity	 and	 specific-
ity. The 1914 questionnaire altered the 1912 version to read ‘Ecumenical 
Patriarchate and Ecumenical Patriarchate Catholics and Protestants’ (Rum 
ve Rum Katolik ve Protestan) and ‘Armenian and Armenian Catholics and 
Protestants’ (Ermeni ve Ermeni Katolik ve Protestan).87 The original intent 
of the 1912 survey was to collect the statistics on all those associated with 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Armenian communities. Ottoman author-
ities	did	incarcerate	orthodox	Christians,	but	perhaps	prison	officials	did	
not properly vet the titles of these two categories in the original survey.
A	 summation	 of	 the	 significant	 insights	 into	 CUP	 conceptions	 of	
difference as revealed by the 1912 and 1914 prison surveys include: 1. 
Difference	among	the	Ottoman	population	was	classified	according	to	con-
fessional designation, not ethno- nationalist identities. 2. Sectarian identi-
fication	of	Ottoman	prisoners	is	consistent	with	other	forms	of	population	
tabulation utilised by the CUP and previous regimes. 3. Designations of 
ethnicity based upon linguistic, quasi- racial, or cultural designation were 
generally avoided, except in the case of Ottoman Christian communities, 
such as Catholic and Protestant Armenians and Ecumenical Patriarchate 
Christians. 4. No ethnic distinctions were made among Ottoman Muslims, 
such as Turks, Arabs, and Kurds. 5. The only time the term millet does 
imply the meaning of ‘national’ is in relation to foreigner prisoners. 6. 
The Ottoman state did not view any Ottoman communities as distinct 
nations possessing some form of independent sovereign power. The 
Ottoman population was still seen as subjects of the state and sultan. 7. 
Distinctions of identity were based along monotheistic sectarian lines and 
all were supposedly equal before the law. 8. In the 1912 survey the term 
millet possessed multiple meanings including religious, ethno- religious, 
communal, and national identity. Millet was not a static concept during 
the	 late	Ottoman	period,	but	 remained	 in	a	 state	of	flux	until	well	after	
the demise of the empire when it obtained its present meaning of ‘nation’ 
and ‘national’. 9. The ambiguity of millet in the 1912 survey led to con-
fusion	 and	 recording	 errors	 among	 prison	 officials.	 Finally,	 the	 Prison	
Administration attempted to solve this confusion by circumscribing the 
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meaning of millet to ‘ethno- religious communal identity’ in a subsequent 
rendition of the questionnaire.
This investigation into the use and meaning of millet in the prison 
survey possesses the potential for much greater implications regarding late 
Ottoman ‘nationalist’ history – particularly in terms of the development of 
Turkish nationalism. It challenges the claim that the CUP was dominated 
by Turkish nationalists bent on ‘Turkifying’ the empire in order to create 
a Turkish state.88 This investigation demonstrates that the CUP concep-
tualised difference among the Ottoman population according to sectarian 
lines, in part because its core goals were: to centralise and rationalise 
power within its hands and the Ottoman bureaucracy; to modernise and 
transform	the	empire	into	an	efficient,	powerful	state;	and	to	maintain	its	
territorial integrity. CUP members were elitists, but not separatists. They 
were	still	actively	ascribing	to	and	promoting	official	Ottoman	nationalism	
(Osmanlılık) until the end of the empire, even though they became increas-
ingly suspicious of the empire’s Christian subjects after the Balkan Wars 
and	 engaged	 in	 horrific	 acts	 of	 demographic	 engineering	 and	 genocide	
during	WWI.	 This	 official	 Ottoman	 nationalism	was	 supposed	 to	 tran-
scend linguistic, ethnic, communal, and religious differences, even though 
its core constituency consisted of the empire’s Muslim population.89
Conclusion
The 1912 prison survey provides important insights into the composition 
of the Ottoman prison population in terms of numbers, crimes committed, 
gender, age, marital status, occupation, punishment, recidivism, and ethno- 
religious identity. This information is vital to reconstructing the population 
itself and making sense of who was incarcerated at the end of the empire. 
These statistics reveal that the prison population stayed relatively low 
throughout	 the	Second	Constitutional	Period,	fluctuating	from	21,000	to	
40,000 prisoners. The Ottoman prison population, in terms of percentage 
of its overall population, was comparable to other contemporary states. 
For example, the United States’ 1910 prison population was 112,362 
inmates. According to the 1910 US Census, the country’s total population 
was 92,228,496. This means that prisoners made up only 0.12 per cent of 
its population. The Ottoman prison population, at most, was only 0.16 per 
cent of the empire’s entire population. Even during the height of WWI, 
the percentage of the Ottoman population that was incarcerated never 
approached 0.2 per cent. The empire, therefore, should not be character-
ised as a ‘police state’ even though it exerted tremendous efforts to trans-
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The vast majority of prisoners were male (32,584 out of 34,085), 
whereas females made up 4.4 per cent of the prison population (1,494 
out of 34,085). Nearly 24,500 inmates were under the age of forty with 
twenty to thirty year- olds making up almost a third of the prison popula-
tion (11,395). A total of 15 per cent of the population was under the age 
of twenty. Women and children, therefore, made up more than 19 per 
cent of the total prison population. Despite their relatively small numbers, 
Ottoman prison reformers took great interest in these segments of the 
prison population. Issues of female and juvenile inmates are dealt with 
in Chapters 4 and 6, respectively. More than 30,000 prisoners were from 
the lower socio- economic classes with almost 13,000 farmers, 7,191 arti-
sans, and 4,856 labourers. Muslims accounted for nearly 20,000 inmates, 
more than 7,000 were Christian, and at least 372 were Jewish. The ethno- 
religious, communal constitution of the prison population was generally 
in line with overall population percentages in the empire. In other words, 










Baghdad 115 0 1,425 56
Beirut 699 3 1,751 46
Bitlis 4 0 316 31
Canik 166 0 821 23
Edirne 1,134 52 5,475 455
The	Hijaz 39 0 364 45
Istanbul 1,349 18 2,519 143
Kastamonu 137 2 847 125
Manastır 412 0 1,480 99
Mamuretülaziz 299 0 1,214 79
Mosul 129 0 2,066 26
Yanya 205 5 1,076 88
Totals 4,688 80 19,354 1,216
Chart 3.10 1911–12 prisoner literacy statistics.
Note Several provinces and independent administrative sub-divisions are not represented here 
because their results are not available to researchers. Not all available surveys provided data on 
prisoner literacy. These numbers, therefore, do not match total prison population numbers.
Source BOA, DHMBHPSM 3/36, 4/4, 4/20, 4/21, 5/1, 5/9, 6/27, and 12/70; DHMBHPS 145/2, 
145/56, 145/78, 146/69, and 146/70
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it does not appear that a particular population was targeted for incar-
ceration over another. In areas that were predominantly Bulgar, Muslim, 
Armenian, or Ecumenical Patriarchate Christian, they were respectively 
the majority of the prison population, but in mixed areas, such as Istanbul, 
the numbers appear to be in line with overall population percentages. 
Regarding marital status, at least 11,400 were single, nearly 13,000 were 
married, and 4,400 prisoners had children. Illiteracy was rampant among 
the prison population. More than 20,500 inmates could not read or write 
while no less than 4,800 prisoners could. The most common crimes were 
misdemeanour ‘theft’ and ‘assault and battery’, while roughly one- third 
of the prison population was imprisoned for serious offences, such as 
homicide and violent theft. This data is very similar to that available for 
other European powers during the long nineteenth century, such as Great 
Britain, France, Germany, or Russia, even though these states, generally, 
had much larger prison populations.
In addition to understanding the composition of the Ottoman prison 
population, these prison surveys provide important insights into Ottoman 
sensibilities towards crime, punishment, and criminality. Prison and 
criminal legal reforms worked hand in hand during this period. The exten-
sive changes made to the IOPC and to prison policy and practice reveal 
a vibrant agenda of increased centralisation of power in the hands of the 
state through the rationalisation of law and legal procedure concerning 
crime and punishment. The bureaucracy removed intermediaries to its 
power and the state took a greater role in the lives of its population in an 
attempt to standardise legal proceedings, law enforcement, and punish-
ment. The correlation between the changes made to the IOPC and the 
1912 prison survey demonstrate this close correlation between reform and 
practice. Most of the information collected on crime in the prison surveys 
correlated to issues of personal rights, safety, property, and honour, 
thus demonstrating CUP interests in maintaining social order, public 
rights, and rationalising punishment in line with contemporary global 
sensibilities.
Ottoman statistical efforts to understand the background, identity, 
and criminal behaviour of inmates represent an important progression in 
Ottoman statecraft. They also demonstrate innovative approaches to long- 
held Ottoman practices concerning land registries and censuses. This is 
much less about rupture of practice than about continuity, transformation, 
and expansion of long- held Ottoman administrative policies and practices. 
The	knowledge	gained	by	Ottoman	prison	officials	 and	 the	Ministry	of	
the Interior regarding the composition of the prison population facilitate 
the exploration of prison conditions, everyday life, and reform efforts to 
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organise, supervise, discipline, and rehabilitate the empire’s convicts. This 
is the topic of Chapter 4.
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The Spatialisation of Incarceration: Reforms, 
Response and the Reality of Prison Life
From	 July	 1909	 to	 August	 1910	 Ahmed	 Şerif,	 an	 Ottoman	 journalist,	
travelled throughout the Balkans, Anatolia, and some of the empire’s 
Arabic- speaking territories reporting on what he observed for the Tanin 
newspaper	(the	semi-	official	newspaper	of	the	Ottoman	Government).	Of	
special interest to him was investigating the effectiveness of government 
administration in each area. As part of each of his journeys he visited each 
town’s government buildings, courts, police, gendarme, and prison. His 
reports are detailed and surprisingly candid concerning administrative 
problems,	 such	as	corruption,	nepotism,	and	abuse	by	government	offi-
cials. These reports provide rich insights into the state of the empire in the 
early years of the Second Constitutional Period.1
During	 his	 visit	 to	 the	 district	 of	 Karaağaç	 (Şarkıkaraağaç)	 located	
in	Konya	province	 from	9	 to	13	September	1909,	Şerif	 investigated	 its	
prison.	As	he	walked	into	the	government	offices	he	came	to	the	door	of	
the prison dorm room, which was across a narrow garden. A foul odour 
emanated from the small metal grate in the door that acted as the prison’s 
only	source	of	fresh	air.	Looking	through	the	opening,	Şerif	saw	a	rela-
tively large room holding about 25 prisoners who were either lying down 
or sitting and who were talking to one another. Their faces, however, were 
‘pale, death shaded, and bloodless’.2
As he entered the prison, he was overcome with what he would later 
describe as the worst stench imaginable, forcing him to cover his mouth 
and nose. He also found the prison to be poorly lit, with only one small 
lamp and no natural source of light. Conditions as he saw and felt them 
were extremely damp, miserable, and wretched. At the back of the room 
stood a government toilet (hükümet abdesthanesi) that emptied its con-
tents	into	an	open	sewer	and	emitted	a	horrific	stench	that	filled	the	entire	
room. He could not see how anyone could survive being imprisoned in 
such horrible conditions.3
With his anger kindled, he marched straight to the prison director and 
demanded	an	explanation.	He	received	only	deflecting	excuses,	such	as	a	




made similar excuses in an attempt to blame their superiors at the provin-
cial level.4	In	the	end,	he	left	Karaağaç	angered	that	the	town’s	administra-
tion was so inept and spineless. Throughout the rest of his visits in Konya 
he used the awful conditions of this district’s prison as the standard to 
measure the conditions of all the other prisons. While conditions in each 
of	the	other	prisons	were	still	poor,	none	was	as	bad	as	Karaağaç.5
When punishment shifted from the plethora of options it had been in 
the early modern era to primarily incarceration in the nineteenth century, 
Ottoman	 authorities	 faced	 a	 series	 of	 challenges	 that	 Karaağaç	 prison	
starkly illustrates. As a ‘total institution’, the prison constitutes ‘a place of 
residence and work where a large number of like- situated individuals, cut 
off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead 
an enclosed, formally administered round of life’.6 Incarceration requires 
intense and continuous supervision, housing, provisioning, and health 
and hygienic measures that raise other logistical and disciplinary prob-
lems. With the discontinuance of incarceration in the Imperial Shipyards 
where prisoners were continuously employed, authorities now had a 
large number of convicts incarcerated together in idleness. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, Ottoman authorities and prison reformers spent much of 
the nineteenth century dealing with the unprecedented scale of problems 
caused by this shift to incarceration.
The	 CUP	 inherited	 these	 concerns	 and	 problems	 when	 it	 seized	
power in 1908, and solving them was a matter of high priority. During 
the Second Constitutional Period it addressed prison conditions, order, 
and discipline on three interrelated fronts: 1. Constructing new prisons 
and transforming existing ones, 2. Improving health and hygienic condi-
tions, and 3. Implementing programmes to facilitate the rehabilitation 
of inmates, such as secular and religious education, skills training, and 
labour. These efforts resulted in the production of incarcerated space by 
physically dividing and separating the prison population according to dif-
ferences in crime, health, age, and gender. Although these efforts peaked 
in the Second Constitutional Period, their origins can be traced to the 1880 
Prison Regulation (Hapishaneler ve Tevkifhaneler Nizamnamesi), which 
the CUP implemented at an unprecedented level.
This chapter argues that through these reforms and the implementa-
tion of the 1880 Prison Regulation, the Prison Administration and the 
CUP engaged in what Henri Lefebvre called the ‘production of space’ to 
create well- ordered prisons and to address the awful conditions illustrated 
above.7 The Ottoman administration spent a great deal of time, energy, and 
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resources improving prison conditions. These efforts exemplify Ottoman 
attempts to assume greater responsibility for the welfare of its population, 
particularly prisoners, improving public health and hygiene, provisioning, 
and regulating inmate interactions. Many of these responsibilities were 
traditionally reserved for individuals and the family. This chapter argues 
that this intervention represents the expansion of Ottoman state patriar-
chy and the Ottoman ‘nanny state’. Despite the best of state intentions, 
an investigation of reform implementation and the actual experiences of 
prisoners	demonstrate	the	variegated	and	often	haphazard	nature	of	prison	
reform programmes, and the effects that these efforts actually had on their 
intended targets.
This	 chapter	 consists	 of	 three	 main,	 interrelated,	 sections.	 The	 first	
investigates the conditions and challenges facing inmates and administra-
tors in the empire’s sprawling prison network through the in- depth inves-
tigation of Karesi central prison (Karesi merkez hapishanesi). The second 
section	 looks	 at	 specific	 attempts	 at	 creating	 the	 well-	ordered	 prison	
through the production of space in terms of new building projects, prison 
architectural designs, health and hygiene regimens, and the concrete ways 
the Prison Administration organised inmates. Finally, this chapter looks at 
Ottoman efforts to rehabilitate convicted criminals. These three sections 
are linked by an emphasis on the theme of state patriarchy and an evalua-
tion of reform and reality.
Prison Conditions and Daily Life
As discussed in the previous two chapters and as illustrated above, 
prison conditions, including order and discipline, during the nineteenth 
century were woefully inadequate. Horrible conditions, relaxed regimens, 
dilapidated	 buildings,	 corruption,	 escapes,	 and	 abuse	 typified	 prison	
experience. The 1880 Prison Regulation was never implemented sys-
tematically or comprehensively throughout the empire until the Second 
Constitutional Period. In the Hamidian era, administrators built numer-
ous prisons, but few were up to modern health, hygiene, or architectural 
standards. Additionally, there was a general lack of regular funding for 
prisons, including for their management and upkeep, resulting in the 
dilapidation of many of these newly built structures.8 Periodic foreign 
and Ottoman inspections of the empire’s prisons, such as those conducted 
by Ambassador Canning, Abdülhamid II’s ‘Commission for Expediting 
Initiatives and Reforms’ (Tesri- i Muamelat ve Islahat Komisyonu), Ahmet 
Şerif,	and	the	CUP	Prison	Administration	confirm	these	assertions.9
The central prison in the provincial sub- division of Karesi is an 
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excellent example of the problems faced by prison administrators from 
the 1870s through WWI. In Karesi’s 1871–2 provincial budget, central 
Ottoman authorities allocated 40,165 kuruş for the construction of a 
new central prison. According to building reports, it cost 24,000 kuruş 
to build.10 Three years after the Hamidian regime issued the 1880 Prison 
Regulation a report revealed that the prison contained three women incar-
cerated for serious crimes and requested that a women’s prison (kadınlar 
hapishanesi) be built to house them.11 Within months, the Council of 
State approved the request and allocated more than 11,000 kuruş to the 
construction of the prison.12 In 1897, an earthquake severely damaged the 
government buildings, including Karesi’s prisons. Its municipal council 
sent a request to the imperial government for funds to use to rebuild these 
structures and to expand the main prison to hold a maximum of 350 pris-
oners. It was approved, and 120,000 kuruş were allocated to the rebuilding 
of the area, including its prisons.13
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, in 1911 the newly established Prison 
Administration undertook a survey that included Karesi central prison and 
initiated a series of measures to build new prisons and repair older struc-
tures. These plans came to a screeching halt when the CUP lost power in 
the summer of 1912. In 1914, after its hiatus from power ended, the CUP 
initiated and conducted another comprehensive prison survey. This ques-
tionnaire (sual varakası) was distributed to every prison in the empire. It 
contained a series of questions regarding the state and condition of each 
prison facility. It is unique, because it calls for local prison administrators 
to	 write	 extensive	 comments	 and	 suggestions	 about	 the	 specific	 needs	
of their respective prisons.14 To make their cases, some prison directors 
included	photographs	of	their	facilities	demonstrating	dilapidated	edifices,	
massive	overcrowding,	and	horrific	living	conditions.15 Other administra-
tors included proposed architectural designs of prisons that they wanted to 
be built in their districts.16
In the case of Karesi’s central prison, the warden reported in the 1914 
survey that there were 794 prisoners incarcerated there, including twenty- 
two females. The prison built in 1897 was designed to hold 350 prisoners. 
Needless to say, prison conditions, according to the report, were severely 
crowded. In fact, they were so ‘narrow, dark, crowded, and unhealthy’ 
that the warden deemed the prison to be beyond repair and proposed that a 
new one be built in its place. To illustrate just how dire prison conditions 
were, the warden included the following four photographs of the prison 
(Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4).17 These photographs graphically illustrate 
the terrible shape of many of the empire’s prisons. They also demonstrate 
just how much work the Prison Administration had to do if it was com-
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mitted to comprehensive prison reform. Photographs from this provincial 
prison show that conditions were severely overcrowded. Prisoners were 
housed in tiny chicken- coop- esque hovels (kümes), make- shift tents 
described as ‘gypsy dwellings’ (çerge baraka), and huts that resembled 
dilapidated stalls in a local market. Each unit contained as many as two or 
even	three	prisoners.	The	roofing	and	walls	of	the	prisoners’	quarters	were	
made of simple wood or canvas and were held down by rocks, bricks, and 
clay shingles. The structures depicted in these photographs were, in fact, 
additions built onto the prison in order to accommodate almost two and 
half times the prison’s intended capacity.18
Generally speaking, prisons throughout the empire were located next 
to or within fortress compounds and other government buildings with 
very few being properly enclosed. These prison conditions made escape a 
common occurrence. According to archival records, throughout the Second 
Constitutional Period there were constant problems with overcrowding and 
prisoner escapes. In fact, in several reports sent to the Prison Administration, 
overcrowding, poor conditions, and lack of supervision and discipline were 
listed as the main reasons for prison breakouts.19 Judging from Figures 4.2 
and 4.4, escape from Karesi’s central prison would have been quite easy. 
The walls were either non- existent or they were very low and weak, 
being made from materials that meant they were not structurally sound. 
Furthermore, the town, just outside of the prison, was easily accessed by 
simply climbing over the roof. As escapes were so common, the Prison 
Administration attempted to address this issue in April 1912 by issuing a 
general directive regarding prison order, discipline, and the prevention of 
prisoner escapes. The directive emphasised that the prevention of prisoner 
escapes and general prison order was the responsibility of the prison cadre 
and that most escapes were the result of negligence on the part of prison 
employees or even direct assistance from prison employees.20
Another way that the Prison Administration attempted to remedy the 
chronic problem of prison escapes was by alleviating overcrowding. 
With the approval of the Ministry of Justice, the Prison Administration 
periodically extended amnesty to prisoners who had served two- thirds of 
their sentence, who had been convicted of less serious offences (cünha ve 
kabahat), and who were well- behaved.21 Authorities also transferred many 
inmates to less crowded facilities in adjacent sub- districts and provinces.22
Internal order, security, and discipline were also severely lacking. As 
evidenced by the Karesi prison photographs, inmates were not subject to 
work details, nor were they gainfully employed. In fact, during WWI, the 
Directorate of Prisons solicited the number of employed prisoners. Out of 
a total of 478 prisoners incarcerated in Karesi’s central prison and jail only 
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twenty inmates worked in some capacity inside the prison.23 Most prison-
ers throughout the empire, including Karesi, sat idle all day, drinking tea, 
smoking, playing backgammon, and gambling.24 Gambling was such a 
problem	that	many	fights,	injuries,	deaths,	and	prisoner–guard	collusions	
were	blamed	on	it.	In	1922,	a	gambling-	related	fight	that	broke	out	in	the	
Istanbul penitentiary resulted in one death and seven injuries before the 
gendarme could suppress it.25
Prisoner	fights	and	riots	also	resulted	from	a	general	 lack	of	 internal	
order,	 supervision,	 and	 discipline.	 For	 example,	 in	 1913	 a	 fight	 among	
prisoners broke out in the Siirt administrative sub-division (sancak) in 
Bitlis	province	that	resulted	in	 the	injury	of	several	prisoners.	The	fight	
was attributed to the smuggling of weapons (kesici aletleri) into the 
prison, which had exacerbated tensions among inmates.26 No doubt, 
much smuggling occurred in Ottoman prisons with the consent of prison 
guards.27	Prison	fights	similar	to	Siirt’s	were	common	place	in	Ottoman	
prisons. Archival records attest to numerous uprisings, disturbances, and 
Figure 4.1 ‘An example of the makeshift structures, tents, and shacks [located] at the 
walls of the central prison in Karesi Sancak’ (Karesi sancağı merkez liva hapishanesi 
hıvalisindeki çerge baraka ve külliyelerden birer nümune).
Source BOA, DHMBHPSM 10/14, doc. 12
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other disorderly conduct throughout the prison system and discuss the 
Prison Administration’s continuous efforts to prevent such occurrences.28
Ottoman prisons and jails suffered from a general lack of supervision. 
In 1915, Karesi central prison employed only six male prison guards 
(gardiyanlar), who received a monthly salary of 200 kuruş each. It also 
employed one female prison guard (nisa gardiyan) at a monthly salary of 
150 kuruş.29 Considering that the previous year’s prison population con-
sisted of 772 males, it would be impossible for six guards to provide ade-
quate inmate supervision. Judging from the photographs, it also appears 
that there was no separation of prisoners according to crimes committed 
or whether they were accused or convicted. This is not surprising since the 
prison was severely overcrowded.
Similar	to	the	prisons	inspected	by	Ahmed	Şerif,	 inmates	at	Karesi’s	
central prison also suffered from poor health conditions. Overcrowding 
exponentially facilitates the spread of communicable diseases, such as 
typhus, typhoid fever, and cholera. Add to these threats the open sewage 
Figure 4.2 ‘Huts located on the eastern side of an interior section of the Karesi Sancak’s 
central prison’ (Karesi sancağı merkez liva hapishanesinin şark cephesinde bir kısm- i 
dahili barakaları).
Source BOA, DHMBHPSM 10/14, doc. 13
Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire
118
running through the prison huts, as illustrated in Figure 4.2, and it becomes 
obvious how easily cholera epidemics could ravage a prison.
Judging by the cooking grates and the utensils strewn about the huts and 
the prison compound, prisoners cooked their own food, which was usually 
supplied by family members or local charitable organisations. Despite 
directives contained in the 1880 Prison Regulation, local prisons rarely 
provided food to inmates apart from a few small loaves of bread on a daily 
basis.30 They did, however, often hire outside contractors, such as bakers 
and grocers, to provide food for the prisoners.31 As prisoners often cooked 
for themselves and stoves were the main heating source in dormitory- style 
prisons,	fires	 regularly	broke	out,	 causing	death	 and	 extensive	property	
damage.	 For	 example,	 in	March	 1918	 a	 fire	 broke	 out	 in	 the	 Beyoğlu	
women’s	jail	that	caused	far-	reaching	damage.	Prison	officials	conducted	
an investigation and allocated funds for the repairs. During this period, 
the female inmates were housed at other local prison facilities, such as the 
Istanbul	women’s	penitentiary	and	the	women’s	jail	in	Üsküdar.32
Figure 4.3 ‘A sectional view facing the entrance to Karesi Sancak’s central prison’ 
(Karesi sancağı merkez liva hapishanesinin medhali karşısının bir kısm- ı manzarası).
Source BOA, DHMBHPSM 10/14, doc. 14
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The shocking photographs and report detailing the awful conditions 
and	overcrowding	at	Karesi	central	prison	led	to	an	official	visit	by	Talat	
Pasha (Interior Minister) in 1914. Talat Pasha declared the prison to be 
‘crowded,	 terrible,	 filthy,	 and	 unacceptable’	 and	 said	 that	 it	 would	 be	
replaced. In 1915, a new prison of approximately 14,000 m² was built on 
an almost two- acre (6.8 dönüm) wooded plot of land just outside the city 
fortress at the cost of about 24,000 kuruş. This new prison was two stories 
tall, had seven separate wards intended to house 300 prisoners, and had 
indoor toilets.33 After the new prison had been built, conditions improved, 
but overcrowding persisted. In 1917, prison reports indicate that it held 
417 prisoners (all of them male) and continued to employ a total of seven 
prison guards. It still suffered from overcrowding, but not to the extent that 
it had done two years earlier. The local municipality was also supplying 
the prisoners with proper provisions.34 These improvements reduced the 
risk	of	fire,	greatly	ameliorated	the	spread	of	communicable	diseases,	and	
Figure 4.4 ‘A section of the chicken coop-esque huts in the southern part of Karesi 
Sancak’s central prison’ (Karesi sancağı merkez liva hapishanesi cenub çephesindeki 
kümes şeklinde barakaların bir kismi).
Source BOA, DHMBHPSM 10/14, doc. 15
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improved prisoner health and living conditions, despite continued over-
crowding. Through the implementation of the 1880 Prison Regulation, 
the state assumed greater levels of responsibility for and power over its 
prisoners, although there were limits to its success.
This brief history of Karesi central prison provides a sense of the 




building sheds outside the prison in order to ease overcrowding and halt 
the spread of a disease epidemic by isolating sick prisoners.35
The vast majority of prisons suffered from bad sanitary conditions 
caused by poor ventilation and lighting, an inadequate potable water 
supply, and a lack of running water. Most prisons had no washing facili-
ties and toilets consisted of a hole dug in the earth for communal use. 
Regimens stipulating regular cleanings of prison facilities and hygienic 
measures for inmates were rarely implemented. As a result, outbreaks of 
cholera, typhoid fever, typhus, scabies, and other communicable diseases 
were rampant in the squalid and fetid conditions under which prisoners 
languished. These conditions resulted in numerous deaths each year.36 
Issues related to poor health and hygiene, as illustrated in Figures 4.1, 4.2, 
4.3, and 4.4, constituted a major source of concern and focus for the Prison 
Administration.37	In	fact,	when	announcing	its	first	comprehensive	reform	
programme	in	April	1912,	it	justified	renovating	existing	prisons	and	con-
structing new ones by claiming that these reforms would bring health and 
hygiene conditions into conformity with the ‘laws of civilisation’.38 The 
existence	of	unsanitary	conditions	was	also	the	most	common	justification	
given by local prison administrators for the construction of new prisons.39
Creating the Well- ordered Prison
As discussed in Chapter 2 and above, the Ottoman Ministry of Justice 
issued	the	first	comprehensive	prison	regulation	for	the	empire	in	1880.	
This regulation meticulously detailed the responsibilities of all prison 
officials	and	employees.	It	also	stipulated	clear	health	and	hygiene	stand-
ards, prison labour, regimens, prison organisation, and the spatial separa-
tion of different types of prisoners.40 This was a thoroughly modern and 
progressive prison regulation according to nineteenth- century standards. 
It attempted to implement modern concepts of time and space in order to 
facilitate prison health, discipline, and organisation for the maintenance 
of order and the rehabilitation of the incarcerated. When implemented, 
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this regulation engaged in the ‘production of space’. In the minds of 
prison administrators, a key to prison order and inmate rehabilitation was 
the ‘spatialisation of incarceration’. This entailed dividing and organis-
ing	 the	physical,	mental,	 and	social	 structure	of	 the	prison	 into	 specific	
areas and categories that facilitated proper health, order, discipline, and 
rehabilitation.41
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Prison Administration drew up new 
architectural designs; constructed new prisons and repaired existing ones; 
prepared and promulgated new regulations; and implemented new prison 
regimens in order to centralise power and instil discipline, order, cleanli-
ness, and industriousness within the prison for both prisoners and employ-
ees. As early as 1910, the CUP began its attempts to remedy the awful 
conditions found in Ottoman prisons by establishing a commission for the 
purpose of producing a general plan for prison reform and the construction 
of new prisons.42 This commission formulated a comprehensive prison 
construction programme that was initiated in late 1911.43
During the Second Constitutional Period, the Prison Administration 
viewed the design and construction of modern prisons as the remedy for 
poor sanitary conditions. These new prison designs incorporated the latest 
developments in order to facilitate standards of health, hygiene, discipline, 
and surveillance, and in order to promote prisoner rehabilitation through 
labour. Through the production of special modern spatial relationships 
these new prisons were supposed to remedy the problems of disorder and 
death	that	typified	ancien régime (Hamidian era) prisons.
In order to create the environment that would bring the health and 
hygiene of Ottoman prisons in conformity with the ‘laws of civilisation’, 
each new prison was to include washrooms (çamaşırhaneler), toilets (apt-
eshaneler), running water, electricity, proper ventilation, dormitory- style 
wards where prisoners of similar criminal convictions would be housed 
together, courtyards for exercise, and kitchens (mutfaklar). Each prison 
would	also	include	a	separate	hospital	or	infirmary	depending	on	prison	
capacity in order to isolate the sick from the healthy. Prison budgets and 
reports delineated the costs of medicines and treatments and reported 
them to the Prison Administration. Prison authorities also introduced 
new regimens regarding cleanliness, such as scheduled prison cleanings, 
whitewashing walls with lye, regularly changing and washing prison-
ers’ clothing and bedding, frequent bathing, and the washing of hands 
before eating. Finally, each prison was required to employ a doctor. If 
the prison was small (on the district level), several prisons in the same 
area collectively employed a physician.44 These seemingly obvious prac-
tices were initially mandated by the 1880 Prison Regulation, but their 
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full  implementation was not attempted until CUP rule. For example, in 
late 1913, Istanbul’s penitentiary experienced an outbreak of cholera and 
scabies. Health measures to combat these communicable diseases and to 
prevent future outbreaks included the distribution of clean, new clothing 
to poor prisoners; introducing the practice of quarantining new inmates 
prior to their introduction into the general prison population; having the 
prison physician examine prisoners prior to their release to prevent them 
leaving with a communicable disease; making sure that prison bathrooms 
were in good repair; and ensuring that the prison hospital had access to 
fresh running water.45
Regarding the affect that these new spatial relationships had on prison 
order and discipline, prison administrators segregated inmates according 
to severity of crime (serious and less serious offenders), convicted and 
accused, age (children and adults), health (sick and well), and gender. In 
some cases, authorities allocated separate space for each of these divisions 
within the same prison, but often different prisons were constructed to 
meet these needs. For example, if there were enough female prisoners then 
a separate women’s prison (kadın or nisa hapishanesi) was built alongside 
a men’s prison, as was done in Karesi.
Less serious offenders with a sentence of less than three months’ incar-
ceration were usually kept on the district (kaza) level. Those prisoners 
with sentences of up to three years (either cünha or cinayet) were incarcer-
ated at a sub-division level (liva or sancak) prison. Only serious offend-
ers with sentences of three years or more were incarcerated in central 
prisons (merkez hapihaneler) on the sub-divisional and provincial levels. 
Prisoners convicted of serious crimes and sentenced to hard labour (kürek) 
of	five	years	or	more	were	incarcerated	in	penitentiaries	(hapishaneler- i 
umumi) in specially designated cities around the empire, such as Istanbul, 
Edirne,	İzmir,	and	Sinop.46 Ottoman prison reformers eventually separated 
children from adult prisoners by releasing them to their parents or guardi-
ans or by sending them to reformatories (ıslahaneler). Prisoners aged from 
fifteen	 to	nineteen	were	 still	 incarcerated	 in	 regular	prisons.	They	now,	
however, received reduced sentences in comparison with adults and were 
separated from them in specially designated areas within the prison.47 
New and refurbished prisons also included special quarters for prison 
employees,	such	as	offices,	guard	rooms,	and	observation	towers,	as	well	
as sleeping quarters. The style and capacity of prisons varied according 
to location, type of prisoner, and security needs. Prison capacities ranged 
from sixty to 1,000 prisoners.48
While many of these regulations were effectively implemented, as 
demonstrated by the number of new prisons built for male and female 
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prisoners, these reforms did not go uncontested.49 Prison administrators 
attempted to hire more guards, but war- time needs for additional troops 
often	took	precedence	over	staffing	prisons.50 Prisoners also complained 
about the new spatial divisions and organisation. For example, during an 
investigation into allegations of prisoner abuse and administrative corrup-
tion	at	the	Sinop	penitentiary	in	late	1912,	one	prisoner	(Ismail,	Fatsa’lı	
Hasan	Ağa)	 took	 the	opportunity	during	his	 questioning	 to	 express	his	
displeasure with the prison’s new system of organisation. He claimed 
that the prison was divided into three wards and that the prisoners were 
no longer allowed to walk around interacting freely with one another. In 
his opinion this caused prisoner distress and low morale, especially for 
those incarcerated in a prison fortress, such as Sinop. In response to the 
prisoner’s assertions, the inspector (Sami Bey) argued that the Prison 
Administration promoted these divisions in order to prevent violence and 
prison escapes. Ismail rejected these rationales, claiming that no such 
problems would occur if greater prisoner conviviality were allowed.51 
This	exchange	confirms	 several	 important	points.	New	spatial	 relation-
ships and prisoner organisation were being implemented; prisoners were 
directly	 affected	 by	 these	 changes;	 and,	 finally,	 prisoners	 voiced	 their	
displeasure	through	official	channels,	expecting	to	be	heard	by	the	Prison	
Administration.
Gender also played an important role in the production of space in 
Ottoman prisons. In fact, prison authorities spent a considerable amount 
of time and energy creating female gendered space if one considers it 
in relation to the overall numbers of women prisoners. In 1917, women 
represented	less	than	6	per	cent	of	the	total	prison	population,	at	a	figure	
of 1,249 out of 21,666 prisoners.52 This percentage was up more than 
2 per cent since 1915, when women made up about 3.4 per cent of the 
prison population (976 out of 28,773 inmates).53 In 1917, the provinces 
of	Ankara	(139),	Aydın	(183),	and	Kastamonu	(218)	had	the	most	female	
prisoners. Karesi also had a high number of incarcerated women (55). The 
vast majority of these female inmates (at least 80 per cent) were Muslim, 
single, and unemployed, and most were incarcerated for less than a year. 
The most common crimes committed by women were assault and petty 
theft. Women incarcerated for lesser offences (kabahat ve cünha) were 
held in district prisons. When there were only a few female prisoners in 
a particular region a room was rented for them in a government building 
(konak) or they were entrusted to local religious leaders (Christian, Jewish, 
or Muslim).54	A	significant	percentage	of	female	prisoners	(nearly	20	per	
cent) were incarcerated for serious offences, such as murder, banditry, 
violent theft, and brutal assault. These inmates would be  incarcerated 
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in central prisons, such as Karesi, or in penitentiaries, depending on the 
length of their sentence.55
The 1880 Prison Regulation gave very clear instructions regarding the 
creation of gendered space within Ottoman prisons. This should be of no 
great surprise since gendered space is an important aspect of most prisons 
in the modern period. Gendered space also has deep roots in Middle 
Eastern and Islamic societies. These regulations stipulate that female pris-
oners be supervised by female guards and special provisions be made for 
incarcerated women who were pregnant or nursing.56 All three of these 
issues (gendered space, gendered supervision, and gendered provisioning) 
were not adequately addressed during the Hamidian era, but they became 
pressing issues during the Second Constitutional Period as the CUP 
assumed greater control and authority over crime and punishment. One 
case	in	particular	exemplifies	the	anxiety	felt	by	the	Prison	Administration	
regarding female inmates and its desire to assume greater responsibility 
for them.
In 1913, an incident involving a male prison guard by the name of 
Mahmud	Çavuş	and	two	female	prisoners	at	the	women’s	prison	in	Karesi	
came	to	light.	Prison	officials	investigated	Mahmud	Çavuş	for	running	a	
prostitution ring from the prison. Apparently, he smuggled female inmates 
out	of	the	women’s	prison	and	forced	them	into	prostitution	for	his	finan-
cial	gain.	As	a	result	of	the	investigation,	Mahmud	Çavuş	was	fired	from	
his	job,	fined	225	kuruş, and imprisoned for three months. The condition 
of the female inmates forced into prostitution was never mentioned in the 
report.57
Similar	 violations	 led	 officials	 within	 the	 Prison	 Administration	 to	
place the treatment of female prisoners under closer scrutiny and push for 
important reforms regarding the incarceration, supervision, provisioning, 
and rehabilitation of female prisoners across the empire. As a result of 
this	 closer	 scrutiny,	 specific	questions	 arose	 regarding	 the	 incarceration	
of convicted female sex- workers and women incarcerated with small 
children. There was a desperate need for the creation of better and safer 
conditions	for	female	prisoners.	The	Mahmud	Çavuş	incident	only	drew	
greater attention to the pressing issue of female inmate conditions and the 
necessity of hiring more female guards (nisa gardiyanları).
In early 1912, the Prison Administration issued a directive to imple-
ment fully the 1880 Prison Regulation regarding strict gendered space 
within all of the empire’s prisons. In essence, the 1912 directive states that 
in areas where there are no women’s prisons, budgetary allotments should 
be made to rent space for female prisoners and hire female guards for 
their supervision. In new prisons under construction, a secure, specially 
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designated area for female inmates was to be separated completely from 
the male section. In districts where prisons already existed, separate secure 
wards were to be created for women prisoners. If it was not possible to 
secure a separate place for female inmates within the main prison, then 
they should be removed to a neighbouring district with proper facilities.58
This regulation led many prisons around the empire to make alterations 
to their facilities in order to provide separate quarters for female prison-
ers. Where there were only a few females or where the conditions were so 
crowded that a separate female area was not feasible, rooms in government 
buildings (konaklar) or police barracks were rented for female prisoners. 
For	example,	in	1914,	officials	in	Turgutlu,	a	district	in	Aydın	province,	
established	a	‘women’s	prison’	to	house	Ayşe	Kadın	by	renting	space	in	
a local government building for 60 kuruş a month.59 Another example 
is the sub-division of Kütahya, wherein a local government building, a 
police barracks, and even a house were all rented in order to accommodate 
female prisoners.60
Officials	 also	made	 special	 provisions	 for	 the	 gendered	 treatment	 of	
sick female inmates. A 1916 case involving overcrowding and health 
concerns in the women’s wing of Istanbul’s penitentiary called for the 
allocation of space and funding to create a special women’s hospital for 
ill	female	inmates.	Officials	requested	four	separate	wards	(koğuşlar) to 
accommodate up to forty ill female prisoners. The directive sent by the 
Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of the Interior stipulated that if this 
space was not available in the prison itself, then the ill female prisoners 
should be sent to another prison hospital or to a civilian hospital or rooms 
should be rented in order to accommodate the gendered space necessary 
to care for them.61 At this time Istanbul’s penitentiary contained a total of 
thirty- three female inmates.62 Perhaps this new facility was supposed to 
house ill female prisoners from the seven other prisons and jails located 
in Istanbul province. The total female prison population in these facilities, 
however, was only fory- eight at the time.63
Safeguarding female honour by separating the general female prison 
population	from	female	sex-	workers	is	another	example	of	prison	officials	
creating female gendered space and Ottoman state patriarchy. Separating 
certain types of prisoners from others, however, is not new to Ottoman 
prison regulations. As mentioned above, there was a requirement to 
separate convicted and accused persons as well as to separate serious and 
petty offenders. There was, however, an extensive discussion concern-
ing separating female sex- workers (a lesser offence) from other female 
inmates.64 Safeguarding the honour of women was an important responsi-
bility assumed by the state at this time and was a common theme in public 
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discourse.65 There was absolutely no discussion, however, of separating 
male sex- worker from other male inmates. This is an unusual situation. 
There are no other examples of prisoners convicted of lesser crimes being 
separated from the general prison population unless they were sick or 
being punished for bad behaviour. Here is an ironic situation of the state 
attempting to safeguard the ‘morality’ of women and by extension ‘the 
family’ by shielding petty criminals from one another.
As stated in the 1880 Prison Regulation and in numerous directives 
issued by the Prison Administration, female prisoners were not supposed 
to be directly supervised by male guards. It was a lack of female guards 
that	led	to	the	Mahmud	Çavuş	incident.	The	CUP	made	it	a	special	priority	
to hire more female prison guards. It viewed the prison cadre as linchpins 
of prison reform and prisoner rehabilitation, and the key to ending cor-
ruption, guard–prisoner collusion, as well as prisoner exploitation and 
abuse. This assumption applied equally to female and male prison cadre. 
Unfortunately, when the CUP came to power, the training and morality of 
prison guards was poor and the number was too few.
The need for more female prison cadre was especially critical. 
According to the 1880 Prison Regulation, female guards answered only 
to	the	chief	prison	officer	(ser gardiyan) and the warden (müdir). No male 
prison personnel was supposed to enter the female wing of the prison, 
except	if	there	was	an	extreme	event	(such	as	a	fire	or	an	uprising),	and	
then	 only	 the	 chief	 prison	 officer	 could	 enter	with	 a	 sufficient	 number	
of	guards	to	handle	the	situation.	The	chief	officer	was	then	required	to	
submit a report to the warden detailing the incident. Not even the warden 
himself was supposed to be anywhere near female inmates without a 
female guard present.66 The ideal female or male prison guard would be 
educated, of good moral character, and familiar with penal law and regula-
tions. Despite the great importance placed on hiring female prison guards, 
they were paid, at most, two- thirds of the wage of their male counterparts 
(50–100 kuruş monthly).67 Female guards, however, were given consider-
able autonomy to perform their duties. They were essential to maintaining 
the gendered space and supervision needed to run a well- ordered prison.68
All prisoners were supposed to be rehabilitated in order to become 
contributing members of society, but special provisions were made in this 
regard for women and children that were not made for adult males. These 
included reduced prison sentences, easier pardons, and clergy supervi-
sion. Of chief concern were inmates who were pregnant, nursing, and/
or incarcerated with young children. By 1914, the Directorate of Prisons 
made concerted efforts to care for women who fell into these categories. 
It directed prisons to allocate additional food to pregnant women, nursing 
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mothers, and women incarcerated with children under the age of six.69 
Young children were allowed to remain with their mothers during incar-
ceration. According to local custom and Islamic law, children should 
remain with their mothers until at least age six. Interestingly, these docu-
ments reveal the Directorate of Prisons’ concern that children incarcerated 
with	 their	mothers	would	be	adversely	 influenced	by	other	 female	con-
victs. Authorities feared that children aged six and older would become 
maladjusted and more prone to a life of crime through their extended 
exposure to prison life. In response to these fears, one proposed solution 
called for placing the mother and child in a special area in the Istanbul 
Darülaceze (poor house or orphanage) where they would be isolated from 
the institution’s general population. If the woman, however, had family or 
friends (kimsesiz değil) then they would be assigned guardianship of the 
child.70
Both the Prison Administration and the Directorate of Prisons made 
the improvement of prison conditions for women a special priority during 
the Second Constitutional Period. Even though women made up less than 
6 per cent of the total prison population, administrators made provisions 
to provide separate space and special supervision and provisioning for 
female inmates. Therefore, Ottoman prisons became sites for gendered 
space, gendered supervision, and gendered provisioning wherein the state 
assumed greater responsibility for its female prisoners.
Prisoner Rehabilitation through Education and Labour
One of the main purposes of incarceration for Ottoman reformers, at least 
in the ideal, was the prisoner’s rehabilitation and reintroduction to society 
as	 a	 productive	 citizen.	 Prison	 administrators	 and	 reformers	 viewed	
inmate rehabilitation as a multifaceted project that had to be implemented 
on a variety of fronts. These fronts included moral rehabilitation, educa-
tion	through	instruction	and	productive	labour,	and,	finally,	proper	disci-
pline and supervision by competent, properly trained, and morally upright 
prison cadre. Similar to most prison reforms throughout world in the 
nineteenth century, Ottoman reformers met with relatively little success 
in implementing their vision of rehabilitation. Their efforts, successes, 
and failures do provide valuable insights into broader social and political 
issues.
As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 Ottoman	 officials	 participated	 in	 inter-
national prison conferences and adapted many assumptions regarding 
incarceration, its purpose, and methods to the empire. One central concept 
was prisoner rehabilitation, which was not new to Islamic societies. The 
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idea of reforming the wayward soul runs deep within Islamic law and 
practice. Punishment is seen as a key ingredient in reforming the sinner or 
criminal.71 In addition to punishment, Ottoman authorities maintained that 
moral instruction could also rehabilitate a convict’s soul.
Articles 50–2 of the 1880 Prison Regulation mandate that prisoners 
be allowed access to their respective religious leadership and have the 
freedom to practise their religions. Religious authorities (Muslim, Jewish, 
and Christian) should visit prisoners in their wards on a daily and/or 
weekly basis in order to attend to the inmates’ spiritual needs. Also in the 
event	of	a	death,	religious	authorities	should	be	notified	immediately	 in	
order to perform proper rites and rituals.72 Article 9 of the 1880 Prison 
Regulation states that in addition to other staff, such as wardens, chief 
scribes, chief guards, and guards, prisons should also employ an imam 
and, if needed, clergymen of other denominations.73 Additionally, Article 
91 stipulates that ‘all prisoners are required to carry out their respective 
religious obligations and rituals’. Likewise, Article 93 requires that all 
young prisoners who are on the verge of puberty (mürahik) and others des-
ignated by the prison warden must be given compulsory religious instruc-
tion by their respective clergy.74 Despite these regulations, it is not clear 
how	well	the	Prison	Administration	fulfilled	all	of	these	requirements.
Only two prisons actually employed clergy to teach, preach, and/or 
minister to their inmates. According to the 1916 Ottoman prison employ-
ment records only the Istanbul penitentiary and the Kastamonu central 
prison had clergy on their payrolls. The Istanbul penitentiary employed 
an imam, ecumenical patriarchate priest (rum papası), an Armenian 
priest (ermeni papası), and a Jewish Rabbi (haham). The imam received 
a monthly salary of 330 kuruş while the two Christian clergymen and the 
Rabbi were paid only 230 kuruş each. The Kastamonu prison employed 
an imam and preacher (vaiz) for its Muslim inmates at a monthly salary of 
50 kuruş.75 It appears that if other prisons kept the regulations stipulated 
in Articles 9 and 50–2 then the vast majority must have drawn upon the 
voluntary services of local religious authorities. Of course Article 9 also 
made	the	provision	that	prisons	could	fill	any	position	‘according	to	need’	
(icabına göre), which, by extension, means that hiring was predicated on 
the number of prisoners in a particular facility.76 Most central and provin-
cial	prisons	had	hundreds	of	inmates	that	would	have	justified	the	employ-
ment of clergymen, as stipulated in Article 9, but it appears that the local 
municipal	councils	did	not	see	fit	to	expend	the	necessary	funds.
In spite of the poor numbers of professional clergy in prisons, other 
provisions were made to ensure that prisoners were able to worship. 
Some prisons provided special areas of worship for inmates. For example, 
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according to Charles Riggs, the Istanbul penitentiary contained a small 
mosque and chapel where prisoners could worship on a voluntary basis.77 
Apart from these scant pieces of evidence, there is very little data on pris-
oner rehabilitation through moral uplift and instruction. It can reasonably 
be	 concluded,	 therefore,	 that	 rehabilitation	 through	 spiritual	 edification	
was not the primary method for the Prison Administration and for its suc-
cessor, the Directorate of Prisons.
Modern education was another possible method for prison rehabilita-
tion. Apart from Article 92, which stipulates that every prison should have 
a select number of books available to prisoners, the 1880 Prison Regulation 
is surprisingly silent on this issue.78 Apparently, the Prison Administration 
did not have an empire- wide inmate education programme. Prison admin-
istrators during the Second Constitutional Period, however, showed inter-
est in inmate literacy. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 1912 prison survey 
collected statistics on this issue. According to the survey, literacy among 
prisoners was roughly 18 per cent.79
Archival documents indicate that individual prisons did employ instruc-
tors to provide a basic education to inmates. This was not, however, an 
empire-	wide	programme,	 and	 it	 seems	 to	 have	been	primarily	 confined	
to penitentiaries with inmates incarcerated for long periods of time (more 
than	 five	 years).	 For	 example,	 according	 to	 1915	 prison	 employment	
statistics, the Istanbul penitentiary employed two teachers (mualim) at 
a generous monthly salary of 600 kuruş each. In 1913, the Sinop peni-
tentiary	employed	İzmid’li	Hasan	Efendi	as	a	 teacher.	Being	a	prisoner	
himself, he received a salary of 50 kuruş a month and a private room near 
the entrance to the prison hospital. His duties included holding regular 
class	hours	 each	day	and	 teaching	prisoners	 to	 read	and	write.	 İzmid’li	
Hasan Efendi was relieved of his duties for alleged ‘bad behaviour’, which 
included not performing his teaching duties, gambling, and inciting other 
prisoners to rebellion. He allegedly showed up to teach each day for only 
fifteen	to	twenty	minutes	and	then	he	would	wander	off	to	gamble	in	the	
various wards of the prison. The warden, Cemal Bey, reported his behav-
iour to Sinop’s municipal school board and informed the board that he had 
replaced	İzmid’li	Hasan	Efendi	with	another	prisoner	–	İstanbul’lu	Kemal	
Efendi.	This	new	teacher	was	a	former	cavalry	officer	currently	serving	
fifteen	years’	hard	labour	for	homicide	(katil- i nefs). Local municipalities 
controlled the hiring of prison teachers and not the Prison Administration, 
which may explain why every prison in the empire did not employ a 
teacher.80 Apart from hiring a couple of professional teachers, allowing lit-
erate prisoners to educate their fellow inmates, and collecting statistics on 
prisoner literacy, it does not appear that the Prison Administration or the 
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Directorate of Prisons exerted much effort to rehabilitate inmates through 
education.81 Ottoman prison policy, instead, appears to have focused its 
prisoner rehabilitation efforts on productive labour.
In addition to facilitating prison supervision by keeping inmates occu-
pied with attention- directing labour, productive labour had other important 
functions for Ottoman prison reformers. First, according to the assump-
tions of prison reformers of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth, 
productive labour was an essential element to effective rehabilitation. This 
labour would keep them constructively occupied, thus preventing sloth-
ful behaviour through the pursuit of lascivious activities and idleness. As 
discussed above, idleness was a serious problem for prison administrators, 
because	 it	often	 led	 to	escapes,	fights,	and	uprisings.	Labour	could	also	
provide prisoners with useful occupational skills that would help them 
to become contributing members to society upon their release. In this 
way, prisoners were rehabilitated and shaped into productive members of 
society, thus making it possible for them to avoid  recidivism.82 Ottoman 
prison	reformers	discussed	the	benefits	of	prison	labour	in	their	report	of	
the 1890 International Prison Conference proceedings in St Petersburg, 
Russia.83
Ottoman	officials,	however,	did	not	appropriate	 these	 ideas	 from	 the	
West.	The	1880	Prison	Regulation	 already	 reflected	 these	 assumptions.	
Moreover, incarceration with hard labour (kürek cezası) in galleys of the 
Imperial Shipyards had already been practised in the empire since at least 
the eighteenth century.84 The concept of hard labour changed over the 
course of the nineteenth century from that of the galleys to labour in prison 
workshops and factories, but it still maintained its original name (kürek), 
which means ‘oar, paddle’.85
Articles 69–72 of the 1880 Prison Regulation stipulated that no pris-
oner was to ‘remain unemployed’ while incarcerated; that prisoners 
must work throughout their entire prison sentence; and that they should 
be paid for their labour. Part of that money should be used to offset the 
costs of their upkeep, another part should go to the state treasury, and 
the remainder should be held in reserve for the prisoner’s personal use. 
Prison wardens were responsible for organising productive labour for the 
inmates.86 They were also personally responsible for deciding which pris-
oners would work on what projects and for supplying the necessary tools. 
They	were	also	required	 to	 inspect	 the	quality	of	 the	final	products	and	
oversee their sale.87	The	Ministry	of	 the	Interior	reaffirmed	these	provi-
sions by issuing a special regulation (talimatname) in 1911 that called for 
the full implementation of the principle of prison labour and that described 
its	benefits	for	reforming	prisoners.88 According to this special regulation, 
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all prisons throughout the empire were to implement the principles of the 
1880 Prison Regulation regarding work. Prison wardens were responsible 
for arranging the details in conjunction with local administrators, farmers, 
and businesses in order to get prisoners working.89
As a result of these regulations, many prisons established workshops 
that produced, on a small scale, socks, fabrics, shoes, carpets, tools, 
cabinets, and other carpentry items. Other prisons, especially in rural 
provincial areas, engaged in agricultural production where inmates would 
pick fava beans, chickpeas, tobacco, and other produce. Both male and 
female prisoners were supposed to engage in productive work, but in 
separate areas. Females were authorised to work in their prison dormito-
ries on  needlework, sewing, knitting socks, making and repairing clothing, 
bedding, towels, and carpets.90
In addition to the proliferation of prison workshops around the 
empire, the CUP developed a plan to create large- scale prison factories 
(imalathaneler, sanayihaneler, or fabrikalar) in 1911. It envisioned these 
factories as centres of industrial production in the empire’s major cities. 
These factories would require industrial education and training for prison-
ers to learn how to operate the modern machinery necessary for textile 
mass production and other light industrial activities. In fact, a curriculum 
was proposed for prison factory workers that included instruction in 
reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, history, and Ottoman Turkish.91
As these types of factories required a great deal of investment and pris-
oner	training,	officials	decided	to	locate	them	in	penitentiaries	where	pris-
oners	served	sentences	of	at	least	five	years.92 There is an inherent logic to 
this type of restriction. Once trained, these prisoners would be able to do 
these jobs for an extended period of time. In the eyes of the CUP, prison 
factories	had	many	possible	benefits.	Prison	labour	is	inexpensive,	readily	
available, reliable, and relatively stable. Additionally, factory space, 
housing, health care, worker discipline, and supervision are readily avail-
able and paid for by the state. In other words, by utilising prison labour 
an entrepreneur’s costs are minimised, thus making it possible to gain an 
advantage on the open market.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, prison factories were established to help 
pay	for	prison	reforms	in	1911.	Prison	reformers,	however,	also	justified	
their development as a means of ‘stimulating’ the economies of major 
urban	 centres,	 such	 as	 Istanbul,	 Ankara,	 Beirut,	 Damascus,	 İzmir,	 and	
Edirne.93	Half	of	the	net	profits	gained	in	the	sale	of	these	manufactured	
goods were to go to the Ottoman Treasury.94 These funds would then be 
used for industrialisation and economic programmes in the cities where 
the factories were located, thus assisting the CUP in its imperial economic 
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development programme.95 In fact, prison factories had the dual purpose 
of rehabilitating both the prisoner and the economy, thus making prisons 
doubly effective as ‘microcosms of modernity’. In other words, prison 
factories were viewed as an important aspect of imperial economic regen-
eration through industrialisation. They facilitated the development of the 
Ottoman industrial complex and a local Muslim entrepreneurial middle 
class that could compete with inexpensive, mass- produced foreign goods. 
Construction	 of	 these	 prison	 factories	was	 one	 of	 the	 first	 steps	 of	 the	
CUP to implement its plan to create an Ottoman ‘national economy’ (milli 
iktisat).96
This plan of creating a ‘national economy’ was not put into full effect 
until	 after	 the	 assassination	 of	 Mahmut	 Şevket	 Pasha	 and	 the	 CUP’s	
assumption of full control over the Ottoman administration.97 Therefore, 
the construction of Ottoman prison factories and their use to stimulate 
local economies pre- dates the implementation of the CUP’s plan to build 
a ‘national economy’. This demonstrates the critical role that Ottoman 
prisons played as a testing ground for larger imperial projects.
The factory established in Edirne’s penitentiary is an excellent example 
of a successful textile factory built and funded by the state. Edirne’s prison 
textile factory actually became the model prison factory upon which 
others were fashioned and built throughout the empire.98 Not all prison 
factories, however, had to produce textiles. Each was given leeway to 
adapt its production to local strengths, such as iron works, carpentry, or 
other appropriate products.99
It is not clear exactly how many prison workshops and factories existed 
in	 the	empire	by	1917,	but	 there	must	have	been	at	 least	 twenty-	five	 in	
operation.100	 As	 late	 as	November	 1917,	Dr	 Paul	 Pollitz,	 the	 Inspector	
General of Ottoman Prisons, was still requesting and receiving funds for 
the construction of more prison factories and the development of prison 
lands for agricultural production.101 These prison factories and farms were 
also incorporated into the Ottoman war effort, because they produced des-
perately needed items for the military and the civilian population during 
WWI.102 Prison factories and farms were seen as essential elements in the 
creation	of	modern	penitentiaries	and	prisons	that	benefited	prisoners	and	
the empire as a whole.
Despite	 state	 officials’	 idealisation	 of	 prisoner	 rehabilitation	 through	
productive labour and the proliferation of prison workshops and factories 
around the empire, inmates engaged in productive labour still represented 
a very small percentage of the prison population. Numerous documents, 
inspections, and eyewitnesses attest to this fact.103 The 1916–17 prison 
survey indicates that less than 8.5 per cent of the prison population (1,812 
133
The Spatialisation of Incarceration
prisoners out of a total population of 21,666) was gainfully employed 
in working for the ‘common good’, working at special jobs (hasus işle 
meşgul), or working within the prison’s workshop or factory.104 Despite 
the many regulations, programmes, and expenditures, the vast majority of 
inmates were still not gainfully employed. Instead, most prisoners were 
spending their sentences in idleness. Without a doubt, the small percentage 
of	inmates	working	within	the	prison	did	benefit	from	their	experiences,	
but most prisoners were not rehabilitated through productive labour.
Conclusion
As this chapter demonstrates, Ottoman prison reformers heavily engaged 
in	 what	 Lefebvre	 termed	 ‘the	 production	 of	 space’.	 Officials	 did	 this	
through the conscious construction of an ordered, uniform physical 
space – the prison, jail, and penitentiary – in order to incarcerate criminals. 
This represents a direct response to the challenges the empire faced as it 
transitioned from a multifaceted system of punishments to one that primar-
ily employed imprisonment. As a ‘semiotic abstract’, the Ottoman prison 
became a space wherein the ideals of imperial reformers, governmental 
aspirations,	 state	 administrators,	 local	 officials,	 prison	 cadre,	 charitable	
organisations, families, and inmates all converged, interacted, contested, 
and/or	conformed	on	various	 levels.	This	convergence	affected	 the	effi-
cacy of intention, reform, and reality in Ottoman prisons. Creating the 
well- ordered prison through the spatialisation of incarceration altered 
the	everyday	life	of	prisoners	and	prison	officials	in	terms	of	interaction,	
organisation, living conditions, and self- perceptions, thus affecting the 
reality of imprisonment.
Ottoman efforts to create the well- ordered prison met with a great 
deal of success and failure. The greatest challenges included terrible 
prison conditions, overcrowding, dilapidated structures, poor supervi-
sion and discipline, and a lack of funding. Ottoman policies attempted to 
rehabilitate	 the	 incarcerated,	 through	 specific	means,	 such	 as	 improved	
prison organisation, supervision, and provisioning; attempts at moral and 
secular education; and putting prisoners to work. These efforts epitomise 
nineteenth- century sensibilities regarding increased state intervention into 
the	lives	of	its	citizens	and	caring	for	its	population,	including	prisoners.	
These efforts also demonstrate how prison reform addressed many of the 
most pressing questions of Ottoman modernity.
Building on the reforms of earlier regimes, the CUP oversaw the great-
est improvements to prison policy implementation and the transformation 
of prison conditions. While many of these efforts did achieve success, 
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others ended in failure, met resistance, or encountered problems asso-
ciated with wartime constrictions. The Prison Administration and the 
Directorate of Prisons constantly monitored, inspected, issued directives, 
and exerted efforts that did have trangible results. On the other hand, war, 
prisoner	and	cadre	resistance,	corruption,	and	financial	crisis	undermined	
many of these gains. The ideal of reform must always be tempered by the 
reality of implementation and its limitations as various actors exert power 
and agency.
The CUP, the Prison Administration, and the Directorate of Prisons 
knew that all these rules, regulations, and modern designs were only as 
good as those who implemented them. This is why CUP prison reforms, 
first	and	foremost,	 focused	on	professionalising	 the	prison	cadre.	 In	 the	
eyes of Ottoman prison reformers, the prison cadre represented the linch-
pin to successful prison organisation and prisoner reformation. The next 
chapter investigates CUP attempts to professionalise its prison cadre as a 
means to combat the prevalence of guard–prisoner collusion, corruption, 
and inmate abuse. It also juxtaposes the ideals of these reforms with the 
realities of everyday prison life.
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Disciplining the Disciplinarians:  
Combating Corruption and Abuse through  
the Professionalisation of the Prison Cadre Combating Corruption & Abuse
Usually	 when	 the	 topic	 of	 discipline	 and	 prisons	 is	 broached,	 the	 first	
items of discussion are Jeremy Bentham’s prison panopticon and Michel 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish. The panopticon was designed to 
provide prison guards with maximum surveillance over inmates, there-
fore facilitating the guards’ ability to control, discipline, and rehabilitate 
the	 incarcerated.	This	design	enabled	prison	officials	 to	peer	 into	every	
cell and continuously supervise prisoners while remaining hidden from 
view. This act of unseen surveillance was supposed to instil prisoner self- 
discipline. For Foucault, this act represented the ultimate example of the 
state’s ability to control and dominate society through the implementa-
tion of new instrumentalities of governance. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
these new methods of prison governance included new regimens, prisoner 
organisation and divisions, improved hygiene and health conditions, better 
provisioning, constant surveillance, religious instruction, and ‘rehabilitat-
ing’ labour. Most importantly, prison guards became the linchpins in the 
implementation	of	these	reforms.	According	to	Foucault,	prison	officials	
and	 especially	 guards	 are	 the	 definitive	 representatives	 of	 state	 power	
to prisoners who, in turn, epitomise society’s disorder, unruliness, and 
menace to the common good.1
Foucault, however, fails to recognise very important aspects of the 
panopticon and the various roles played by guards. The panopticon’s 
architectural design contains a dual disciplining purpose. In addition to 
disciplining prisoners, it is also designed to discipline the prison cadre. 
Foucault never acknowledges how corruption and collusion between 
guards and inmates adversely affects discipline and order. In other words, 
the state, as represented by the guards, also requires surveillance, thus 
breaching the supposedly impenetrable barrier and upending the unidi-
rectional	flow	of	power	that	Foucault	drew	between	‘state’	and	‘society’.2
The origins of the panopticon can be traced to eighteenth- century 
Russia during the reign of Catherine the Great. Jeremy Bentham’s brother, 
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Samuel,	was	the	first	to	invent	this	design,	but	for	a	factory,	not	a	prison.3 
Samuel Bentham designed his factory panopticon to facilitate discipline, 
order,	and	efficiency	through	maximum	surveillance	of	 the	‘subject’.	 In	
addition to the workers, the ‘subjects’ of his panopticon also included the 
foremen. In fact, it appears that the supervision of the foremen was the 
primary purpose of his original design. If factory owners or  managers 
could control and discipline the foremen, they could better control 
the	 labourer,	 thus	 improving	 factory	 order,	 productivity,	 and	 profits.4 
Foucault misses this important aspect in his analysis of the intent, power, 
and purpose of Jeremy Bentham’s prison panopticon. He fails to see the 
negative affect that prison guards had on overall prison order and disor-
der and the need for prison guards to be supervised and disciplined as 
well.5
Disciplining the disciplinarians or the professionalisation of the prison 
cadre is a central aspect of prison reform that is often overlooked by 
penal scholars. It is, however, vital to understanding the CUP’s attempts 
at penal and imperial reform and state centralisation of power. The 
 stipulations, sources, and legitimation of CUP attempts to professionalise 
its prison cadre together with other aspects of prison administrative reform 
 demonstrate that prison guards acted as the foundation for Ottoman penal 
policy and modernisation. Disciplining the disciplinarians was seen as the 
means of putting an end to corruption, prisoner abuse, and guard–prisoner 
collusion that was so prevalent in Ottoman prisons. Properly trained prison 
cadre would facilitate the rehabilitation of criminals by fostering a disci-
plined and well- ordered prison environment. The CUP’s vision of the 
ideal prison guard also embodies its self- image as a group of elite tech-
nocrats or savant that would rescue the empire from ruin and destruction. 
The professionalisation of prison cadre and general administrative reform 
within Ottoman prisons also represent broader CUP attempts to centralise 
state power during the Second Constitutional Period and to continue the 
process of Ottoman modernity initiated by earlier regimes. How these 
reforms were formulated, legitimated, and implemented represent an 
Ottoman passage to modernity.
This chapter argues against a distinct rupture with the past that often 
pervades	 the	discourse	of	modernity,	be	 it	unified,	alternative,	or	multi-
ple. There is much more continuity in these processes of transformation 
than is often acknowledged.6 The protection of the ‘weak’ from the abuse 
of	 state	 officials	 had	been	 at	 the	 core	 of	Ottoman	 sultanic	 practice	 and	
legitimacy since the empire’s inception. The Sultan’s subjects from the 
lowest classes, including prisoners, had always been empowered to peti-
tion their ruler and expected their grievances to be heard and appropriately 
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addressed. This ‘Circle of Justice’ is not a modern concept and its ideal 
was	 central	 to	 the	 efforts	 exerted	 by	Ottoman	officials	 to	 ‘police’	 their	
own.7 What is distinctly modern about these actions, however, is the level 
of standardisation of norms and procedures regarding the training, super-
vision, and requirements for the ideal prison guard. These standardisations 
also affect imperial oversight, inspection, and investigation of violations 
of these norms and practices. The goal of all of these reforms was to bring 
the Ottoman criminal justice system into ‘conformity with the laws of 
civilisation’. These actions created a distinct process of Ottoman socio- 
legal practice that is both modern and Ottoman.
Finally, this chapter focuses on the praxis between normative legal 
and administrative reform and its implementation among state authori-
ties and prisoners from 1880 to 1919. In so doing, it builds upon previous 
chapters and continues to expand the analysis of prison reform and reality 
through the prism of imperial intention, daily prison life, and the compli-
cated interactions between local prison administrators, staff, and inmates. 
Therefore, this chapter focuses on examples of corruption, prisoner abuse, 
guard–prisoner	 collusion,	 imperial	 efforts	 to	 fight	 these	 problems,	 the	




Regulation. It then investigates Ottoman prison reformers’ vision of the 
role	that	prison	officials,	specifically	guards,	were	to	play	in	implementing	
the comprehensive overhaul of the empire’s prisons and in rehabilitat-
ing prisoners. Finally, this chapter looks at concrete steps that the Prison 
Administration took to combat corruption, prisoner abuse, and guard–
prisoner collusion through the detailed analysis of a 1912–13 scandal at 
the Sinop penitentiary and its aftermath. The explication of this and other 
examples of guard–inmate interactions demonstrates the reality of prison 
life and illuminates the murky and porous boundaries between guards and 
inmates, continuity and change, and state and society.
Professionalising Prison Employees
Ideally speaking, prison guards are the front line of state power, author-
ity, discipline, and justice against the incarcerated. Guards and prisoners, 
however, often become common bedfellows. Within prison culture and 
society there exists a long history of prisoner–guard collusion. Bribes, 
kickbacks, sexual favours, contraband, smuggling, assisted escapes, gam-
bling, extortion, and so forth have been and still are common within 
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prisons around the world. Ottoman documents detail numerous incidents 
of rampant corruption among prison cadre, prisoner abuse, and extensive 
collusions between guards and inmates. These fraternisations and abuses 
of power blur the boundaries and moral distinctions between these seem-
ingly oppositional entities.
As	briefly	described	in	Chapter	4,	administrative	corruption	and	offi-
cial misconduct were rampant in Ottoman prisons during the nineteenth 
century as evidenced by guard- assisted prisoner escapes, weapons’ smug-
gling, guard- run prostitution rings, and so on. There are numerous reports 
and investigations regarding the occurrence of these types of incidents 
involving guards and prisoners during the nineteenth century, some of 
which are discussed below.8 Ottoman authorities expended much time, 
energy,	 and	 resources	 attempting	 to	 fix	 these	 problems.	 This	 section	
begins with a detailed discussion of the 1880 Prison Regulation’s deline-
ations of the authority, responsibilities, and organisation of local prison 
administration.	Prison	officials	utilised	the	1880	Prison	Regulation	as	the	
template for proper prison administration and reform throughout the rest 
of the empire’s existence.
The	1880	Prison	Regulation	lists	the	offices	and	responsibilities	of	all	
prison personnel. According to Article 9, prison employees consisted of:
a director (müdir), a chief scribe (birinci katib), assistant scribe (ikinci 
katib), a chief guard (ser gardiyan), regular guards (gardiyanlar), gatekeepers 
(kapıcılar), a physician (tabib), launderer (çamaşırcı), health personnel/nurse 
(hastahane hademesi), janitor/custodian (işçi), and an imam and/or clergyman 
(imam ve iktiza eden memurin- i ruhaniyyeden).9
Not	every	prison	filled	all	of	these	positions.	In	fact,	district-level	prisons	
(kaza) often only had one guardian to run the entire prison, especially if 
the prison held only a few inmates. Most prisons located in provincial 
centres, however, were fully staffed.10
The Ministry of Justice appointed prison wardens (müdir) on the pro-
vincial, sub- division, and district levels. It was also responsible for their 
dismissal. Wardens were required to implement the entirety of the prison 
regulation	by	overseeing	 the	organisation,	order,	 security,	finances,	 and	
administration of the prison. They were also in charge of organising work 
details, securing provisions and prisoner possessions, and overseeing pris-
oner admittances, releases, and discipline. The 1880 Prison Regulation 
also required them to submit regular reports to the respective ministries 
about the goings- on inside the prison and any changes to prison personnel. 
Wardens also had to wear special uniforms and be present twice a week 
for a general count of all prisoners.11
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Prison clerks (katib) were responsible for keeping an accurate inven-
tory of all prison materials, such as furniture, bedding, tools, prisoner 
belongings,	prisoner	wages	and	financial	accounts,	prison	stores,	provi-
sions, and the number of prisoners. They were supposed to keep registers 
of all prisoners on a daily and weekly basis, something that was inspected 
regularly by the warden and chief guard. Additionally, they were to docu-
ment prisoner behaviour and punishments, keep track of sentences, and 
see to it that inmates were released on time. Finally, they were ordered to 
regularly submit copies of their prisoner registers and bookkeeping to the 
Ministry of Justice, the Police Administration, and to provincial governors 
and judicial inspectors.12
Chief guards (ser gardiyan) were required to be literate, to know arith-
metic, to be of 30 to 50 years of age, and to wear the appropriate uniform. 
They oversaw all guards and answered to the warden for any damage or 
misconduct by guards or prisoners should it not be reported immediately. 
They could not be employed in any other capacity outside the prison. 
Their responsibilities included supervision of the prison cadre, counting 
prisoners daily in the presence of the chief clerk, and maintaining general 
prison discipline, order, cleanliness, and appropriate prisoner behaviour. 
Additionally, they oversaw the proper storage and distribution of provi-
sions and prisoner belongings. Chief guards were charged with conducting 
any investigations into prisoner or guard misconduct, wherein they would 
personally	interrogate	suspects,	report	their	findings	to	the	prison	director,	
and write up any prescribed punishments. They were also responsible for 
the proper transfer of prisoners and for all the comings and goings at the 
prison. Everything and everyone entering or exiting the prison had to be 
inspected by the chief guard, including visitors, personnel, food stuffs, 
medicine, industrial products, and letters.13
Guards	 represent	 the	 front-	line	 prison	 officials	 who	 interact	 with	
inmates and are subject to the supervision of the chief guard and warden. 
They oversee the day- to- day activities of the prison and prisoners, includ-
ing basic discipline, order, and cleanliness. This was the same in Ottoman 
prisons. Any problems they encountered with prisoners had to be reported 
to their superiors or else they would be held responsible for any resulting 
consequences and damages. Similar to the chief guard, guards could not 
hold outside employment. Their families could not enter any portion of 
the prison or grounds where prisoners were present. Guards also could 
not allow any prisoners to enter their personal quarters. Male and female 
guards	had	the	exact	same	responsibilities	regarding	their	gender-	specific	
charges. Guards distributed food, clothing, and other provisions as 
directed by the chief guard. They were responsible for supervising inmates 
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during transfers, while on work details, caring for their personal hygiene, 
and receiving approved visitations. Guards were to prevent unauthorised 
visitations, contact between vendors/contractors and prisoners, as well as 
the smuggling in or out of any goods or persons. Their personal interac-
tions with prisoners were to be strictly professional. Thus any prisoner 
fraternisation, such as gambling, game playing, eating or drinking with 
prisoners or their visitors and relatives, talk or idle chatting, accepting 
gifts from them or their relatives and friends, or buying from or selling 
anything to prisoners was strictly prohibited. Guards were also forbidden 
to drink alcohol or use any kind of narcotic. If they violated any of these 
regulations	they	were	subject	to	incarceration,	fines,	and	dismissal	from	
their jobs.14
Despite this legislation, Ottoman prisons continued to maintain the 
reputation as legendary bastions of corruption and prisoner abuse. Tales of 
sadistic	torture	and	prison	cadre	venality	fill	numerous	pages	of	Western	
travel volumes and foreign reports (the vast majority of which are, at 
best, second- hand accounts). For example, Vahan Cardashian claimed 
that, during Sultan Abdülhamid II’s reign, should severe beatings and 
brandings of ‘Christian’ prisoners not produce the desired information 
regarding political secrets then their ‘hair was shaved off, incision made, 
and vermin placed in the skull’, adding that, ‘thousands upon thousands 
of	innocent	men	have	undergone	these	fiendish	tortures,	 in	one	or	more	
forms’.15 Although the evidence is clear that many of the most salacious 
accounts are hyperbole – products of those with clear political agendas – 
corruption, prisoner abuse, and guard–prisoner fraternisation regularly 
occurred in Ottoman prisons. The Ministry of the Interior during the 
Hamidian era regularly replaced prison directors and guards for acts of 
misconduct (yolsuz), forcing them to forfeit their pensions.16 Still, cor-
ruption, bribe taking, and prison cadre- assisted escapes remained regular 
occurrences. Although not completely realised during the Hamidian era, 




As	discussed	 in	Chapter	 2,	 the	CUP	 established	 the	 empire’s	 first	 cen-
tralised Prison Administration (Hapishane İdaresi) in May 1911. This 
agency was attached to the newly restructured Ministry of the Interior and 
immediately began collecting statistics on every aspect of incarceration. 
Efforts	to	professionalise	all	of	the	empire’s	officials	commenced	imme-
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diately with the Ministry of the Interior circulating the Regulation for the 
School of Civil Servants (Mekteb- i Mülkiye Nizamnamesi) to the Prison 
Administration on 14 August 1911. This regulation contains forty- two 
articles that stipulate the basic guidelines for conduct, character, and duties 
applicable	to	all	state	officials.	It	was	the	foundation	of	more	job-	specific	
regulations for prison personnel, such as the 1880 Prison Regulation.17
On 5 October 1911, the Prison Administration distributed an employee 
survey to each of the empire’s prisons. According to the survey’s direc-
tive, at the end of each month every prison had to report any changes 
in the employment status of its prison cadre. The information requested 
included the names, positions, responsibilities, dates of hire, and salaries 
of all prison personnel.18	This	directive	exemplifies	Ottoman	attempts	to	
monitor	 prison	 employment	 practices.	 During	 the	 first	 quarter	 of	 1912	
most of the provinces and independent administrative sub- divisions (liva 
or sancak) returned their completed employment statistical forms to the 
Prison Administration.19
Mosul	province	exemplifies	 the	general	prison	employment	 informa-
tion gathered by this survey. Its central prison employed Muhammad 
Nuri Efendi as warden at a monthly salary of 750 kuruş, a chief clerk 
(Muhammad Sadik Efendi) at 400 kuruş a month, an assistant clerk 
(Mahmud Efendi) at 300 kuruş a month, a chief guard (Rakha Bey) also at 
a monthly salary of 300 kuruş,	a	physician	(Haziyat	Efendi)	at	250	kuruş, 
and eight male prison guards all at the same salary of 150 kuruş a month. 
In addition to these personnel, the prison employed a nurse and a laun-
derer. Twelve of the sixteen employees had been working at the prison for 
more than a year, whereas the other four had been hired quite recently.20 
The eight guards and one chief guard were responsible for supervising 592 
inmates over the course of the year. This total number included convicted, 
accused, and serious and lesser offenders. Ninety- six inmates were con-
victed of serious crimes (cinayet), ranging from manslaughter and murder 
to severe assault and highway robbery. All of them were serving sen-
tences of incarceration with hard labour ranging from three years to life. 
Four others received death sentences for highway robbery. A total of 199 
inmates were convicted of lesser crimes (cünha and kabahat), serving sen-
tences ranging from twenty- four hours to three years of incarceration. This 
means that over the course of the year the guard–to–prisoner ratio could 
have been as high as 1:65 for Mosul’s central prison in 1911. Most likely, 
the ratio was much lower, since not all of these prisoners were necessarily 
incarcerated simultaneously. A total of 156 prisoners served terms of three 
months or less and an additional 297 prisoners were awaiting trial.21
These employment records not only reveal very detailed information 
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about each prison employee, but they also demonstrate that there were 
discrepancies in pay between prison employees in smaller administrative 
districts and provincial centres, between male and female personnel, and 
between employees who worked in penitentiaries (hapishaneler- i umumi), 
prisons (hapishaneler), and jails (tevkifhaneler). It also appears that 
salaries had not yet been standardised.22 Except for the warden, all prison 
employees were appointed by the local municipal councils on the district, 
sub- district, and provincial levels. It appears that these councils decided 
the number, identity, and salary of those hired and, thus, possessed a great 
deal	of	local	autonomy	in	terms	of	staffing	prisons,	especially	since	prison	
budgets came from local coffers.
A few examples illustrate these points. Most provinces only hired chief 
guardians for the central prison and jail in the provincial capital and on 
the	sub-divisional	level.	In	1914,	the	province	of	Trabzon,	however,	had	
a chief guard for every prison and jail irrespective of whether it was at 
the provincial, sub-divisional, or district level. Each prison had at least 
two	guards	and	one	of	them	was	always	a	chief	guard;	therefore,	Trabzon	
employed three times more chief guards than any other province, seven-
teen in total.23
Female prison guards were generally paid at least a third less than their 
male counterparts. In the provinces, especially at the district level (kaza), 
most male guards received a monthly salary in the region of 100 to 150 
kuruş, whereas female guards generally received in the region of 50 to 
100 kuruş per month.24 Male guards who worked in some of the provincial 
capitals made an additional 50 kuruş a month. In general, prison employ-
ees who worked in the central prisons in the provincial and major adminis-
trative sub- districts received higher wages than their district counterparts. 
A comparison of prison personnel salaries in the provinces of Adana 
and Bitlis for 1914–15 illustrates this point. Adana’s guard salaries were 
completely standardised throughout the province from provincial prisons 
to district jails. All male guards received 200 kuruş a month and female 
guards received 150 kuruş, whereas in Bitlis provincial centre and sub-
division male guards received 150 kuruş a month, but district level male 
prison- guard salaries ranged from 100 to 150 kuruş. Discrepancies were 
even greater among female guards, who on the provincial level received 
a monthly salary of 100 kuruş, but on the divisional level, received pay 
ranging from 100 to 150 kuruş, which was similar to the male guards in the 
same sub-division (muş). On the district level, however, monthly salaries 
for female guards were very erratic, ranging from 40 to 80 kuruş. Since 
local municipal councils set salaries and hiring practices, large pay dis-
crepancies existed from one province to another and even within the same 
Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire
150
province.25	Such	low	wages	for	employees	often	led	to	acts	of	embezzle-
ment and prisoner extortion, as discussed below.
The Prison Administration and later the Directorate of Prisons con-
stantly	issued	directives	to	prison	employees	defining	acts	of	misconduct,	
warning against them, and delineating the punishments that violators 
would incur. These directives provide important insights into what types 
of	misconduct	and	criminal	behaviour	prison	officials	were	engaging.	For	
example, stealing prisoners’ food was one of the most prevalent kinds of 
misconduct	committed	by	officials	as	attested	to	by	numerous	reports	and	
eyewitness accounts.26 Prison guards often stole state- allocated prisoner 
rations for their own personal gain, especially during wartime.27 In 1915, 
a case of corruption involving prisoner bread came to the attention of 
the	Directorate	 of	 Prisons.	A	 combination	 of	 prison	 official	 negligence	
and private contractor corruption led to the purchase and distribution of 
spoiled bread in Jerusalem’s central prison. The contractor was punished 
and	prison	officials	were	reprimanded	for	their	actions.28 Both the Prison 
Administration and the Directorate of Prisons repeatedly issued directives 
reasserting	the	official	policy	regarding	proper	food	purchase,	storage,	and	
distribution.	A	1911	directive	specifically	details	the	proper	distribution	of	
prisoner provisions with the unspoken purpose of preventing misappro-
priation of foodstuffs by prison cadre.29 In 1916, 1917, and again in 1918 
the	Directorate	 of	 Prisons	 reissued	 the	 specific	 articles	 governing	 pris-
oner food found in the 1880 Prison Regulation.30 Prison regulations also 
empowered several different commissions at different times to combat 
the issues of misappropriation of prisoner food, negligence regarding the 
purchase of food, and poor prisoner nutrition.31
Other examples of directives warning against corruption and mis-
conduct include the ones issued in December 1912 and May 1913. 
Both	 reiterated	 official	 policy	 that	 prison-	cadre	 misconduct	 must	 be	
properly investigated and could result in the loss of salary, pension, and 
 employment.32 On 19 March 1914, the Directorate of Prisons issued 
another	directive	reaffirming	the	illegality	of	selling	smuggled	intoxicants	
and	other	items	by	government	officials.	These	sorts	of	violations	also	had	
to be properly investigated, judged in a court of law, and given appropri-
ate punishments.33 Then in August 1916, the Ministry of the Interior reis-
sued	part	of	the	prison	regulation	that	discussed	the	fines	and	punishments	
meted	 out	 to	 employees	 who	 engaged	 in	 misconduct,	 such	 as	 embez-
zlement	 and	 dereliction	 of	 duty.34 A similarly worded, but expanded, 
 directive was reissued six months later in February 1917.35
This	continual	dissemination	of	regulations	and	official	policies	regard-
ing	 proper	 conduct	 and	 prison-	cadre	 responsibilities	 reflect	 CUP	 inter-
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ests in ending the rampant corruption occurring in the empire’s prisons. 
Reminders	of	official	policy	and	 the	consequences	of	 its	violation	were	
not the only ways prison administrators addressed the problems of cor-
ruption and prisoner abuse. They also emphasised prison personnel 
professionalisation.
While the 1880 Prison Regulation discusses only rudimentary quali-
fications	for	 the	chief	prison	guard,	such	as	an	age	requirement	and	 the	
ability to read, write, and carry out basic computations, it is entirely 
silent	concerning	the	qualifications	of	other	prison	officials.	On	4	January	
1912, the Prison Administration issued a directive entitled ‘Concerning 
the	 Selection	 and	 Appointment	 of	 Prison	 Officials	 and	 Employees’	
(Hapishaneler Memurin ve Mustahdeminin İntihab ve Ta’yini Hakkında). 
This	directive	delineated	in	abundant	detail	the	criteria,	qualifications,	and	




of European prison employees. According to the directive, European 
prison cadre paid careful attention to the social and spiritual welfare of 
their prisoners and preformed their duties with such exactitude, diligence, 
order, and discipline that they were able to transform ‘vile and wicked’ 
prisoners into individuals who possessed ‘moral character’ by the end 
of their incarcerations.37 The directive also indicated that the Prison 
Administration shared the same goals as other European countries regard-
ing prison conditions and prisoner rehabilitation. It clearly linked the 
employee’s	qualifications	and	attributes	with	the	effective	implementation	
of penal policy. The calibre of Ottoman prison cadre needed to match that 
of their European counterparts. If Ottoman prison guards did not possess 
the	necessary	qualifications	or	were	found	negligent	in	their	duties,	they	
would be discharged from service without a pension or any monetary 
compensation.38
The directive clearly delineates the new selection process for prison 
employees	 and	 the	 necessary	 qualifications,	 characteristics,	 and	 skills	
ideal prison guards would possess. In addition to emulating the model 
European	prison	guard,	 the	properly	qualified	Ottoman	guard	needed	to	
possess the ability to read and write Ottoman Turkish, needed to have 
good oral communication skills, and needed to demonstrate an adequate 
knowledge of criminal law as assessed by an exam. Guards also had to 
possess the attributes of order, discipline, virtue, and good moral char-
acter, in addition to being ethical people with job- related experience. 
Ideal	candidates,	therefore,	were	former	military	and	gendarme		officers.	
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Finally, the directive concludes that prison cadre possessing these stipu-
lated qualities would act as ‘the foundation for the implementation of 
general Ottoman prison reform’.39
This	 directive	 reflects	 the	 Prison	 Administration’s	 view	 of	 the	 role	
that	guards	and	other	officials	were	to	play	in	prison	reform	and	prisoner	
rehabilitation. First, European prisons were seen as models of proper 
administration, discipline, and order. This, in turn, enabled them to reha-
bilitate their prisoners successfully.40 It also demonstrates that one of the 
primary goals of CUP prison reform was to bring discipline, progress, and 
order to Ottoman prisons and facilitate the ‘rehabilitation of the criminal’s 
soul’.41 This would, in turn, make former prisoners productive members of 
society upon their release, because they would now possess good ‘moral 
character’.42
Additionally, the directive reveals ideological connections the CUP 
made between prisons and the military in terms of committee members’ 
shared assumptions and practicality. As discussed in Chapter 2, Comtian 
Positivism was at the core of CUP ideology and the centralisation of 
power was its chief aim.43	The	Positivist	members	of	the	CUP	identified	
themselves as the savant	of	the	empire.	Their	self-	identification	was	due	
to the fact that most of the CUP inner circle consisted of low- level bureau-
crats	and	junior	military	officers	educated	according	to	European	stand-
ards in the military and professional academies of Sultan Abdülhamid II. 
Preserving the empire and transforming it through the centralisation of its 
administration and bureaucracy was their chief priority.
Many	 CUP	 members	 had	 been	 military	 officers	 who	 planned	 and	
participated in the 1908 Constitutional Revolution.44 This connection 
between the military and imperial reform has a long imperial tradition. 
Most	 reforms	associated	with	defensive	developmentalism	 focused	first	
on the military. For these reasons it is natural that the CUP should want 
military	officers	to	run	its	prisons.	Former	military	personnel	were	ideal	
prison employees as a result of their training, discipline, and experience in 
a ‘total institution’ similar to the prison. Since the inception of the modern 
conscript army, it has been the military’s responsibility to take untrained 
peasants and workers and turn them into disciplined soldiers. In the minds 
of	CUP	members,	former	military	officers	were	the	most	qualified	to	train,	
supervise, discipline, and ‘rehabilitate’ society’s miscreants.45 Military 
and	gendarme	officers,	trained	according	to	European	standards,	were	the	
prison guards of choice. The CUP considered them the advanced guard 
of administrative reform that would purge the Ottoman bureaucracy of 
Abdülhamid II’s nepotistic, corrupt, and sycophantic cronies, thereby 
ensuring	professional	advancement	based	on	merit	and	efficiency.
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Since much of the top leadership of the CUP was trained in military 
academies	 and/or	were	 former	military	officers,	 they	wanted	 to	use	 the	
best of their kind as the leaders of their penal reform programme. And 
since the prison was a microcosm of imperial transformation, the CUP 
wanted to place its ‘best and brightest’ in control of its prisons. By dis-
ciplining the disciplinarians, the CUP inserted the cream of the crop into 
the	centre	of	 their	 imperial	 reform	programme.	Former	military	officers	
were the Ottoman harbingers of modernity. They were the vital, front- line 
players who were supposed to bring order, discipline, progress, and reason 
not only to prisons, but to the entire empire. They were the key to imperial 
transformation, administrative centralisation, and prisoner rehabilitation.
There were more than a thousand prisons and houses of detention 
within the empire when the CUP created the Prison Administration in 
May	1911.	In	order	to	fulfil	the	requirements	of	this	directive,	the	Prison	
Administration would need to hire an enormous number of guards with 
military experience. Also according to a documented exchange between 
the Istanbul penitentiary and the Prison Administration dated 10 and 15 




Despite the ideology and the directives, this ratio was never achieved 
according to prison employment and prisoner statistics collected in 1915 
and 1917.47 The total prison population in 1914–15 was 28,773 inmates, 
but the total number of guards (including chief guards, male and female 
guards) was only 1,782. This makes the overall guard- to- prisoner ratio 
1:16.	 The	 female	 guard-	to-	female	 inmate	 ratio,	 however,	 was	 signifi-
cantly lower at less than 1:6. The male- guard- to- male- inmate ratio was 
1:18,	making	this	ratio	significantly	higher	than	what	the	1912	directive	
mandated.48 This stark difference in ratios between males and females can 
be attributed to the requirement that every prison employ a female guard, 
even if there were only a few female inmates. Since women only made up 
3 to 6 per cent of the prison population, in many cases one female guard 
was supervising just a handful of prisoners.
The overall guard- to- prisoner ratio became even higher as WWI pro-
gressed. By 1917, the guard- to- prisoner ratio nearly doubled to 1:30. The 
prison system employed only 719 guards to supervise a prison population 
of 21,666 inmates. Unfortunately, the breakdown of male and female 
guards is not available, but the overall numbers are staggering. In just a 
couple of years, the prison population dropped by more than 7,000 con-
victs, while the number of guards plummeted by almost 60 per cent.49 
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This sharp decrease in prison cadre and inmates can be attributed to 
wartime mobilisation efforts. Many prison guards were actually reserve 
military personnel who were activated for military duty during WWI.50 
Additionally, many prisoners were mobilised for military duty as part 
of an amnesty programme in 1917 that allowed male prisoners of good 
behaviour, convicted of lesser crimes (cünha), and with six months to a 
year left of their sentences to enter military service in lieu of completing 
their prison terms.51
Guard–Prisoner Relations: Breaking down the State–Society 
Divide
As	 mentioned	 above,	 officials	 exerted	 great	 amounts	 of	 effort	 and	
resources	 professionalising	 the	 prison	 cadre,	 fighting	 prisoner	 abuse,	
and preventing cadre corruption, with mixed results. While the Prison 
Administration and later the Directorate of Prisons never eradicated these 
problems,	officials	undertook	extensive	investigations	into	prisoner	alle-
gations;	 punished	 prison	 officials,	 cadre,	 and	 prisoners	 for	misconduct;	
and standardised prison administration, oversight, and accountability to 
an unprecedented degree. This was all accomplished despite the numerous 
challenges	the	empire	faced	in	its	final	decade	of	existence.	In	this	case,	
Samuel Benthan’s panopticon model acts as an effective double meta-
phor for Ottoman efforts to discipline both prisoners and prison cadre. 
The concrete reforms taken by the Prison Administration and Directorate 
of	 Prisons	 represent	 a	 form	 of	 surveillance	 over	 local	 prison	 officials	
and cadre. Together they enacted clear regulations concerning conduct 
and responsibilities; established and empowered inquiry commissions 
to oversee and investigate prison employee conduct, thus holding them 
accountable for their actions; and allowed inmates to petition central 
authorities with complaints of ill- treatment. Many of these petitions 
resulted	in	official	investigations	and	disciplinary	action.
While the archives provide numerous cases of corruption and abuse that 
Ottoman authorities investigated and attempted to resolve through punish-
ments	to	both	prisoners	and	prison	officials,	one	stands	out	as	epitomising	
administrative efforts and illustrating the dual metaphor of the panopticon. 
It also demonstrates the types of events and malpractices that character-
ised prison life and the interactions between prison cadre and inmates.52 
In October 1912, the Prison Administration initiated an investigation into 
allegations of corruption and abuse against Sinop penitentiary’s warden, 
Cemal Efendi, and his staff.53
According to the investigative reports, on 28 October 1912 a male 
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inmate by the name of Ismail submitted a formal complaint (petition) to 
the Ministry of Justice claiming that the recently appointed prison warden 
(Cemal Efendi) had obtained his position through nepotism. (His brother 
was the vice- general prosecutor for the Kastamonu province.) The com-
plaint accused the warden of poor character, of possessing no merit as an 
administrator, and that all of his decisions were based on self- interest. 
Ismail	went	on	to	allege	that	the	warden	was	making	a	huge	profit	from	his	
involvement in a prison- wide weapons’ smuggling ring. He warned that 
if the ministry did nothing then the situation in the prison would worsen, 
because	of	the	traffic	in	illegal	weapons.54
These	allegations	are	very	serious,	but	what	is	most	significant	about	
Ismail’s petition is the language he uses in an attempt to move the ministry 
to action. He asserts that the warden’s actions ‘go against the age of prison 
reform wherein prisons are supposed to be schools of reform and places of 
rehabilitation’. Likewise, he asserts that ‘in the end your ministry’s clean 
conscience will never be content with this state of affairs and with my 
loyalty to the state, I humbly submit this information’. Finally, he signs the 
petition as ‘Ismail from among the prisoners’.55 Calling upon authorities to 
administer justice and to protect the weak while asserting one’s loyalty is 
nothing new to Ottoman culture or politics. Nor is it unusual that petition-
ers would themselves appear as one of the masses (‘Ismail from among 
the prisoners’). What is interesting is that as a convicted criminal he uses 
the language of prison reform to justify action against the warden. This 
indicates that the CUP’s rhetoric of reform did not stay within the realm 
of the elite, but had reached the masses. Prisoners knew their rights, peti-
tioned for them, and couched their complaints in the ideals and rhetoric 
of the day, thus demonstrating their exercise of agency by appropriating 
certain	 concepts	 for	 their	 own	benefit.	 In	 the	 end,	 petitioning	 prisoners	
became part of the Prison Administration’s system of cadre surveillance 
and assisted in disciplining the disciplinarians.
In response to these allegations, another prisoner, by the name of 
Cemal, wrote a letter of support for the prison warden to the Kastamonu 
provincial	office	of	 the	Ministry	of	Justice	dated	20	February	1913.	He	
denied all of Ismail’s accusations. In his petition he claimed that the peni-
tentiary was being terrorised by a gang of tyrannical inmates who were 
intimidating the well- behaved prisoners and slandering the warden and 
guards. He requested that these ‘bad’ prisoners be transferred as a way to 
remedy the situation. Cemal also denied that guards were abusing these 
prisoners. He asserted that they only punished these prisoners according 
to regulations, because of their constant infractions. Interestingly, he also 
claimed to speak for all the prisoners.56
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The Ministry of Justice forwarded Ismail’s petition to the Ministry of 
the Interior with instructions that the matter be investigated. The Ministry 
of the Interior took the allegations very seriously and assigned Behçet 
Bey, a state inspector (mülkiye müfettişi), to oversee the case. It charged 
him with conducting a thorough and meticulous investigation into the alle-
gations.57 This is exactly what he and Sami Bey (the other state inspector 
assigned to the case) did, judging by the documents they produced and the 
punishments carried out. In the end, this investigative team worked with 
local	officials	from	the	municipal	council	and	other	provincial	offices	to	
take depositions from numerous individuals including the warden, prison 
guards,	gendarme	officers,	and	several	prisoners.58 The way this investiga-
tion	was	conducted	and	its	findings	provide	rich	insights	into	prison	life,	
reform, and administrative oversight in the late Ottoman Empire.
The	first	thing	the	investigative	team	did	was	contact	the	local	munici-
pal	council	 to	 request	 the	personnel	file	 for	Cemal	Efendi	 (the	warden)	
in order to ascertain his background and employment history. Personnel 
files	usually	included	the	employee’s	date	of	birth,	place	of	origin,	family	
history, education, and previous state appointments. It also contained 
information on past disciplinary actions or investigations taken against 
the	employee.	According	to	his	file,	Cemal	Efendi	was	born,	raised,	and	
educated	in	Trabzon	and	had	held	various	governmental	positions	includ-
ing district governor (kaymakam) and tax collector. He had been previ-
ously under investigation for refusing to assume an assigned position as a 
village mayor (nahiye müdürü), but appeared to then have been appointed 
as warden of the Sinop penitentiary, instead, where he had served for the 
last four months.59
The	next	portion	of	 the	 investigation	 looked	 into	 the	official	 records	
submitted by the Sinop prison cadre regarding disciplinary actions taken 
against the prisoners in question. The inspectors requested follow- up 
information about these cases from the warden and chief guard. According 
to	the	official	records,	several	prisoners	were	punished	for	violating	prison	
rules and engaging in dangerous behaviour. These violations included 
attacking	 guards,	 intimidating	 other	 prisoners,	 bad	 conduct,	 not	 fulfill-
ing their responsibilities, making and smuggling weapons, and trying to 
escape.	The	first	prisoner,	Çorumlu	Şakir,	confessed	to	making	skewers	
(şişler) from the legs of gas stoves in the prison in order to sell them to 
other inmates. As a result he was sentenced to twenty days of solitary 
confinement,	according	to	Article	85	of	the	Prison	Regulation.60 The next 
two	prisoners,	Tikveşlu	Hakki	and	Arslan,	hid	behind	a	door	in	the	third	
ward	of	the	prison	and	attacked	a	prison	guard	(Bekir	Çavuş)	with	clubs	
when he opened the door. The two prisoners claimed they had been angry 
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with the guard because he opened their ward late. These prisoners were 
punished	with	 twenty-	one	days’	 solitary	 confinement,	 placed	 in	 chains,	
and fed reduced rations. Supposedly this punishment was in accordance 
with Article 81 of the 1880 Prison Regulation. Punishment with chains 
(prangabendlik), however, had been outlawed since the 1850s.61 Another 
prisoner,	Kastamonulu	Şükrü,	was	sentenced	to	forty-	two	days	of	solitary	
confinement	in	chains	for	stealing	the	iron	from	window	frames	and	walls	
in order to manufacture weapons. Previously, he had stolen similar items 
from the prison factory, thus the harsher sentence.62 Sami Bey, the state 
inspector, summarised most of these actions in his own report and had it 
verified	by	the	chief	guard	of	the	Sinop	penitentiary,	Ahmet	Hamdi.63
In addition to these inmate misdeeds and punishments, Sinop peni-
tentiary records discuss three other important events that took place on 
23 October 1912. All three are central to the investigation of the prison 
warden and his cadre, resulting from Ismail’s petition. According to the 
official	 records,	 the	first	event	concerns	an	attempted	escape	by	several	
prisoners who allegedly broke the lock on the main door of the third 
prison ward and attempted to rush the main gate. It just so happened 
that this attempted escape coincided with a prison search conducted by 
the gendarme in the presence of the vice- governor, vice- prosecutor, and 
gendarme	commander.	The	search	resulted	in	the	discovery	and	confisca-
tion of eighty- three daggers (kama), knives (bicak),	and	files	(eğe) used 
for weapons making. All prisoners involved in the attempted escape were 
thrown	into	chains	and	sentenced	to	solitary	confinement	for	21	days.
The	second	event	involved	a	prisoner	by	the	name	of	İzmid’li	Hasan	
Efendi who lost his position as prison teacher for not performing his duties 
and	 for	 suspicion	 of	 aiding	 and	 abetting	 the	 trafficking	 of	 weapons.64 
Finally, ten other prisoners of various religious, ethnic, and linguistic 
backgrounds, such as nomadic, Kurdish, Shiite, Armenian, Sunni, and 
Albanian, were accused of planning to escape from the prison by building 
a	ladder,	breaking	a	hole	in	the	ceiling,	and	fleeing	through	the	attic	of	the	
prison’s third ward. The accused were each sentenced to 21 days of soli-
tary	confinement	in	chains.65
Finally, the warden Cemal Efendi submitted his own report stating 
his	version	of	 events.	He	 simply	 reiterated	what	 the	official	 documents	
said about the prison search for weapons and punishments handed out to 
the prisoners involved. He also revealed that he took disciplinary action 
against	seven	of	the	prison	cadre	(five	guards	and	two	supervisors).	They	
were all dismissed from their positions for weapons’ smuggling and owing 
debts to prisoners (implying that they engaged in prisoner fraternisation 
and gambling).66	This	 is	a	 significant	number	of	prison	personnel	 to	be	
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fired	all	at	once,	especially	since	at	the	time	Sinop	penitentiary	incarcer-
ated more than 700 prisoners and employed only thirty- one guards (that 
being one chief guard, eight supervisory guards, two gatekeepers, and 
twenty regular guards).67
After	 investigating	 the	 official	 records	 and	 questioning	 the	 prison	
officials,	the	state	inspectors	began	questioning	some	of	the	inmates.	The	
interviews were recorded word for word, according to what the prisoner 
said	 in	 the	 first	 person,	 thus	 preserving	 colloquialisms,	 poor	 grammar,	
and so on. These interviews give a very different version of events. The 
main	prisoners	questioned	were	Fatsa’lı	Hasan	Ağa	(Ismail	of	the	origi-
nal	petition),	İzmid’li	Hasan	Efendi,	and	Reşit	Efendi.	They	claimed	that	
there had been no attempt to escape the day of the prison inspection that 
uncovered the contraband weapons. In fact, they asserted that prisoners 
had gathered together (including the three of them) to protest the treat-
ment of one of their own who they claimed had been unjustly punished by 
the	cadre.	This	protest	occurred	after	Ismail	(Fatsa’lı	Hasan	Ağa)	wrote	
his petition and submitted it to the warden who, in turn, purposefully 
delayed forwarding it to the Ministry of Justice until after the search for 
weapons had been conducted. The prisoners who congregated to protest 
were	 bound	 in	 chains	 and	placed	 in	 solitary	 confinement	 for	five	 days.	
The inmates denied that any of their friends were trying to escape through 
the ceiling of the third ward, but that they had somehow been framed by 
the warden and the guards and then falsely accused.68 The warden denied 
that	Fatsa’lı	Hasan	Ağa	and	İzmid’li	Hasan	Efendi	had	ever	been	placed	
in	solitary	confinement,	but	claimed	that	İzmid’li	Hasan	Efendi	had	been	
removed from his teaching position on suspicion of smuggling weapons 
and not performing his teaching duties.
Finally,	Fatsa’lı	Hasan	Ağa,	İzmid’li	Hasan	Efendi,	and	Reşid	Efendi	
all claimed that the warden and the guards were the ones behind a weapons 
smuggling scheme. The warden had allegedly awarded a monopoly over 
the production and sale of prison- manufactured goods to a prisoner named 
İpsiz	Recep.	He	was	 the	only	prisoner	allowed	 to	 import	 raw	materials	
to the prison, such as wood, mother of pearl, and fabric, and sell them to 
the prison factory craftsmen at high prices or on credit so that they could 





weapons into the prison and selling them to inmates at exorbitant prices. 
The three prisoners claimed that skewers and knives usually costing 10 
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kuruş at the local market were being sold to prisoners for 1 to 2 lira! They 
also contradicted the warden’s story that only eighty- three weapons had 
been found during the inspection. Instead, they claimed that the guards 
actually uncovered more than 200 weapons, but only eighty- three had 
been reported and turned over to the gendarme commander. Their overall 
story implicitly claims that the search for weapons had been staged as a 
means to counteract Ismail’s petition and cover up the prison cadre’s cor-
ruption and prisoner abuse. They also claimed that the guards, gatekeep-
ers, and chief guards were all complicit in the warden’s corruption by 
not doing their duty and allowing these weapons to be smuggled into the 
prison.69
As a result of this investigation, Kastamonu province, the Ministry of 
Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Prison Administration took 
measures to restructure Sinop penitentiary’s cadre. The situation had 
become so unruly that the gendarme was called in to restore prison order 
and aid in its reorganisation in May and June 1913. Additionally, the 
prison warden, Cemal Efendi, was relieved of his duties and replaced.70 
The above- mentioned ministries also authorised and implemented 
the complete restructuring of the prison personnel in order to stream-
line the chain of command and standardise prison positions and titles 
throughout the empire. In so doing, they increased the wages of all prison 
personnel with the exception of the warden. Prior to these changes, Sinop 
penitentiary employed a cadre consisting of a warden (salary: 1,000 kuruş/
mo.), a clerk (300 kuruş/mo.), a chief guard (300 kuruş/mo.), eight guard 
supervisors/gardiyan çavuş (200 kuruş/mo.), two gatekeepers/kapıcı (160 
kuruş/mo.), and 20 regular male guards/gardiyan nefri (150 kuruş/mo.). 
After the restructuring, it employed a warden (1,000 kuruş/mo.), a clerk 
(400 kuruş/mo.), a chief guard (400 kuruş/mo.), an assistant chief guard/
ser gardiyan maafi (300 kuruş/mo.), two gatekeepers/kapıcı (250 kuruş/
mo.), and 19 male guards/gardiyan (200 kuruş/mo.).71
By taking these actions and implementing change the Prison 
Administration attempted to improve prison discipline and organisation in 
order to stamp out corruption and prisoner abuse. The cooperation among 
various ministries on the imperial, provincial, and local levels to investi-
gate this case and the concrete steps that were taken to rectify the situation 
all	reflect	the	state’s	commitment	to	disciplining	its	disciplinarians.	This	
commitment did have a real effect on order, discipline, and conditions 
throughout the empire’s prisons. Despite these efforts, however, corrup-
tion, guard–prisoner collusion, prisoner abuse, and breakdowns in order 
and discipline still continued to occur.
The Sinop case also vividly illustrates the realities of prison life and the 
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interactions	between	prison	officials	and	inmates	and	among	the	prisoners	
themselves. Rivalries, alliances, collusions, abuse, allegations, and exploi-
tations abounded within Ottoman prisons causing serious problems for the 
Prison Administration in terms of order, discipline, security, and prisoner 
rehabilitation. Understanding the realities of prison life and administration 
clearly explicate the blurred boundaries between convict and cadre.
Conclusion
Professionalising the prison cadre was a central focus for the Ottoman 
administration, CUP, and prison reformers. These entities viewed the 
prison cadre as the linchpins to creating a progressive, modern, and civi-
lised penal system that was standardised, disciplined, ordered, and able to 
rehabilitate and transform the empire’s miscreants into productive moral 
citizens.	This	vision	did	not	stay	in	the	ethereal	realm.	Officials	translated	
it into concrete programmes for improvement of prison administration, 
personnel supervision, and accountability.
Samuel Bentham’s intended subject of his factory panopticon acts as 
an effective metaphor for Ottoman prison reforms intended to discipline 
the disciplinarians. As demonstrated by the central government’s response 
to the Sinop penitentiary scandal, the Prison Administration took con-
crete actions to supervise and discipline its local prison personnel. These 
included taking prisoner petitions seriously, conducting robust investiga-
tions	into	corruption	and	abuse	allegations,	punishing	guilty	officials,	and	
implementing real change concerning prison chains of command, wages, 
new standards of employment, and increased employee oversight. This 
vision and these actions, however, did not stamp out corruption, abuse, or 
collusion in the Ottoman prison system.
One	of	 the	most	 significant	findings	of	 this	 investigation	 into	prison	
corruption and attempts to professionalise prison personnel concerns the 
porosity	of	the	boundaries	between	state	officials	and	societal	actors,	espe-
cially guards and prisoners. In other words, personal agency often blurs 
the	 rigid	 lines	 that	social	scientists	 tend	 to	establish	between	 the	reified	
entities labelled ‘state’ and ‘society’. This investigation also demonstrates 
the intricate interactions between ideal, reform, implementation, and 
reality.	The	 involvement	of	 so	many	 individuals,	 from	visionaries,	offi-
cials, and reformers to local actors, such as cadre and inmates, disrupts and 
often upends the top–down methodology repeatedly used to describe late 
Ottoman reforms. Local realities and actors affected reform programmes 
much more than the scholarly literature often acknowledges.
Resistance to and appropriation of these visions of reform affected the 
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reality of prison life in many unexpected ways. The question should not 
be whether these reforms failed or succeeded, but how they affected the 
reality of lived experience. Ottoman visions of the well- ordered prison 
staffed	by	 former	military	officers	acting	as	harbingers	of	penal	 reform	
never came to full fruition. Its attempted implementation, however, did 
change the power dynamics within the prison as individuals, such as 
Ismail, other prisoners, and various prison personnel exercised their own 
agency to work within and against the system in an attempt to reshape it 
to their own advantage. The Ottoman prison provides a vivid illustration 
of this dynamic.
Continuing with this theme of reform and reality and the state’s assump-
tion of greater responsibility for its population, Chapter 6 investigates the 
situation of incarcerated children. It looks closely at the efforts of Ottoman 
legislators,	 governmental	 officials,	 and	 the	 Prison	 Administration	 and	
Directorate	of	Prisons	to	change	the	very	definition	of	childhood	and	to	
care for the empire’s most vulnerable segment of its population. These 
reforms and their implementation provide additional insights into late 
Ottoman views about childhood, punishment, law, criminal accountabil-
ity, and state patriarchy.
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Creating Juvenile Delinquents: Redefining 
Childhood in the Late Ottoman Empire
According to the results of the 1912 Ottoman prison survey, Beni Saab’s 
prison in Beirut province contained 447 prisoners – two females and 445 
males. The local nizamiye court convicted 373 prisoners of less serious 
offences (cünha ve kabahat), and the other seventy- four individuals were 
awaiting trial. Among the 373 sentenced inmates, three males were con-
victed of deviant sexual behaviour (fi’il- i şeni).1 In modern Turkish this 
term refers almost exclusively to sodomy, but in late Ottoman times it 
also included any action considered to be ‘deviant’ sexual behaviour not 
allowed under Islamic law, including prostitution.2 It also implies con-
sensual participation by all involved. Violent, deviant sexual behaviour 
(cebren fi’il- i şeni) had its own category in the prison questionnaire and 
was considered a serious offence (cinayet), carrying with it a more severe 
punishment.3
In the case of these three male prisoners incarcerated for ‘deviant 
sexual behaviour’ at the Beni Saab prison, all were sentenced to incar-
ceration from three to six months. It is very likely that they committed 
their crimes together based upon several interrelated pieces of infor-
mation gleaned from the administrative organisation of Beni Saab, 
geography, and the prison survey. Beni Saab was located on the eastern- 
Mediterranean coast between the port towns of Yafa (Jaffa) to the south 
and Hayfa (Haifa) to the north on the Plain of Sharon. As a district (kaza) 
it possessed a minimum security prison for criminals convicted of minor 
and lesser crimes from the local area. In 1850, Beni Saab consisted of 
twenty- seven villages (köyler).4 According to population records in 1914, 
the sub- district’s total population was 35,951: breaking down into 35,929 
Muslims, eighteen Ecumenical Patriarchate (Rum) Christians, and four 
Samaritans.5 The town of Tulkarem was the largest urban area in Beni 
Saab having a population estimated at 5,000 in 1916.6 The bulk of the dis-
trict’s population consisted of farmers who lived in small villages. In fact, 
204 of the 447 prisoners were listed as farmers on the prison survey with 
another 114 listed as land owners.7 More concretely, the prison survey 
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indicates that all three of the aforementioned prisoners were artisans 
(esnaf ) and Muslim. One was between twenty and thirty years old and the 
other two were under the age of fourteen.8 It is not, therefore, unreason-
able to speculate that the two minors were working under the supervision 
of the adult prisoner. The two children and the man with whom they most 
likely perpetrated their crime were incarcerated together. They all shared 
a common religion, social class, profession, regional identity, and crimi-
nal conviction for which they would spend the next three to six months 
incarcerated together in a dormitory- style prison with the adult having full 
access to both minors.
Circumstances permitting, Ottoman prison authorities at the time 
separated inmates according to the gravity of their crimes, whether they 
were convicted or accused, and by gender. Juvenile prisoners, however, 
were not separated from adults. In the case of Beni Saab, there were no 
serious offenders incarcerated in its prison. The less serious offenders 
found in this prison, however, would not have been separated according 
to their particular crimes. During the day prisoners milled around together 
with little supervision, and at night they all slept together in open wards. 
Prisoners were not separated according to differences in age, and, there-
fore, all prisoners, whether they would be considered children or not by 
twenty-	first-	century	standards,	were	incarcerated	together,	slept	together,	
and had complete access to one another at all times.
It does not take a vivid imagination to picture the treatment these 
boys may have experienced. Circumstances similar to those at Beni Saab 
helped	motivate	Ottoman	officials	to	reform	prison	conditions	and	intro-
duce laws regarding children convicted of criminal offences. In fact, the 
CUP- led government implemented numerous reforms to the empire’s 
criminal justice system regarding the status and treatment of children. 
These	reforms	included	altering	the	legal	definition	of	childhood,	promul-
gating new laws establishing the age of criminal culpability, and consoli-
dating the state’s authority over Islamic criminal law in relation to minors. 
Additionally, these reforms created a gradated system of punishments for 
individuals aged from fourteen to nineteen, separated children from adult 
inmates, expanded the purpose of ‘reformatories’ (ıslahhaneler) to accom-
modate juvenile delinquents, and established the practice of early release 
for	minors	who	met	particular	specifications.
The interest in incarcerated children and corresponding actions taken 
by the CUP provide important insights into Ottoman views concerning the 
nature	and	definition	of	childhood.	They	also	demonstrate	the	importance	
of children and childhood in Ottoman society’s imagination about its own 
national future. These concerns and reforms, however, do not constitute 
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a case of rupture whereby Ottoman views simply conformed to those of 
the West. Instead, they represent a process of continuity and change over 
the course of the nineteenth century whereby the state gradually assumed 
more responsibility for the welfare of the empire’s children. CUP reforms 
regarding juvenile delinquents, when viewed in the context of the devel-
opment of state- mandated child reformatories, public primary education, 
health and hygiene regulations, and the establishment of scouting and 
other youth organisations, demonstrate the state’s increasing intervention 
into	the	lives	of	its	citizens.	Children	became	associated	with	the	future	
prosperity, pride, and protection of the Ottoman ‘nation’. The health and 
welfare of children and their legal status moved from the private sphere of 
the family to the public sphere as determined and controlled by the state. 
The Ottoman administration thus assumed the position of chief power-
broker, at least in large urban areas, regarding a child’s legal status and 
welfare.
Children and Childhood in the Middle East
There	 is	 no	 universal	 definition	 of	 childhood.	 Class	 differences,	 socio-	
economic status, levels of education, religion, and cultural norms and 
mores	all	influence	opinions	regarding	the	purpose	and	definition	of	child-
hood. The Middle East is no exception in this respect. The vast number 
of religious, linguistic, ethnic, and socio- economic communities in this 
region	makes	it	particularly	difficult	to	distil	a	commonly	held	notion	of	
childhood. There are, however, some ideal commonalities that help to 
illustrate generally held societal views of childhood in the Middle East 
prior to the sweeping changes brought about by modernity, particularly 
among the majority Muslim population.
According	to	Elizabeth	Warnock	Fernea,	the	‘cultural	ideal’	of	child-
hood in the Middle East prior to the onset of modernity consisted of 
several elements, such as the importance of sons, and values associated 
with honour, religion, morality, hospitality, and respect for elders. Social 
practices such as religious traditions, discipline, education, and division 
of labour helped to impose notions of ‘proper’ masculinity and ‘proper’ 
femininity and the superiority and dominance of men over women. Social 
norms and mores emphatically stressed loyalty to family and family 
honour, and viewed the family as society’s most fundamental unit, as well 
as the main source of protection, support, instruction, control, and social 
standing.9 This ‘ideal’ view of children and childhood in the pre- and early 
modern Middle East closely parallels the view in Europe. According to 
Ariès, in medieval Europe childhood was a fairly short period that ended 
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‘as soon as the child could live without the constant solicitude of his 
mother, his nanny or his cradle- rocker’.10 Of course, historical, cultural, 
and	 social	 specificities	 augment	 this	 ‘ideal’	 view	depending	on	 context	
and circumstances. It is, however, useful for analysing the changes that 
took place in the Ottoman Empire over the long nineteenth century (espe-
cially during the Second Constitutional Period) in terms of the state’s 
newly assumed role regarding child welfare.
Present- day assumptions characterising children as innocent, malle-
able, dependent, and vulnerable have relatively recent origins. They are 
the result of the dislocation and breakdown of the ‘traditional’ rural family 
structure over the course of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
In Western Europe, phenomena such as the Industrial Revolution, the 
development and spread of capitalist market relations, urbanisation, impe-
rialism, and the inception and spread of modern methods of governance 
caused greater centralisation of state power and authority concerning the 
welfare of its population. Child labour, the awful living conditions in tene-
ments, the spread of communicable diseases, the promotion of education, 
the development of national identities, and the population becoming the 
state’s object of rule all led to a heightened interest in the welfare of the 
nation’s future, namely children.11
One of these crucial changes in perceptions and treatment of children 
concerned their discipline and punishment in penal institutions. David 
Garland argues that, beginning in the mid- nineteenth century, ‘our modern 
conceptions of youth and childhood began to restructure the laws and 
practices of punishment in . . . ways we now take for granted’.12 Prior to 
this transformation in Western Europe and North America it was common 
for children under the age of fourteen who were guilty of serious crimes 
to receive the same corporal punishment as adults, including execution.13 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the harsh penal practices that 
state authorities carried out against children began to offend contempo-
rary cultural perceptions of childhood. They functioned as the impetus 
for extensive reform campaigns aimed at creating new legislation that 
established ‘special reformatories, juvenile courts, and a more welfare- 
orientated approach to young offenders’.14
Many of these sensitivities regarding children, however, were not new 
to the Ottoman Empire. For example, the mandate to care for the poor, the 
needy, and especially the orphan and the widow are long- standing require-
ments of Islam. Child welfare, particularly caring for the poor and the 
orphaned, has been a part of Islamic law and society dating back to the ear-
liest community. Ottoman commitments to Islamic norms and mores, such 
as child welfare, were foundational to the dynasty’s ruling legitimacy.
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During	the	nineteenth	century	Ottoman	officials	placed	greater	empha-
sis on protecting and providing for those who were in dire need. While 
widespread industrialisation may not have occurred in the Ottoman 
Empire, as it did in Western Europe, the forced migrations and ethnic 
cleansings	of	millions	of	Muslims	by	Czarist	Russia	and	several	Balkan	
states caused massive dislocation and upheaval to Middle Eastern families 
during the second half of the nineteenth century.15	 Nazan	 Maksudyan	
argues that the presence of overwhelming numbers of orphaned refugee 
children	on	the	streets	of	Istanbul	and	other	Ottoman	cities	compelled	offi-
cials to formulate and implement numerous reforms aimed at bettering the 
welfare of these children. The establishment of poor houses, vocational 
orphanages, and public education were among the attempted solutions to 
reduce the suffering of these children, secure the safety of urban areas, and 
fashion	children	into	productive	citizens.16
Changing Western concepts of childhood and the state’s relationship to 
its	youngest	citizens	did	affect	Ottoman	perceptions,	but	to	cast	Ottoman	
reforms as Western- driven is a gross overstatement. Ottoman actions are 
much better described as responses to a combination of internal crises and 
European encroachment. These responses adapted some Western prac-
tices to long- standing Ottoman institutions and policies, thus creating new 
hybrids distinct to Ottoman modernity. Ottoman penal reforms regard-
ing children were not any different, although they did lag behind other 
Ottoman reforms affecting children, such as the creation of ‘reformato-
ries’ and attempts at expanding public education.
Two	of	the	earliest	attempts	by	Ottoman	officials	to	improve	the	condi-
tions of incarcerated children are Article 90 of the 1880 Prison Regulation 
and	the	empire’s	participation	in	and	ratification	of	the	proceedings	of	the	
1890 International Prison Congress in St Petersburg, Russia. Article 90 
states that ‘incarcerated children under the age of nineteen shall be kept 
separate from other prisoners both night and day in a place specially desig-
nated for them’.17	Prison	officials	in	the	Hamidian	era	did	not	fully	imple-
ment	Article	90.	Similarly,	the	motions	ratified	at	the	1890	International	
Prison Congress were also set aside, even though they included detailed 
regulations regarding the treatment of incarcerated minors with a focus on 
their rehabilitation through work and education.18 Widespread attempts 
at implementation of these provisions did not occur until the Second 
Constitutional Period. In this period prison administrators and Ottoman 
lawmakers implemented many of these laws and viewed it to be within the 
state’s mandate to care for and rehabilitate juvenile delinquents, as well 
as	the	orphaned	and	the	indigent.	One	of	the	first	areas	in	which	the	CUP	
affected change concerned a child’s legal status.
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Shari’a, Childhood and the Age of Accountability
Since the mid- eighteenth century, penal studies have extensively debated 
the legal status of children in terms of criminal culpability and incarcera-
tion.19 In the Ottoman Empire, the issue of incarcerated minors was no 
different, but very few tangible reforms were carried out. Reasons for 
this	lack	of	action	are	twofold:	first,	 the	Ottoman	Government’s	lack	of	
a centralised prison administrative apparatus prior to 1911 and, second, 
the power and autonomy held by Islamic legal institutions to determine 
the age of accountability for one’s actions and to adjudicate in criminal 
matters. The issues surrounding the concept of childhood in the Ottoman 
Empire and its change during the Second Constitutional Period are inti-
mately connected with Islamic law.
According to Islamic law, criminal culpability for one’s actions begins 
with the onset of puberty.20 Therefore, prior to the physical manifestation 
of puberty (that is, nocturnal semen discharge for males and the com-
mencement of menses for females), perpetrators of criminal offences 
cannot be held accountable for their actions as long as they have not 
completed their fourteenth year. In other words, prior to the onset of 
puberty, offenders are ‘presumed not to be aware of the unlawfulness of 
their actions and lack criminal intent’.21 Minors do not possess a mens 
rea or ‘guilty mind’, because they are deemed unable to comprehend the 
full implications of their actions. The various schools of Islamic theology, 
with the exception of Shi’ism, set a minimum and a maximum date for 
the	onset	of	puberty.	For	females,	according	to	the	Hanafi	tradition	(that	
is,	 the	 official	 Islamic	 school	 of	 law	 for	 the	 empire	 since	 the	 sixteenth	
century)	puberty	begins	as	early	as	nine,	but	no	later	than	age	fifteen.	For	
males,	 the	Hanafi	 tradition	 holds	 that	 puberty	 starts	 sometime	 between	
the	ages	of	twelve	and	fifteen.22 Lawmakers adopted these Islamic legal 
concepts for juvenile criminal culpability into the 1858 IOPC.23 In other 
words, girls as young as nine and boys as young as twelve theoretically 
could be tried, convicted, and incarcerated as adults.
Article 40 of the original 1858 IOPC reads as follows:
An offender who has not attained the age of puberty is not liable to the punish-
ments prescribed for the offence which he has committed and if he is further 
not a person possessed of the power of discernment he is given up to his father, 
mother or relatives by being bound over in strong security. In case no strong 
security is produced by the father, mother or relatives he is put in prison for a 
suitable period through the instrumentality of the police for self- reformation.
 But if such offender who has not attained puberty is murahiq [that is, on 
the	verge	of	puberty,	between	the	ages	of	nine	and	fifteen	and	still	not	having	
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shown the physical signs of puberty] that is if he has committed that offence 
deliberately by distinguishing and discerning that the result of his action and 
deed will be an offence, if his offence is of the category of Jinayets [serious 
crimes] calling for the punishments of death or perpetual kyurek [permanent 
incarceration	 with	 hard	 labour]	 or	 confinement	 in	 a	 fortress	 or	 perpetual	
exile	he	is	put	in	prison	for	a	period	of	from	five	years	to	ten	years	for	self-	
reformation; and if it is an offence necessitating one of the punishments of 
temporary	kyurek	or	temporary	confinement	in	a	fortress	or	temporary	exile	he	
is likewise put in prison for a period equal to from one fourth up to one- third of 
the period of the punishment called for by his offence; and in both these cases 
he	may	be	taken	under	police	supervision	for	from	five	years	to	ten	years;	and	
if his offence necessitates the punishment of deprivation of civil rights he is 
similarly imprisoned for reformation for from six months to three years; and if 
his offence is one necessitating a punishment less severe than the punishments 
mentioned	he	is	similarly	imprisoned	for	reformation	for	a	definite	period	not	
exceeding one- third of such punishment.24
Article	40’s	legal	definition	regarding	the	age	of	accountability	was	miti-
gated	and	clarified	for	procedural	purposes	by	a	Ministry	of	Justice	direc-
tive circulated on 26 March 1874. This circular states:
Males and females who have not completed the age of thirteen years shall be 
regarded	as	infants	whilst	offenders	who	are	just	over	the	age	of	fifteen	if	their	
puberty cannot be established shall be deemed to be murahiqs [on the verge of 
puberty] with discernment.25
However,	 the	original	Hanafi	 interpretation	of	 the	age	of	accountability	
was re- established with the creation of the Mecelle in 1877. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, the Mecelle	 was	 the	Ottoman	Empire’s	 official	 civil	 law	
code	consisting	of	a	combination	of	Hanafi	interpretation	of	shari’a and 
Western civil law.26 According to the Mecelle, the age of puberty and, thus 
the beginning of accountability and adulthood, is as follows:
Art. 985. The time of puberty is proved by the emission of seed in dreams and 
the power to make pregnant, and by the menstrual discharge and power to 
become pregnant.
 Art. 986. The beginning of the time of arrival at puberty is, for males, exactly 
twelve years of age and, for females exactly nine years, and the latest for both is 
exactly	fifteen	years	of	age.	If	a	male,	who	has	completed	twelve,	and	a	female	
who has completed nine, has not reached a state of puberty, until they reach 
a state of puberty, they are called ‘murahiq’ and ‘murahiqa’ [on the verge of 
puberty].
 Art. 987. A person in whom the signs of puberty do not appear, when he has 
reached	the	latest	time	for	arrival	at	puberty	[fifteen	years	old]	is	considered	in	
law as arrived at the age of puberty.27
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In other words, everyone who has commenced puberty is considered 
criminally culpable and punished as an adult, even if she is only nine 
years old. If a child has reached the minimum age of the commencement 
of puberty, but has not shown its signs, she or he is considered ‘partially 
responsible’ and is subject to punishment. This punishment, however, is at 
a reduced level from that of an adult. Additionally, if a person has reached 
the	age	of	fifteen,	but	he	or	she	has	yet	to	produce	evidence	of	puberty,	he	
or she is criminally culpable and subject to full punishment under the law. 
It is theoretically possible, therefore, according to Article 40, that children 
even under the age of nine (girls) and twelve (boys) could be placed in 
jail alongside adults if there was no relative to whom the child could be 
‘bound in strong security’.
Determining the criminal culpability of a minor was very convoluted 
in the nineteenth century. Consequently, it was open to vast differences 
of	 interpretation	 and	 opinion.	 This	 complicated	 definition	 of	 criminal	
culpability allowed Islamic court judges incredible latitude in determining 
accountability on a case- by- case basis. Each child’s accountability was 
subject to issues of age, sex, and puberty instead of a simple age threshold. 
Having the parameters for accountability more clearly delineated for the 
first	 time	 in	 the	1858	IOPC	and	 the	Mecelle constitutes a vast improve-
ment over previous practice since it standardised the rules for criminal 
culpability	and	limited	them	to	Hanafi	guidelines.	Even	though	the	empire	
was	officially	Hanafi	in	its	Islamic	traditions,	various	regions	of	the	empire	
were allowed to maintain alternate Islamic interpretations and local judges 
possessed the liberty to follow those customs as long as they did not con-
travene	Sultanic	decree.	For	these	reasons,	the	new	codifications	should	be	
considered a major rationalisation of Islamic law and practice within the 
empire. Islamic judges and courts, however, still possessed great autonomy 
in implementing these laws. The CUP considered this autonomy contrary 
to its desired outcome of a standardised, rationalised, and centralised crim-
inal justice system. This issue, therefore, became a major focus of reform.
Adopting a Concrete Definition of Childhood
These legal statutes determining the age of accountability remained intact 
until the Second Constitutional Period. On 4 June 1911, the Ottoman 
Parliament repealed Article 40 of the 1858 IOPC and replaced it with this 
new version:
Those who have not completed the age of thirteen years [who are not fourteen 
years old] at the time of committing an offence are deemed to be devoid of the 
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power of discernment and are not responsible for the offence they commit, but 
are given up to their parents or relative or guardian by judgment of a Junha 
Court [Court of Less Serious Criminal Offences] and by way of taking recog-
nisance from them, or they are sent to a reformatory [ıslahhane] for training or 
detention for a period not to extend beyond their age of majority. If opportunity 
is afforded through negligence in care or supervision to children given up to 
their parents or relative or guardian by recognisance, to commit an offence 
before	 completing	 the	 age	 of	 fifteen	 years,	 a	 fine	 of	 from	 one	 Lira	 to	 one	
hundred Liras is taken from those charged with their care.
 With regard to those who, at the time of committing an offence, have com-
pleted	the	age	of	thirteen	years	but	have	not	finished	the	age	of	fifteen	years	
[who are not sixteen years old] punishment is ordered with regard to them, on 
account of the offence committed by them, in the following manner:– 
 If his offence is of the category of Jinayets [serious offences] calling for the 




exile he is likewise put in prison for self- reformation for a period equal to from 
one- fourth up to one- third of the period of the punishment called for by his 
offence, and in both these cases he may be taken under police supervision for 
from	five	years	to	seven	years;	and	if	his	offence	necessitates	the	punishment	
of deprivation of civil rights he is likewise put in prison for self- reformation for 
from six months to three years. If it necessitates a punishment less severe than 




of eighteen years [who are not nineteen years of age] are put in prison for self- 
reformation	for	from	seven	years	to	fifteen	years	in	cases	calling	for	the	pun-
ishments	of	death	or	perpetual	kyurek	or	perpetual	confinement	in	a	fortress	or	
perpetual exile; and in cases calling for the punishments of temporary kyurek or 
temporary	confinement	in	a	fortress	or	temporary	exile	they	are	likewise	put	in	
prison for self- reformation for from one- half to two- thirds of the period of the 
original punishment, and in both cases they may be taken under police supervi-
sion	for	from	five	years	to	ten	years;	and	if	the	offence	is	one	necessitating	a	
punishment less severe than the punishments mentioned, punishment of impris-
onment is ordered after deducting one- fourth of the original punishment.28
A comparison of the original Article 40 with its successor reveals a 
number	of	important	changes	in	the	legal	status	of	children	and	definition	





Islamic legalistic view to one that is standardised and consequently closed 
to individual interpretation, particularly concerning the age of accounta-
bility, when childhood ends, and the ‘rehabilitation’ of juvenile offenders.
The 1911 revisions establish the age of accountability and the ability to 
discern between right and wrong as being fourteen years of age. No longer 
is accountability based on the attainment of puberty, but solely on a spe-
cific	age	regardless	of	gender	or	puberty.	This	represents	a	closer	adher-
ence to the 1810 French Penal Code, which states in Article 66 that those 
accused under the age of sixteen are not capable of knowing the difference 
between right and wrong (sans discernement). However, the new Article 
40 preserves a version of the concept of mürahik by making provisions for 
lesser	punishments	for	those	who	are	fourteen	and	fifteen	years	old,	thus	
preserving Islamic interpretations of accountability at the latest possible 
age prior to the manifestation of puberty and melding this with Western 
conceptualisations of criminal culpability. This demonstrates an interest-
ing example of Ottoman adaptation of European norms and mores to its 
specific	cultural	context	that	does	not	represent	what	many	scholars	have	
deemed Ottoman ‘secularisation’.29
This change also represents an example of continuity and ideo-
logical manifestation. The CUP and the Ottoman Parliament during the 
Second Constitutional Period built upon continuous attempts by various 
Ottoman governments to centralise bureaucratic, administrative, and 
legal power within the hands of the state. This is evident in the progres-
sion and development of the legal statutes determining the age of dis-
cernment, which progressed from a strictly Islamic legal interpretation 
as witnessed by the promulgation of the 1858 IOPC and the Mecelle 
to	the	combination	of	Islamic	legal	definitions	and	age	designations	in	
1874 to accountability being determined solely upon an established age 
in 1911. In addition to being an example of continuity and change, the 
1911 Article 40 is a manifestation of the CUP’s ideological goals and 
pragmatic style of rule.
One of the core facets of CUP pragmatism and ideology or ‘shared 
set	of	attitudes’	was	the	creation	of	a	more	rational,	centralised,	efficient,	
and regulated system of government in all of its multifarious actions and 
responsibilities.30 By placing a concrete standard for the age of account-
ability, the CUP circumscribed the power of Islamic courts and judges. It 
also rationalised the process for determining accountability and removed 
the ambiguity that existed under previous legal interpretations. When 
combined with other changes to the IOPC discussed in Chapter 1, these 
actions further established the state as the central powerbroker over its 
population in terms of crime and punishment.
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Access and Reconfiguration
Through the appropriation of increased authority at the expense of ‘tra-
ditional’ Islamic legal institutions, the CUP gained more access to the 
private	sphere,	specifically	the	family.	One	of	the	quintessential	character-
istics of the modern era is the attempt by states to intervene into the lives 
of their populations in order to harness social power. From time immemo-
rial, the family is the most recognised unit of the private sphere, where 
individuals,	specifically	fathers	and	husbands	in	patriarchal	societies,	have	
the greatest amount of autonomy over their dependants in terms of social 
behaviour,	finances,	education,	living	arrangements,	and	marriage.31 With 
the commencement of the early modern period and absolutism, rulers 
attempted, in a more systematic way, to remove intermediaries and gain 
greater access and control over the resources of their domains, includ-
ing the family. Starting in earnest in the late eighteenth century, rulers 
and states assumed progressively greater amounts of authority over the 
family, so much so that traditional patriarchy had been replaced by ‘state 
 patriarchy’.32 In other words, the state assumed the role of the familial 
 patriarch in an attempt to shape and control society on its most fundamen-
tal level. This was done through education, concerns for child safety and 
welfare, the promotion of women’s rights and freedoms, and even issuing 
marriage licences and promulgating inheritance laws. The CUP’s appro-
priation of the power to determine the age of accountability demonstrates 
a culmination of Ottoman bureaucratic efforts over the nineteenth century 
to create a level of ‘state patriarchy’.
The Ottoman administration’s penetration into the lives of its sub-
jects, particularly at the level of the family, is further illustrated by the 
nature and potency of an important vagrancy law passed by the CUP- 
led Ottoman Parliament in 1909, entitled The Law on Vagabonds and 
Suspected Persons (Serseri ve Mazanna- ı Su- i Eshas Hakkında Kanun). 
This law provided the police with incredible latitude and discretion in con-
trolling what the Ottoman administration viewed as the most volatile and 
threatening segment of the population: single, adult, unemployed males, 
who lived alone. Parliament passed stringent laws restricting and control-
ling	 their	movements,	 housing,	 ability	 to	 find	work,	 and	 leisure	 activi-
ties.	Authorities	 justified	 these	measures	 by	 claiming	 that	 vagrants	 and	
vagabonds	were	immoral,	lazy,	and	lecherous	individuals	who	threatened	
civil order because they did not pursue ‘family life’. The state assumed 
the responsibility to protect the family from these dangerous individuals, 
because it viewed the family as the foundation of national identity and 
civil society’s well- being.33
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Ottoman lawmakers did not formulate and pass the 1909 vagrancy 
law in a vacuum. This law built upon legislation passed in the 1890s 
that increasingly restricted the occupation of begging and highlighted 
vagrancy as a threat to public order. These were not laws, but ‘regulations’ 
(nizamnameler), crafted in direct response to the break down in public 
order	in	urban	areas	resulting	from	a	huge	influx	of	refugees	to	the	empire	
from the Balkans, the Crimea, and the Caucasus. They did not, however, 
target vagrants in such a direct way as did the law of 1909.34 The roots 
of this law can be traced even further back to the late eighteenth century. 
Sultan Selim III decreed harsh anti- vagrancy laws and adopted extensive 
surveillance practices in response to social disorder caused by a sharp 
increase in rural migration to Istanbul.35
Throughout the nineteenth century Ottoman sultans and administrators 
established many youth organisations associated with athletic, educational, 
and military institutions in order to expand state patriarchy and further 
intervene into the life of the family.36 For example, the CUP adopted and 
promoted boy scouting in the empire. Scouting originated in Great Britain 
and	quickly	spread	to	the	United	States	during	the	first	decade	of	the	twen-
tieth	century.	The	first	scouting	organisation	established	in	the	Ottoman	
Empire was The Turk’s Strength (Türk Güçü) in 1913 with the support 
of CUP members such as Ziya Gökalp. It was organised with the purpose 
of promoting morality and vitality among the empire’s youth, particularly 
among male Muslim Turks.37
In	May	1914,	the	Minister	of	War,	Enver	Pasha,	hired	Harold	Parfitt,	
an	Englishman	 and	 founder	 of	 the	first	 boy	 scout	 troop	 in	Belgium,	 to	
establish a new scouting organisation (İzcilik Dernekleri) in the Ottoman 
Empire. This was a state- sponsored organisation connected to the Ministry 
of War and founded to prepare young males for military service. It was 
a completely voluntary organisation whose membership comprised of 
young males aged from eleven to seventeen.38
Within a month of the establishment of İzcilik Dernekleri, Enver 
Pasha and the Ministry of War established another scouting organisa-
tion, the Ottoman Strength Associations (Osmanlı Güç Dernekleri). This 
organisation was compulsory for all young males aged seventeen and 
above attending public schools. Consequently, the İzcilik Dernekleri was 
subordinated to the Osmanlı Güç Dernekleri, and the Türk Güçü was dis-
banded. In addition to founding the Osmanlı Güç Dernekleri, the Ministry 
of War also directed and funded it, thus making it a distinctly paramilitary 
organisation mandated to prepare male youth for military and national 
service. This purpose is clearly illustrated by the following Ministry of 
War declaration:
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In this era, for every nation which wants to survive, to defend its homeland 
(vatan), its virtue (ırz), and its honour (namus) in the face of its enemies, [it] 
must become a ‘nation- in- arms’ (millet- i müsellah) . . . From now on when 
our homeland is in danger, those who are true men will not loiter in the streets, 
but will run and take up arms to defend our Ottoman honour and homeland, 
which has been entrusted to us by God . . . The Ministry of War is concerned 
about this vital issue more than anyone else, therefore, it took upon itself this 
responsibility and founded the Ottoman Strength Associations (Osmanlı Güç 
Dernekleri).39
This notion of a ‘nation- in- arms’ was further reinforced by the outbreak 
of WWI and by mobilisation of the Ottoman full military (seferberlik). 
All of the nation’s assets and resources had to be mobilised, including its 
children for protection and self- defence. The connection between scout-
ing and the ‘nation- in- arms’ concept continued to strengthen and evolve 
during	 the	 war,	 especially	 as	 a	 result	 of	 German	 military	 influence.40 
Scouting	 is	 a	 clear	 example	 of	 state	 attempts	 to	 train,	 influence,	 and	
gain greater access to children, which had traditionally been the primary 
concern of the family.
The combination of the CUP’s newly established graduated system of 
punishments for minors and the establishment of scouting organisations 
represents the entrenchment of the concept of adolescence in the Middle 
East. These legal and social developments helped establish a grey area 
between childhood and adulthood for male inhabitants of the empire. 
Adolescence became a critical period for young males to gain education, 
training, and experience, thus preparing them for adulthood and service to 
their national family.41
In addition to giving the state more access to the private sphere, these 
regulations and laws also enabled the CUP to reshape and secure state 
control over the public sphere, at least in terms of consolidating and cen-
tralising its control over the adjudication of criminal matters. Building on 
the legal reforms of the nineteenth century, particularly the adoption of the 
1858 IOPC and the promulgation of the Mecelle, the creation of nizamiye 
courts, and the adoption of the 1879 Code of Criminal Procedure, the CUP 
intensified	 Ottoman	 bureaucratic	 efforts	 to	 whittle	 away	 the	 relatively	
independent authority of the empire’s Islamic legal institutions. This 
process culminated in 1917, when the CUP- controlled parliament passed 
the Law of Şeriat Court Procedure and the Law of Family Rights. These 
two	laws	effectively	unified	Ottoman	judicial	procedure	by	finishing	the	
codification	process	of	Islamic	law	started	during	the	Tanzimat	and	fully	




judicial practice and procedure in both criminal and civil matters. The 
state assumed complete control over all judicial authority by completely 
bringing both shari’ and nizamiye courts under its authority.42
The consolidation of state power over criminal law and its adjudica-
tion	 are	partial	 fulfilments	of	 the	CUP’s	 stated	goals.	When	addressing	
the Grand Assembly (Ottoman Parliament) in 1910, the Ottoman Grand 
Vizer,	İbrahim	Hakki	Pasha,	declared:
A constitutional government cannot govern according to the methods of an 
authoritarian regime [that is, Abdülhamid II’s ancien régime]. A constitutional 
government cannot accept or allow one law to be valid in one part of the 
country and not in another, or that soldiers are recruited from one portion of the 
population and not from another, or that a portion of the population would pay 
certain taxes while another portion is exempt.43
The ambiguity caused by utilising puberty to determine one’s age of 
accountability could not remain unchanged according to the ruling phi-
losophy of this new constitutional government and administration. All 
facets of life, law, religion, and politics had to be harmonised and uni-
formly applied. This CUP agenda appears to be equal parts pragmatism 
and idealism.
Rehabilitating the Delinquent Child: Islahhaneler 
(Reformatories)
The 1911 version of Article 40 places great emphasis on the ‘rehabili-
tation’	 of	 juvenile	 delinquents.	 It	 significantly	 augments	 the	 gradation	
of punishment according to the age stipulations set forth in the original 
article. In 1911, prisoners aged from fourteen to nineteen were not con-
sidered ‘full’ adults, and therefore, deserved lighter sentences than their 
adult counterparts. New provisions stipulate measures for the betterment, 
welfare, training, and ‘rehabilitation’ of the accused under the age of four-
teen.	Most	significantly,	however,	these	rehabilitative	provisions	were	to	
be determined by newly established ‘Cünha’ (minor criminal offence) 
courts. Court judges no longer automatically entrusted parents or guard-
ians of the child to supervise and rehabilitate their under- aged juvenile 
delinquent. Special courts were designated to determine the proper proce-
dure for the ‘correction’ and ‘rehabilitation’ of the child. Unlike its origi-
nal version, the revised Article 40 stipulated that children under fourteen 
be placed in reformatories (ıslahhaneler).
Ottoman	 reformatories	 originated	 in	 the	 Tanzimat	 period	 (1839–76)	
and	were	first	established	by	the	famous	Ottoman	bureaucrat	and	reformer,	
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Midhat	Pasha,	during	his	governorship	of	the	Danube	and	Niş	provinces	in	
the 1860s. Midhat Pasha originally intended these institutions to be special 
training and vocational schools for orphaned and indigent children in the 
above- mentioned provinces. They soon spread throughout the empire 
in order to assist in the manufacturing sector of the Ottoman economy. 
Separate reformatories were established for girls and boys and some were 
employed to make uniforms for the army and to train young artisans after 
the disbanding of the guilds. Still others were used to develop a new cadre 
of trained technicians to run the sultan’s factories. These modern schools 
and factories served technical, economic, and charitable purposes.44
Midhat	Pasha	specifically	commissioned	these	first	reformatories	as	a	
means of assisting in the relief of poor, orphaned juvenile refugees who 
were	flooding	the	empire’s	urban	areas	as	a	result	of	recent	wars	 in	 the	
Balkans and the Crimea. He legitimised these institutions by claiming 
to	draw	their	name	from	a	Quranic	verse	that	calls	for	the	improvement	
and reformation of orphans. During the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, 
the Ottoman administration continued to utilise these reformatories, but 
changed their name from ıslahhaneler (reformatories) to Hamidiye Sanayi 
Mekteb- i Alisi (Sultan Abdülhamid II’s Vocational School for Industry) in 
order to marginalise Midhat Pasha and take control of these institutions.45 
It	is	important	to	point	out	that	at	their	inception	and	for	the	first	fifty	years	
of their existence these nineteenth- century ıslahhanes were not centres of 
punishment or reform for juvenile delinquents. Even during the Second 
Constitutional	Period,	Ottoman	 journalists	 referred	 to	 the	Tanzimat	and	
Hamidian era reformatories as ‘orphanages’ instead of juvenile criminal 
correctional facilities.46 In fact, the only provisions made for children 
convicted of criminal behaviour prior to the Second Constitutional Period 
entailed either placing them under the strict supervision of their parents/
guardians or in prison.
The CUP’s prison reform programme for children under the age of 
fourteen	consisted	of	two	interrelated	policies.	The	first	required	the	com-
plete separation of juveniles from adult criminals and the second called 
for a focus on their rehabilitation. Reformatories (ıslahhaneler) were 
the key to achieving both of these priorities. The Prison Administration 
reintroduced ıslahhaneler into the Ottoman bureaucratic vernacular, but 
transformed them into centres of reform and rehabilitation for juvenile 
delinquents as detailed in a new penal regulation entitled Regulations for 
Reformatories (Islahhaneler Nizamnamesi), promulgated in the fall of 
1911.	Officials	circulated	this	new	regulation	concurrently	with	the	1911	
IOPC changes, the drafting of the comprehensive prison survey, and the 




Article 40, especially the portions stressing the rehabilitation of children, 
thus reinterpreting and expanding the role of the ıslahhane.	In	fact,	the	first	
article	of	 the	newly	written	Regulations	 for	Reformatories	 justified	 this	
transformation based upon the non- existence of a ‘suitable place within 
the Ottoman Empire’ to reform and rehabilitate juvenile delinquents under 
the	age	of	fourteen	as	mandated	by	the	revised	Article	40.	Ottoman	offi-
cials created these reformatories for the sole purpose of reforming juvenile 
criminal	offenders	and,	therefore,	they	should	not	be	conflated	with	exist-
ing institutions for the orphaned and indigent.47
The Prison Administration designed these new ıslahhaneler as places 
where juvenile delinquents under the age of fourteen would be separated 
from adult criminals, could serve their sentences in a healthy environ-
ment, obtain an education and suitable upbringing (terbiye), and would 
come to possess ‘proper character’. Juvenile delinquents would stay in 
these institutions until they reached the age of majority (eighteen years 
old).48 Ideally, these reformatories would be built far from cities in open- 
air locations with a preference given to agricultural areas. They were to 
accommodate both boys and girls, but were to separate the sexes into 
specially designated buildings. Their education would consist of special 
studies and training in modern curriculums grounded in the science of 
child development. These curriculums included lessons in reading and 
writing, proper behaviour, and industrial training so they could learn a 
trade and work in the empire’s factories. Both the reformatory’s director 
and instructors were required to be specialists in childhood development. 
Other regulations required each reformatory to implement proper health 
and hygiene practices, and keep a physician and chemist on staff. All 
employees, including staff, doctors, and teachers, were required to submit 
regular reports of their observations to the director. Daily routines for the 
children were to follow normal prison regulations and to consist for all 
inmates of lessons, work, and opportunities for religious worship. Their 
food was to be hot and prepared on site. Finally, off- site visitations with 
parents/ guardians or other relatives were prohibited.49
Children were rewarded for industriousness and for good behaviour, 
but they were punished for bad behaviour. If a child was a repeat offender 
then the punishments meted out became steadily more severe. Repeat 
offenders	were	first	placed	in	isolation,	in	the	place	of	which	they	would	
lose privileges, such as correspondence and on- site visits. If infractions 
continued, then the child’s clothing would be withheld (for a maximum of 
three days). If the behaviour persisted then food and water would be with-
held (for a maximum of three days). Finally, as the ultimate punishment, 
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their food, water, and clothing would all be withheld (for a maximum 
of three days). In the course of these punishments the physician was 
instructed to keep close watch over the juvenile to ensure his or her safety. 
These regulations, however, repeatedly stressed that the aim of these pun-
ishments was the child’s rehabilitation.50 The end goal of these reforma-
tories was to provide delinquent children with a safe environment where 
they would be housed, educated, trained, disciplined, and rehabilitated. 
Similar to their nineteenth- century namesakes (that still existed), these 
reformatories rehabilitated delinquent children by teaching them vital life 
skills and by providing them with modern educations, thus turning them 
into contributing members of society.
While the process of establishing these reformatories began in 1911, 
major progress was not made until 1916 when the CUP hired Dr Paul 
Pollitz	 as	 Inspector	General	 of	Prisons	 and	Penitentiary	Establishments	
for	 the	Ottoman	Empire.	As	mentioned	 in	Chapter	2,	Dr	Pollitz	contin-
ued, expanded, and oversaw a massive Ottoman prison reform campaign 
during WWI. Using IOPC Article 40 he successfully pressed for the 
expanded use of ıslahhaneler throughout the empire until his dismissal in 
1919. In addition to advocating for the construction of more reformatories, 
he also called for renting appropriate spaces for these institutions until 
suitable	edifices	could	be	built.51 Prior to his appointment, there appears 
to have been built only one reformatory for juvenile delinquents in the 
empire (Istanbul).52 By 1919 the Prison Administration had completed or 
was building sixteen reformatories in major population centres throughout 
the empire.
Reformatories, however, only dealt with those juvenile delinquents 
under the age of fourteen. There existed a still larger population of incar-
cerated children aged from fourteen to nineteen addressed by provisions 
in	Article	40.	In	lieu	of	reformatories,	Dr	Pollitz	implemented	a	pardoning	
campaign for incarcerated children aged from fourteen to eighteen that 
ended up releasing nearly half of those inmates early from prison.
Counting and Pardoning Juvenile Delinquents
Situations similar to those described above at Beni Saab prison were 
exactly what CUP prison reformers attempted to address by reform-
ing IOPC Article 40, creating a centralised Prison Administration and 
commencing sweeping prison reforms in 1911–12. The 1911 changes 
to	Article	40	were	immediately	reflected	in	the	1912	prison	survey.	The	




requested the number of prisoners who were aged fourteen and younger 
and those aged from fourteen to twenty, respectively, in addition to six 
other categories recording a prisoner’s age grouped according to ten- year 
increments.53
In the period from 1912 to 1917, the number of children under the 
age	 of	 fourteen	 in	 Ottoman	 prisons	 dropped	 significantly.	 In	 1911–12,	
Ottoman prisons incarcerated at least 241 children under the age of four-
teen: 234 males and seven females (see Chart 3.8). By 1917 only a handful 
of inmates under the age of fourteen remained in the prison system. It 
appears that CUP efforts to remove this age category of children from 
prison	were	largely	successful.	This	fact	is	confirmed	by	a	special	prison	
survey taken in 1917.54
As	 discussed	 in	Chapter	 2,	Dr	 Pollitz	 organised	 an	 extensive	 prison	
survey (izahat) beginning in late December 1916. Part of this survey con-
cerned the total number of the empire’s juvenile prisoners who were under 
the	age	of	nineteen.	Prison	officials	completed	this	survey	and	tabulated	its	
results by March 1917.55 The total number of people under the age of nine-
teen incarcerated in Ottoman prisons in 1916–17 was 1,676 out of a total 
prison population of 21,666. The vast majority of these juvenile delin-
quents were male. According to the survey, Ottoman prisons incarcerated 
only forty- nine female juveniles.56 This represents an enormous drop in 
the number of incarcerated young people according to statistics gathered 
in 1912. Ottoman prisons incarcerated at least 5,169 inmates under the 
age of twenty, 236 of whom were female, in 1911–12 (see Chart 3.8). 
Notwithstanding	this	precipitous	decline	in	juvenile	inmates	over	this	five	
year	span,	Dr	Pollitz	still	wanted	to	reduce	further	the	number	of	incarcer-
ated children within the empire’s prison system.
As	early	as	3	March	1917,	Dr	Pollitz	wrote	directly	to	the	Grand	Vizier,	
Talat Pasha, requesting the pardon of certain types of inmates as a way to 
ease	overcrowding.	He	offered	two	specific	proposals.	The	first	called	for	
the release of juvenile inmates (both male and female) under the age of 
nineteen who were well behaved, of good character, and who had served 
two- thirds of their sentences (regardless of whether they committed a 
felony or misdemeanour). Second, he proposed the release of adult prison-
ers, both male and female, who had between six months to a year left of 
their sentences. These prisoners also had to be well behaved and of good 
character. Only those incarcerated for lesser offences (cünha), however, 
were eligible for early release provided that they agreed to enter mili-
tary service.57	Dr	Pollitz	waived	 this	 requirement	 for	pardoned	 juvenile	
inmates.58
With	 the	approval	of	 the	Grand	Vizier,	 the	Ministers	of	 the	 Interior,	
Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire
184
Justice,	Finance,	and	War,	and	the	head	of	Parliament,	Dr	Politz	organised	
and	 oversaw	 a	 special	 prison	 survey	 to	 gather	 specific	 information	 on	
each juvenile delinquent incarcerated in the empire’s prisons. The survey 
commenced in mid- March 1917 and concluded on 26 April 1917 with the 
arrival of Beirut province’s statistics. The Ottoman Prison Administration 
quickly tabulated all the statistics into a master list.59
In	order	 to	determine	which	particular	 juvenile	 inmates	qualified	 for	
early release, this survey collected data that went far beyond simple 
numbers. The grand survey (izahat) of Ottoman prisons completed in 
March	1917	only	requested	overall	figures.	The	special	survey,	however,	
collected the children’s names, ages, dates of incarceration, time served, 
time remaining, and crimes committed.60 For example, in Istanbul peni-
tentiary (Dersaadet hapishane- yi umumi),	 prison	 officials	 recorded	 the	
above- mentioned details for a total of ninety inmates. All of these prison-
ers were male and all but eight were incarcerated for theft. The others were 
serving time for crimes ranging from assault and homicide to kidnapping 
and indecent sexual behaviour. Sentences ranged from sixty- seven days to 
seven years of incarceration. Of the ninety minors, only four were under 
the age of fourteen – two were thirteen years old, one was twelve, and 
one was eleven. All four were incarcerated for theft (sirkat) and their sen-
tences ranged from sixty- seven days to two years. These juvenile inmates 
hailed from various imperial and international locations, such as Mosul, 
Diyarbekir,	 and	Trabzon,	 as	well	 as	 Iran	 and	Greece.	For	 example,	 the	
eleven year- old inmate, Hasan bin Rasul, was given the designation of 
Iranlı (Iranian).61
According	 to	 the	 sources,	Ottoman	officials	 pardoned	 almost	 45	 per	
cent of all of the empire’s incarcerated juveniles (745 out of 1,676) as 
reported by the 1917 prison survey (izahat). These 745 inmates were not 
pardoned all at once, but they were released over a period that stretched 
from May 1917 to December of that year.62 This juvenile pardoning 
occurred simultaneously to the pardoning of adult inmates who met the 
afore- mentioned stipulations. For example, on 15 July 1917 the CUP 
Government,	including	the	Grand	Vizier,	various	cabinet	members,	heads	
of ministries, and the leader of Parliament pardoned ninety prisoners from 
the Istanbul penitentiary. Sixty- nine prisoners were adults and the remain-
ing twenty- one were people under the age of nineteen.63 On 13 December 
1917	the	same	Ottoman	officials	authorised	the	pardon	of	480	additional	
prisoners from various provinces and independent sub-divisions, includ-
ing	 Beirut,	 Antalya,	 İzmid,	 Mecca,	 and	 Haleb.	 The	 pardoned	 inmates	
included 346 adults and 124 children, all of whom met the stipulated crite-
ria for early release.64 By the end of 1917, the empire only had 931 inmates 
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who were eighteen years old or younger in its prisons. This represents an 
	enormous	reduction	in	juvenile	prisoners	compared	to	1912	figures.
Conclusion
In addition to removing large numbers of young people from prison 
through	pardons	 and	 the	 construction	of	more	 reformatories,	Dr	Pollitz	
strove to improve juvenile education, health, nutrition, and living stand-
ards.65	Neither	Dr	Pollitz,	the	Directorate	of	Prisons,	nor	the	Ministries	of	
the Interior and Justice viewed juvenile delinquents in the same light as 
they viewed adult inmates. As they saw it, it was imperative that the two 
groups be separated from each other so that adult criminals would not 
corrupt or physically harm the young people. The Ottoman administra-
tion and society both agreed that juvenile delinquents should be reformed 
and made into contributing members of society.66	Dr	 Pollitz	 continued	
to	change	the	nature	and	definition	of	childhood	in	the	Ottoman	Empire	
that built upon the efforts of the CUP and earlier administrations. He was 
not the harbinger of penal progress and Western standards of penology 
to the Ottoman Empire any more than Stratford Canning had been in the 
1850s. The empire already had its own long tradition of criminal justice 
and was in the midst of its transformation prior to either of these two indi-
viduals’	efforts.	What	Dr	Pollitz	did	was	re-	invigorate	and	better	integrate	
current Ottoman prison programmes and policies in order to help bring 
them to fuller fruition. This is exactly the case for the empire’s juvenile 
delinquents. Nothing he implemented was of his own making; he simply 
enforced and expanded existing Ottoman standards and programmes, 
some of which dated back to the 1850s. With his assistance, juvenile 
delinquency was more clearly delineated and differentiated from adult 
criminality	and	both	penal	codes	and	practices	reflected	broader	Ottoman	
sensibilities regarding childhood and punishment.
Today in the Republic of Turkey and other Middle Eastern successor 
states of the Ottoman Empire, adulthood or the age of majority, at least in 
the eyes of the state, begins at age eighteen. At this age, youths commence 
university studies or full- time employment, submit to military service, 
assume full accountability for their actions before the law, and, where 
available, obtain voting rights. The roots of this notion of the end of child-
hood and the commencement of accountability can be traced to the late 
Ottoman Empire, particularly the Second Constitutional Period. During 
this era, the CUP, the Prison Administration, the Directorate of Prisons, 
and	 Dr	 Pollitz	 successfully	 implemented	 many	 reforms	 regarding	 the	
welfare and legal status of children. These penal reforms, in  conjunction 
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with the establishment of scouting organisations and public education pro-
grammes,	changed	the	nature	and	definition	of	childhood	in	the	empire.	In	
state- controlled legal terms, criminal culpability was no longer dependent 
on	the	commencement	of	puberty,	but	set	at	a	fixed	age.
These developments introduced a grey area – adolescence – between 
the innocence of childhood and full maturation, during which a person was 
partially	accountable	for	her	or	his	actions.	Ottoman	officials	viewed	ado-
lescence as an important time of learning, growth, development, and prep-
aration, so that once adulthood was reached, the individual would be ready 
and able to build, defend, and serve the nation. The CUP’s assumption of 
power over the legal standing of children and its rationalisation of Islamic 
criminal	law	and	procedure	also	reflect	its	desire	and	ability	to	intervene	
more fully into the lives of the members of its population, especially at 
the individual and family levels. It was during the Second Constitutional 
Period that notions of state patriarchy, adolescence, and childhood became 
intimately linked to national survival within the modern Middle East.
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Conclusion
When British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Sir Stratford Canning, 
submitted his ‘Memorandum on the Improvement of Prisons in Turkey’ to 
Sultan Abdülmecid I in 1851, he summarised his observations of Ottoman 
prison conditions and administration accordingly:
In Turkey where prisons exist in every city and town of a certain extent, and 
where little attention has hitherto been paid to the science of constructing and 
administering them, there is ample room for improvement without any consid-
erable out lay. Much unnecessary bodily suffering, much of the evil resulting 
from moral contagion and from a corrupt and cruel exercise of authority not 
contemplated by the law, may be removed at once by a few judicious regula-
tions and corresponding arrangements. Even the adoption of these indispensa-
ble preliminaries to a more complete system of improvement could hardly be 
effected without some additional expense. But in the present advanced state of 
human knowledge and public opinion no government which respects itself and 
claims a position among civilised communities can shut its eyes to the abuses 
which prevail, or to the horrors which past ages may have left in that part of 
its administration which separate the repression of crime and the personal 
 constraint of the guilty or the accused.1
His report makes it clear that prison conditions were very poor and that 
administration	was	corrupt	and	inefficient,	but	he	noted	that	most	prob-
lems could be solved relatively easily and conditions improved.
Flash forward almost seventy years to 1919 and it appears that little had 
changed concerning Ottoman prison conditions and administration. A few 
months after the Ottoman Empire’s unconditional surrender to the Entente 
Powers	in	the	autumn	of	1918	and	their	occupation	of	Istanbul,	British	offi-
cials undertook an inspection of the city’s prison facilities. As mentioned 
in the Introduction, the purpose of this commission was to gain propa-
ganda to use against the ‘Turks’ in the upcoming Paris Peace Conference. 
The commission hoped to reveal the Ottomans’ barbaric and uncivilised 
nature	 and,	 therefore,	 demonstrate	 their	 unfitness	 for	 self-	rule.	 Many	
authorities were also looking for propaganda to vilify the empire’s image 
and undermine its status and prestige among India’s Muslim population. 
The British reports painted a graphic picture of Istanbul prison conditions.2
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Two	 British	 military	 officers	 (Commander	 Heathcote-	Smith	 and	
Lieutenant Palmer) together with the newly appointed Director of the 
Ottoman	Directorate	of	Public	Security	 (Husni	Bey)	conducted	 the	first	
prison	 inspections	on	7	December	1918	and	filed	 their	 report	 four	days	
later.3	The	report	described	horrific	scenes	of	prisoner	ill-	treatment,	mal-
nourishment, facility degradation, corruption, and woeful sanitary condi-
tions, although Commander Heathcote- Smith notably reported that he did 
not consider overcrowding to be a serious problem. He wrote that ‘a con-
siderable number [of prisoners] were recently released, and for a Turkish 
prison [it] is not unduly crowded’.4
According to the report, there were no prison uniforms or bedding. 
Prisoners	 slept	 on	 the	 floor,	 and	 the	 prison	 lacked	 discipline.	 Prisoners	
freely moved about the prison during the day, inside and out, and spent 
their time in idleness. At night, however, guards rounded up the prisoners 
and made them sleep in their assigned wards. Prisoners claimed that their 
treatment by the prison cadre was deplorable and that they were routinely 
beaten.5 They also complained of terrible health and hygiene conditions. 
Vermin were everywhere, because the prison was rarely cleaned and 
inmates had access to washing facilities only once every three or four 
months. Although separate sick wards were available, the ill received little 
treatment. The report also claimed that over the past several months, three 
or four prisoners, on average, died weekly.6
Regarding nourishment, prisoners were left mostly to fend for them-
selves. The state was supposed to provide food rations consisting of six 
ounces of bread and three ounces of a coarse wheatmeal soup (bulgar) per 
day. These rations, according to the prisoners, rarely reached them, because 
the	prison	director,	Hussein	Fuad,	routinely	stole	the	food	and	profited	from	
its sale. The report describes the prisoners as ‘merely a mob of half naked, 
lousy human beings with shrunken wasted bodies and ravenous eyes, 
gradually dying of starvation, cold and disease brought on by neglect’.7
The women’s ward was little better, despite the presence of several 
inmates with infants. There was utter disregard to the inmates’ nourish-
ment, and sick female prisoners were neglected. For example, one female 
prisoner had a severe case of typhus, but was not adequately quaran-
tined and thus posed an infectious threat to the other inmates. The report 
claimed that thirty- two female prisoners had died over the last two and a 
half months.8
As a result of this inspection it was proposed that allied military com-
manders visit all prisons throughout the empire in order to ascertain their 
respective conditions. Additionally, the entire prison system was placed 
under the direction of General Milne to whom orders had recently been 
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given to oversee issues pertaining to the empire’s police and public sanita-
tion.9 Commander Heathcote- Smith and Admiral Webb, therefore, under-
took a subsequent inspection of the same prison in late January 1919 in 
order to ascertain whether or not the Ottoman Government had addressed 
any of the concerns that were expressed in their initial report.10 Admiral 
Webb reported that ‘with the exercise of a considerable amount of moral 
pressure, and in the face of the usual Turkish evasiveness and procras-
tination, some reforms have at length been carried out.’11 Conditions, 
however, still remained horrendously poor. According to Webb:
Maison D’Arret [Sultanahmet Jail (Tevkifhane)] . . . is the place where men are 
confined	while	awaiting	trial	.	.	.	In	an	old	tumbled-	down	building	with	a	small,	
ill- paved courtyard, I found imprisoned 186 Moslem and Christian Ottoman 
Subjects. These were distributed among a variety of rooms each of which I 
visited in turn . . . On the ground which had been laid bare by the removal of 
the	boards	was	an	indescribable	collection	of	excrement	and	filthy	cast	off	rags	
of prisoners, the whole being a breeding place for vermin of all kinds. The 
prisoners were lying about on the boards and sometimes even on the bare earth, 
and	none	of	those	had	any	covering	other	than	the	filthy	rags	which	still	clung	
round	them.	The	squalor	and	filth	of	these	dens,	the	indescribable	stench	arising	
from them, the gloom even at mid- day relieved by tiny windows high up near 
the ceiling, and the total lack of ventilation, all these features formed a scene 
which I am not likely to forget.
	 Of	the	miserable	creatures	lying	or	sitting	about	on	the	ground	and	floors,	
subsequent medical examination showed that between 80% and 90% were suf-
fering	from	the	mange	(Scabies).	Quite	a	number	have	become	consumptive	
through	starvation	and	malnutrition,	and	many	forms	of	illness,	chiefly	Typhus	
and Syphilis were raging among them. There was not even pretence of their 
being given any medical attention. Their diet, which consisted of a very coarse 
and indigestible bread, is augmented once daily by a cupful of so- called soup, 
so repulsive in taste and smell that even the prisoners in their ravenous hunger 
often turned away from it in disgust. I smelt it and the stench was overpower-
ing; to taste it was impossible.
 The sanitary arrangements, or rather the lack thereof, are best left to the 
imagination. Baths were, of course, practically an unknown quantity, and even 
drinking water was so stinted that they clamoured loudly to be given some . . . 
What made the horror of these places even worse was that all were still await-
ing trial; a great majority had been there for over 4 months, many from 6 to 12 
months,	and	some	as	much	as	21	to	25	months.	It	is	difficult	to	understand	how	
any human being could survive 21 months or even 12 months of such treat-
ment, and of course the mortality has been extremely high . . . [T]he Turkish 
Government has at last been persuaded to take action in the matter. The whole 
system is so honeycombed with bribery and corruption that it is hopeless to 
expect any real improvement while the Turks remain their own masters.12
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As	 a	 result	 of	 these	 inquiries	 the	 Ottoman	 Grand	 Vizier	 Damad	 Ferid	
Pasha sent a letter assuring British authorities that all steps were being 
taken to remedy the awful situation that existed in these prisons. Namely, 
he related that new prison buildings were under construction and would 
be opened within the next few months; all inmates would be transferred to 
these	new	prisons;	and,	finally,	the	method	of	detention	currently	in	exist-
ence at the Istanbul Jail (Maison D’Arret) would be discontinued.13
These	 claims	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 carried	 out,	 as	 confirmed	 by	 two	
inspections conducted on 29 March 1919 and 3 April 1919 by Allied 
powers, with the presence this time of both French and British personnel.14 
The report written by the British High Commission of Constantinople 
dated 6 April 1919 claims that ‘regarding the appalling conditions 
prevalent in the Turkish prisons here, I have the honour to record that an 
improvement is now visible’.15 The Maison D’Arret was decommissioned 
and in the process of being torn down.16
Admiral Webb summed up his remarks by stating:
[T]he actual conditions of life for the prisoners were distinctly better; the food 
was more nourishing and almost palatable; the accommodation in use was 
somewhat cleaner, and the prisoners themselves had lost that haunted look 
which was so marked previously. It may reasonably be said, therefore, that the 
prison problem in Constantinople has temporarily ceased to be an acute one . . . 
In conclusion I may say that a great, if spasmodic, step forward has been taken 
in prison reform here, but I am more than ever convinced that were we to relax 
our vigilance the old state of things would inevitably recur.17
Despite these improvements, it appears that within less than a year condi-
tions	worsened	yet	again.	 In	February	1920,	allied	authorities	filed	 two	
additional reports, in French, about conditions in Ottoman prisons. The 
Internal Commission for the Inspection of Anatolian Ottoman Prisons 
submitted its report on 7 February 1920, whereas on 23 February 1920 
a delegation of French, British, and Italian Military Attachés and High 
Commissioners submitted their prison inspection report directly to the 
Ottoman Minister of the Interior. Both reports claimed that Ottoman 
prisons suffered from poor conditons. The second report, however, 
described the state of Istanbul’s penitentiary as one of a ‘reign of anarchy’ 
caused by severe overcrowding, poor hygiene, and tremendous prisoner 
suffering. It claimed that sustained prison improvement was not a prior-
ity for the post- war Ottoman government.18 Some prisoners attempted to 
take advantage of the Entente	occupation	by	petitioning	Greek	officials	to	
intervene	on	their	behalf	for	changes	and	relief	that	specifically	favoured	
Ecumenical and Armenian Christian inmates.19
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According to all of these inspections, sanitary and general living condi-
tions were so deplorable that it appeared that little had changed since the 
1850s. It is, therefore, easy to conclude that the Ottomans spent little time, 
effort, or resources on prison reform during the nineteenth century, despite 
repeated reprimands and urgings by Western powers to make reforms. 
Perhaps the stereotypes concerning the ‘Turkish’ prison and ‘Turkish’ 
barbarity and venality were well- deserved. This is, however, simply not 
the case. Conditions in ‘total institutions’ rapidly deteriorate if the institu-
tion is neglected and not adequately provisioned. These enclosed institu-
tions, including prisons, hospitals, and asylums, completely depend on the 
outside world for care and upkeep. With the loss of the war, the occupation 
of Istanbul, the expulsion of the CUP from power, and the commencement 
of the Turkish War of Independence, there was a general breakdown in 
all social services. The Ottoman Government, economy, military, police, 
and population were in complete disarray. Prisons became low priority for 
the	new	government.	Funds	were	directed	elsewhere	and	Dr	Pollitz	was	
relieved of his duties and sent back to Germany. This all resulted in the 
rapid deterioration of prison conditions and, thus, explains what the foreign 
inspectors found in 1918 to 1921.20 In fact, Charles Riggs, an American 
researcher living in Istanbul, wrote an article entitled ‘Adult Delinquency’ 
that detailed Istanbul’s criminal activities, courts, and prisons in 1920–1.21 
His report substantiates the Entente inspections, but instead of blaming 
‘Turkish venality’ for the poor conditions and high crime rates, he clearly 
attributes these conditons to the grave effects of war and occupation.22
In contrast to the prejudiced and orientalist claims of British, French, 
and other foreign inspectors, this book demonstrates that Ottoman authori-
ties exerted enormous efforts to transform the empire’s prisons and 
criminal justice system over the course of the nineteenth century in order 
to meet the challenges the empire faced as a result of internal crises and 
European encroachment. These efforts aimed at transforming the empire 
into a modern powerful state that possessed a monopoly on the use of 
force, particularly in terms of its military, policing, and the punishment 
of criminal offenders. Ottoman efforts to transform its criminal justice 
system and centralise its power over the adjudication of criminal matters, 
especially punishment, were not systematically progressive throughout 
the second- half of the nineteenth century. Each regime, however, built 
upon the efforts of its predecessors, thus making prison reform a key part 
of imperial transformation, shared ideals of civilisational progress, and of 
modern nation- state construction.
Ottoman prison reform culminated in the Second Constitutional Period, 
specifically	 during	WWI.	 In	 the	 face	 of	massive	 starvation,	 population	
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transfers, civil war, total war mobilisation, economic ruin, ethnic cleans-
ings, genocide, pandemic disease, insurrections, military campaigns, 
and imperial dismemberment, the CUP continued its prison reform cam-
paigns until its expulsion from power. The effort, time, resources, and 
energy expended on criminal justice reform by various regimes during 
the nineteenth century demonstrate the importance of prisons to overall 
imperial transformation. Notwithstanding these seemingly progressive 
reforms, they were also accompanied by devastating social engineering 
programmes that resulted in human atrocities comparable with contempo-
rary colonial and ‘civilisational’ projects around the world, such as those 
waged against Native- Americans, Congolese, various South Asian popu-
lations, Australian and Oceania Aborigines, and Black South Africans, 
to name only a few. This is the dark side of nation- state construction 
and modernity. This is the barbarity of the ‘civilised’ world to which the 
Ottoman Empire belonged.
Prisons do indeed act as prisms into broader nineteenth- century 
Ottoman politics, culture, and society. They are microcosms of impe-
rial transformation wherein many of the pressing questions of Ottoman 
modernity played out. Prison reformers addressed key imperial issues, 
such as administrative centralisation, the introduction of modern methods 
of governance, new concepts of time and space, industrialisation and eco-
nomic development, profesionalisation of government personnel, issues 
of gender and childhood, the rationalisation of penal law and practice, 
concepts associated with ethno- religious national identity, public health 
and hygiene, and the state’s assumption of greater responsibility for the 
welfare and supervision of its population. These efforts provide important 
insights into Ottoman sensibilities towards crime, punishment, and the 
role of the state in maintaining public order and rehabilitating criminals.
Ottoman efforts to transform the empire’s criminal justice system, 
however, do not constitute a process of secularisation and Westernisation. 
Penal reforms in the Ottoman Empire appropriated new approaches to 
governance and adapted them to existing norms, institutions, and prac-
tices. This hybridisation process created an entirely new dynamic of crimi-
nal justice and penality that was both fully modern and Ottoman. This 
new	dynamic	is	manifest	by	the	empire’s	codification	of	Islamic	criminal	
law, the adoption of incarceration as the primary form of criminal punish-
ment, the abrogation of qadi and local administrative punitive autonomy, 
and the standardisation of juvenile criminal culpability. Each of these new 
phenomena was grounded in Ottoman and Islamic cultural norms and 
sensibilities	that	were,	in	turn,	reinterpreted	and	reconfigured	to	meet	the	
challenges of the modern age.
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This study represents an interpretive endeavour concering the role that 
penal institutions played in Ottoman state construction that tests the appli-
cability of Western approaches and methodologies. Similar to the devel-
opment of Western European and North American states, the development 
and centralisation of modern penal institutions were central aspects of 
modern state construction in the late Ottoman Empire in terms of social 
control and discipline. This study argues, however, that Ottoman penal 
institutions represent much more than just apparatuses for imposing social 
control and discipline. Not only do prisons act as windows into Ottoman 
modernity from a state ideological and administrative perspective, but 
they also juxtapose these reform efforts with the everyday experiences of 
the incarcerated and prison cadre. When taken in aggregate, the reform 
and reality of prison life offer unique perspectives into prisoner agency, 
state ideology, and how state efforts are altered, adapted, and resisted by 
the objects of those reforms.
Ottoman prison reforms in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
achieved much. Efforts to remove children from prisons were largely 
efficacious.	 Officials	 eased	 overcrowding,	 improved	 overall	 health	 and	
hygiene conditions, built new prisons, and aggressively prosecuted and 
punished	 corrupt	 and	 abusive	 officials.	 Despite	 these	 improvements,	
prison	officials	and	inmates	still	faced	enormous	challenges,	such	as	dilap-
idated facilities, poor provisions and conditions, limited funds, continued 
overcrowding, escapes, breakdowns in discipline and order, corruption, 
and prisoner abuse. This close examination of Ottoman prison life demon-
strates the convoluted and complex nature of state and societal relations at 
its most basic level.
The collocation of reform and reality in Ottoman prisons overcomes the 
overly deterministic state- centric narrative of late Ottoman efforts at mod-
ernisation. In its place, a new narrative emerges revealing the dynamic 
created by the intersection of reform and the exercise of personal agency, 
wherein individuals accept, reject, appropriate, and augment various 
aspects of Ottoman modernity for their own interests. Ottoman attempts at 
reform should not necessarily be judged with moralistic labels of ‘success’ 
or ‘failure’. Instead, scholars should focus on how attempts at transfor-
mation affected human interactions and relationships, state policies and 
practices, and everyday life within the empire.
In 1926, Clarence Richard Johnson, a professor of sociology at 
Bucknell University in the United States who spent three years living, 
teaching, and researching in Istanbul after WWI, published an insightful 
article in the Journal of Applied Sociology entitled ‘Prison Conditions 
in Constantinople’. His article makes two very important observations 
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concerning Istanbul’s prisons. First, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk did not 
continue the progressive prison reforms of the late Ottoman era in the 
immediate post- war period. Johnson’s article describes Istanbul’s prisons 
as lacking internal order and discipline. Prisoners were poorly clothed, 
improperly provisioned, and not separated according to severity of crime. 
Most prisoners slept in open dorms with no beds and sat in idleness all 
day. No efforts were made to rehabilitate prisoners through education 
and productive labour. Crowded conditions persisted, leading to sickness, 
disease, and vermin infestations. Fights, smuggling, weapons making, and 
gambling were routine occurrences. In his opinion, however, the biggest 
threat to prison order was the prevalence of opium addiction and drug use 
in Istanbul’s prisons. He clearly states that the newly founded Republic 
of Turkey did not implement the regulations it inherited from its Ottoman 
predecessor.23
Second, Johnson’s article asserts that Istanbul’s prison conditions are 
comparable to those of seemingly more ‘civilised’ and progressed coun-
tries, especially the United States. In fact, while lamenting the awful con-
ditions found in the new republic’s prisons, he actually claims that they are 
better than those in the United States:
If we go to them [Istanbul’s prisons] having visited prisons in America, knowing 
something of the disgrace which all prisons are to our twentieth Century, if we 
try to see these prisons exactly as they are in the light of the whole prison 
problem, then one can say that on the whole the prisons of Constaninople are 
not so bad as one would expect them to be in a poverty- stricken country like 
Turkey. The nerve breaking, straight jacket system of many of our American 
prisons,	where	men	are	mere	machines,	and	where	prison	officials	seek	to	break	
the spirit of the inmates, seems to be happily lacking. Our American prisons 
are responsible for much insanity – never can I forget the horrible cries of the 
insane	men	in	solitary	confinement	which	I	heard	in	an	American	prison.	The	
prisons of Constantinople need to be reformed and they need it badly, but so do 
the American prisons, and the prisons in Constantinople are not such a disgrace 
to Turkey as American prisons are to the United States.24
These are remarkable words of national introspection coming from an 
American professor of sociology about the state of prison conditions 
throughout the world in the early twentieth century and about their com-
parability across cultures and borders on a global scale.
Ottoman prison conditions and reform efforts are indeed comparable 
to those found in other countries in the nineteenth century and in the early 
twentieth century. As various states across Latin America, Africa, Asia, 
Europe, and North America appropriated and adapted modern methods 
of governance and became incorporated into the Modern World System, 
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penal institutions became critically important for modern nation- state 
construction and transformation. European characterisations of penal 
practices outside of its borders as despotic, oriental, and barbaric must 
be tempered by reform efforts and prison realities in their own countries. 
They	must	 also	 be	 qualified	 by	 comparative	work	 on	 ‘Western’	 prison	
conditions and those in other global regions that allow for historical and 
regional	 specificity.	 Some	 work	 has	 already	 been	 done	 in	 the	 field	 of	
penal comparative research on a global scale, but more work is needed 
that integrates prisons and punishment into broader global criminal justice 
transformations in policing, courts procedures, and penal codes. More 
work must also be done that integrates these reform efforts with the reali-
ties of lived experience as individuals shaped, interacted with, utilised, 
and resisted modern criminal justice policies, practices, and institutions.
As mentioned above, many of the prison reforms discussed in this 
work do not appear to have been continued by the successor states of 
the Ottoman Empire. Similar to numerous reform programmes, ideal-
ism	 appears	 to	 have	 collided	 with	 pragmatism,	 financial	 constraints,	
and ‘national’ self- interest. Ethnic nationalisms have dominated Middle 
Eastern and South- eastern European states since the empire’s dismember-
ment and placed a premium on the punitive qualities of penal institutions 
for social control and discipline. It appears that efforts at prisoner rehabili-
tation, proper provisioning, and care have been mostly forgotten in con-
temporary Middle Eastern states. Ottoman efforts at criminal justice and 
penal reform, however, did lay an important foundation for the penal insti-
tutions, codes, and practices adopted by many states that emerged in the 
wake of the Ottoman Empire’s dismemberment and collapse. Any study 
of modern penal institutions and practices in former Ottoman  territories 
must take this foundation into account.
Notes
 1. BNA, FO 195/364, pp. 1–32. 
 2. BNA, FO 608/114/3, 608/114/4, and 608/52/13.
 3. BNA, FO 608/52/13, pp. 238–43.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid., pp. 239 and 241.
 6. Ibid., pp. 239–41. 
 7. Ibid., p. 240. 
 8. Ibid., p. 241.
 9. BNA, FO 608/52/13, p. 243.
10. BNA, FO 608/114/4, pp. 120–6.
11. Ibid., p. 120.
Prisons in the Late Ottoman Empire
200
12. Ibid., pp. 120–6.
13. BNA, FO 608/114/3, pp. 140–3.
14. Ibid., p. 151.
15. Ibid., p. 153.
16. Ibid., p. 154.
17. Ibid., pp. 154–6.
18. See BOA, DHMBHPSM 41/32 and 41/38.
19. In March and April 1921 a group of Ecumenical and Armenian Ottoman 
Christians incarcerated in Istanbul’s prisons petitioned Greek occupying 
officials	 to	 intervene	on	 their	behalf	 in	order	 to	 secure	 their	 release.	Their	
petition described very poor living conditions and the abuses they were sub-
jected	to	by	prison	officials	claiming	that	their	poor	treatment	resulted	from	
their Christian faith. The petitioners also pointed out that none of the guards 
or	prison	officials	overseeing	the	prison	were	Christians	and	this	needed	to	
be remedied in order to protect Christian rights. The petition is an interesting 
example of inmates exercising their agency to exploit Entente prejudices and 
interfaith rivalries in order to secure special privileges and better conditions 
(BOA, DHMBHPS 45/75). I would like to thank Elektra Kostopolous for 
translating this petition from the original Greek.
20. For a detailed discussion concerning problems and poor conditions in 
Istanbul’s prisons during the Entente	 occupation	of	 Istanbul,	 see	Yıldıztaş	
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Asayiş, Suç ve Ceza: 18.–20. Yüzyıllar.	Istanbul:	Tarih	Vakfı	Yurt	Yayınları,	
2007a, pp. 212–38.
——,	‘Hapishaneler	ve	Cezalandırmaya	İlişkin	Yaklaşımlara	Eleştirel	Bir	Bakış’,	
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